Written by Jasper Roctus.
Image credit: A-bian at 228 Memorial by david3108/ Flickr, license: CC BY-SA 2.0.
After eight years of control over the executive and a legislative majority, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) retained the presidency in Taiwan’s January 2024 general elections but lost its hold on the Legislative Yuan. This outcome, driven in no small part by growing public fatigue with persistent political polarisation, has only been followed by heightened political turbulence. Against this backdrop, revisiting a rare moment of bipartisanship from two decades ago offers insights into the possibilities – and limits – of political reconciliation in Taiwan.
Chen Shui-bian: Not Just Any Green President
In February 2005, the DPP’s incumbent president, Chen Shui-bian, met with James Soong, who represented the People First Party (PFP). Soong and his PFP had allied themselves to Lien Chan of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which the ever-volatile Soong had defected from after much intraparty drama in 1999, prior to the March 2004 presidential elections to prevent another pan-Blue vote split like the 2000 presidential elections, which had handed the victory to Chen in a plurality (39 per cent to Soong’s 37 per cent and Lien’s 23 per cent). Lien, Soong, and other Blue forces also intended to discuss a merger of their parties after the election. However, Chen, subjected to a much-speculated assassination attempt one day before the elections, ultimately defeated the Lien-Soong unity ticket with the narrowest of margins in March 2004 (50.1 to 49.9 per cent). As expected, however, the pan-Blue camp maintained its legislative majority in the December 2004 legislative elections over the DPP-led pan-Green camp. Chen’s legislative woes – the DPP would only seize its first-ever legislative majority in 2016 – seemed bound to continue.
Technically, however, a defection of the Soong’s PFP’s 34 seats – much less than the equality with the KMT (79 seats) Soong had desired – could hand the pan-Green camp (101 seats) a majority in the (then) 225-seat Legislative Yuan. This idea was also not as farfetched as it might seem under the hindsight of Chen’s “Green radicalisation” during his final two years in power. Sure, Chen had already discarded some of the rather “Blue” outreaches from his first two years in power – in 2000, Chen still spoke of “shared [cross-Strait] blood ties” (相同的血緣] and offered flowers in Chiang Kai-shek’s controversial Memorial hall – and had, after Beijing and the pan-Blue opposition refused to reward him for such efforts, conceptualised his “One country on each side [of the Taiwan Strait]” (一邊一國) in August 2002. However, Chen still stayed clear of more radical initiatives by “Deep Green” forces. In the run-up to the 2004 legislative elections, for example, Chen had stood below the portrait of KMT founder Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who had been elevated to the “Father of the Nation” (國父) of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1940 but had few ties to Taiwan, and clarified that Sun would remain the ROC’s “Father of the Nation” – a decision that still stands as of 2025. As of February 2005, Chen often invoked the ire of Deep Green adherents for his reluctancy to pursue de jure Taiwanese independence and maintained his “Four Noes and One Without” (四不一沒有) pledge that promised he would maintain the ROC and its related symbols and institutions.
2005: Soong Meets Chen and Heads to Beijing
So back in February 2005, when after a historic meeting, Chen Shui-bian and James Soong surprised both edges of the political spectrum by drawing up a joint statement outlining ten key points to further Taiwan’s development and guide cross-Strait relations. The statement emphasised that ensuring permanent peace in the Taiwan Strait and normalising relations – including Beijing’s desired “Three Links” (三通) – were critical for safeguarding the ROC’s national interests. It reaffirmed the ROC constitution in line with Chen’s “Four Noes and One Without” while simultaneously calling for constitutional reforms that would not affect its sovereignty and would “maintain the status quo” (維持現狀) – a stance on cross-Strait relations that has only grown in popularity since then. The agreement also addressed the need to improve Taiwan’s defence capabilities without triggering an arms race and promote ethnic harmony and equality. Finally, it called for a new “sincere” (真誠 – the meeting’s omnipresent slogan) political spectrum that could reach out beyond the Blue-Green divide on issues of national interest such as cross-Strait relations.
Considerable cross-Strait developments followed Chen and Soong’s February agreement. Although the pan-Green camp ultimately did not gain a majority in the December 2004 legislative elections, which Beijing had feared, the PRC promulgated its Anti-Secession Law (反分裂國家法) on March 14, 2005. This authorised the use of non-peaceful measures if Taiwan were to declare independence or if all peaceful options were considered to have been exhausted. Despite this, the KMT decided to continue its rapprochement with the CCP that had taken shape over the preceding years and sent a delegation to Beijing headed by Lien Chan. Lien’s trip, lasting from April 26 to May 3, was hailed as a “peace journey” (和平之旅) by the KMT and culminated in a joint communique with Hu Jintao calling for adherence to “one China” and regular cross-Strait exchanges between the two parties.
Although today, this trip is generally remembered as “the pan-Blue visit of 2005” or “the moment the leaders of the CCP and KMT met for the first time since 1945,” there were actually pan-Blue visits. In May 2005, James Soong attempted to outshine – and was initially successful as expectations in Taiwan were sky-high – Lien by embarking on a “bridge-building trip” (搭橋之旅) to China and also met with Hu Jintao. Some expected Soong to convey messages of goodwill from Chen to Beijing – or even to discuss a peace treaty under their February agreement. However, the meeting’s outcomes largely mirrored those of the Lien-Hu meeting, aside from a clearer acknowledgement that the two sides’ definitions of “one China” differed and expressed willingness to help expand Taiwan’s international space (e.g., WHO membership) – albeit only on the condition of accepting “one China,” a no-go for Chen.
Whether Soong truly served as Chen’s emissary in May 2005 – and if so, whether he had refused to transmit Chen’s overtures or Hu had declined to entertain them – remains unclear. Ultimately, the Chen-Soong cooperation quickly deteriorated as constitutional amendments and legislative reforms proposed that year were unfavourable to smaller parties like the PFP. Their agreement was finally consigned to history when an increasingly frustrated Chen abandoned his “Four Noes and One Without” policy in early 2006, and the PFP fully rejoined the pan-Blue camp in obstructing Chen’s Deep Green policies in the Legislative Yuan. The PFP subsequently gradually marginalised as a political force, and has failed to reach the electoral threshold since 2020.
Two Decades Onwards
Twenty years on, Taiwan once again faces an effective “Blue” majority in the Legislative Yuan, with the KMT and the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) aligning against DPP president Lai Ching-te. This legislative majority has pushed through controversial bills aimed at curbing executive powers, particularly in budgetary control and defence spending – a highly sensitive issue as the Trump administration has pressured Taipei to significantly increase military spending. The Legislative Yuan’s actions have ignited public protests and fierce confrontations within the chamber, while numerous recall petitions target dozens of lawmakers across the political spectrum. Meanwhile, cross-Strait relations also appear to be at an all-time low, with Xi Jinping showing even less willingness than his predecessor to acknowledge any cross-Strait agency from Taipei. The latest developments are Beijing’s blunt threat that “we are going to get you – sooner or later” (早晚要來收了你們) and Lai’s response of labelling China a “foreign hostile power” (境外敵對勢力) and reviving military tribunals to deal with CCP infiltration.
Given the vastly different stakes compared to 2005 – few harbour the illusion that Lai could offer Xi anything short of support for unification that he would be willing to entertain – it isn’t easy to draw direct lessons from the Chen-Soong meeting. Nonetheless, overcoming Taiwan’s polarisation was also the original vision of the TPP, which positioned itself as a “White” force beyond the traditional partisan divide by focusing on domestic issues. Yet, any prospect of a parallel DPP-TPP détente seems improbable following the indictment of TPP leader Ko Wen-je on corruption charges. The case has infuriated the TPP, which accused the DPP of orchestrating a campaign of “Green Terror” (綠色恐怖). In turn, this has further solidified the TPP’s alliance with the KMT, reinforcing the entrenched Blue-Green divide rather than bridging it.
While, in the short term, partisan divisions thus may seem insurmountable and cross-Strait relations beyond salvaging, all parties would do well to remember that even figures as politically opposed as Chen Shui-bian and James Soong were able to ‘sincerely’ agree that:
All political parties should embrace greater tolerance and goodwill, respecting the perspectives and ideals of different parties and ethnic groups. Only with such wisdom can we break through domestic political divisions and the current cross-Strait stalemate. We firmly believe no conflict is unsolvable, no hatred is irreconcilable, and no historical grievances are insurmountable. Only by truly emerging from the political shadows of the past fifty years can the nation embrace new opportunities for overall development.
Jasper Roctus is an Associate Fellow at Egmont working on domestic Chinese p olitics and cross-Strait Relations. He is also pursuing a PhD in the “East Asian Culture in Perspective: Identity, Historical Consciousness, Modernity” research group at Ghent University, where he works on evolutions in narratives surrounding Sun Yat-sen. His “PhD Fellowship fundamental research” is funded by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO) .
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Taiwan’s Budget Crisis’.