As nuclear doubts grow, Germany faces tough choices amid fears Trump’s NATO retreat could spark nuclear proliferation across Europe.
Any country with nuclear weapons can invade others without fear of retaliation. NATO bombed Belgrade to protect the Kosovars from Slobodan Milosevic, but Vladimir Putin faces no similar response for his aggression against Ukraine. The difference is stark: Russia possesses nuclear weapons, making the bombing of Moscow or St Petersburg unthinkable.
In Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, nuclear weapons no longer function as tools of deterrence aimed at preserving peace; rather, they serve as a protective shield enabling an illegal war of aggression. While the war remains conventional, fear of Russia’s nuclear arsenal constrains NATO allies, preventing them from supplying all the weapons Ukraine desires.
Nuclear deterrence effectively prevents war between nuclear states but did not stop Russia from attacking Ukraine that had a far inferior conventional army and lacked nuclear defences. NATO’s mutual defence clause, Article 5, has historically been interpreted as extending America’s nuclear protection to all members, since an attack on any NATO state would trigger war with the nuclear-armed United States. Thus, Article 5 serves both as a deterrent against Russia and as a guarantee designed to halt nuclear proliferation. Particularly after the horrors of the two World Wars, Western allies agreed on a security framework that would render an independent German army, let alone German nuclear weapons, unnecessary or impossible. As NATO’s first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, famously put it, NATO was designed “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”
The deeply rooted unease, felt not only by Russians, about a militarily powerful and nuclear-capable unified Germany is evident in the Two Plus Four Agreement: “The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.”
Yet, the true strength of America’s nuclear guarantee can only be tested in actual crisis. French President Charles de Gaulle famously questioned President Kennedy, asking whether the United States would truly risk trading New York for Paris. De Gaulle himself answered the question by developing France’s independent nuclear deterrent, the Force de Frappe.
Although the United States has not abandoned NATO, doubts similar to De Gaulle’s became widespread in Europe under Donald Trump’s presidency. President Emmanuel Macron has responded by offering an extension—or perhaps even an alternative—to American nuclear protection under France’s deterrent. However, Macron remains unwilling to share decision-making authority with other states. Would France genuinely “trade Paris for Berlin or Warsaw”? Donald Tusk, the former Polish prime minister, remains sceptical and does not rule out Poland pursuing its own nuclear capabilities. He has argued that Poland must acquire “the most modern capabilities related to nuclear and unconventional weapons,” describing this pursuit as “a race for security, not war.”
What would it mean for Germany if Poland—a country whose parliament, including members of Tusk’s Civic Platform, recently approved reparations demands against Germany totalling €1.3 trillion—could reinforce those demands with nuclear threats? Conversely, can Germany’s neighbours realistically desire a powerful German military if the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) could enter government within four years? Furthermore, what becomes of French protection if Marine Le Pen controls France’s nuclear codes?
The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency raises the danger of nuclear proliferation across Europe. The notion of a jointly controlled European nuclear weapon remains unrealistic without agreement on who would authorise its use in a crisis.
Should any NATO country conclude it cannot trust Article 5 protection and pursue its own nuclear arsenal, other nations within and outside NATO will inevitably follow. Preventing such a scenario is crucial for international security. Complaining that wiser decisions yesterday might have prevented today’s dangers is futile; what matters now is decisive action to avoid spiralling nuclear proliferation driven by fear.
The first step should be a clear-eyed assessment of Russia’s threat and Europe’s defensive capabilities. Europe, with 500 million people and ten times Russia’s economic and industrial capacity, must realistically assess its defence against a Russian military that has struggled for three years to overcome Ukraine—a country with just 30 million people and an economy one-tenth the size of Russia’s. Given that a nuclear first strike is improbable, Europe primarily requires a robust conventional defensive capability to deter Russia effectively and discourage future aggression. Supporting Ukraine remains essential, as the Ukrainian military will continue playing a significant role in deterrence even after the ceasefire sought by the United States. Military investments should prioritise defensive capacity over offensive power wherever technically feasible.
Considering Europe’s immense advantage in resources and population, the repeated claim that Russia could build sufficient military power within two to three years to attack NATO countries is exaggerated. Such alarmist rhetoric may stem less from objective analysis than from military-industrial interests or panic. Debate on increasing military budgets and procurement must focus on genuine defence needs rather than outspending each other. Does a modern army truly require tanks and aircraft costing €5 million and €100 million each, respectively, or would it benefit more from thousands of combat drones? Why, despite annual defence spending of €50 billion, is Germany’s Bundeswehr still ineffective? Arms manufacturers prefer profitable sales, but what is good for Rheinmetall is not necessarily best for the Bundeswehr.
Asking these questions does not oppose necessary increases in defence spending but insists that purpose dictate expenditure. It is clear that Germany’s “debt brake” has always been economically senseless and now poses a genuine security risk. The incoming coalition government of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats agreed in a hasty last minute deal with the Green Party to use their two third majority in the outgoing parliament to abolish the debt brake for military expenditure including support for Ukraine and agree a 500 billion euro credit authorisation for additional investment in infrastructure and climate protection. The decision itself to basically abandon the debt brake was long overdue and liberates Germany from self-inflicted financial shackles. However the decision making process itself – while perfectly legal – suffers from limited legitimacy as the three parties will not have the required two third majority in the already elected new parliament. This extraordinary step has been justified by equating the AfD and the Left as a unified “blocking minority” of extreme parties, falsely conflating a democratic left-wing party with an extremist far-right group. Neither Social Democrats nor Greens, both currently governing with the Left Party at regional level, should indulge in this narrative. Offering a dialogue to the Left Party would have shown that there is a willingness to search for a two third majority of democratic forces in the new parliament. It would also have been a test of the readiness of Die Linke for real-world politics and might have even increased the chances for a stronger social dimension in the 500 billion investment package.
Ensuring adequate defence capability does not relieve Europe from the responsibility of reducing tensions with Russia. Initiating dialogue based on mutual distrust may seem difficult, but dismissing diplomacy entirely risks leaving Europe sidelined while Russia and the US negotiate Europe’s future elsewhere, such as in Saudi Arabia. Navigating this delicate balance—reducing risks without appeasement—is the art of pragmatic diplomacy. Such diplomatic skill is crucial to ensuring that increased military strength enhances security rather than escalating into a dangerous arms race.
Frank Hoffer is non-executive director of the Global Labour University Online Academy.