Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2nd R) visits the peak of Hermon Mount (Jabal al-Sheikh) on the Syrian side of the border after the fall of the Baath regime in Syria on December 17, 2024. [Ma'yan Toaf / Israel GPO - Anadolu Agency]
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2nd R) visits the peak of Hermon Mount (Jabal al-Sheikh) on the Syrian side of the border after the fall of the Baath regime in Syria on December 17, 2024. [Ma’yan Toaf / Israel GPO – Anadolu Agency]
Ever since the Israeli government and military failed to intercept the Hamas attack on 7 October, 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has focused on shifting the blame onto senior security and military officials. This deliberate effort appears aimed at deflecting public scrutiny from his own share of responsibility for the unprecedented breakdown.
Despite a wave of resignations among senior military and security officials — including Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi — Netanyahu has refused consistently to heed widespread Israeli demands to establish an official commission of inquiry into the events of 7 October. He is fully aware that the commission’s primary recommendation would likely be his own dismissal and that it would hold him chiefly accountable for this historic failure.
In recent weeks, Netanyahu has embarked on a coordinated effort to restructure the leadership of the military and intelligence communities. This initiative appears intended to sideline figures he perceives as adversarial and install individuals more amenable to his agenda, facilitating the implementation of his domestic and foreign policy objectives. The most recent example of this effort is the dismissal of the Director of the Shin Bet internal security agency, Ronen Bar.
Netanyahu has been accused by Israelis of exhibiting a profound detachment from reality, particularly in his handling of prisoner exchange negotiations with Hamas. He has blamed others repeatedly for obstructing progress and has attempted to discredit senior security officials, accusing them of orchestrating targeted leaks against him. These alleged leaks, he claims, have emboldened Hamas and hardened its negotiating position, setting the stage, in the eyes of the Israeli public, for justifying the removal of these officials.
The prime minister’s behaviour follows a familiar pattern: strategic leaks, evasion of accountability and gauging public response. However, the public has grown increasingly sceptical of his narrative. Following the removal of Halevi, Netanyahu appointed his preferred general, Ayal Zamir, whose views align closely with his own political and strategic outlook.
READ: Majority of Canadians support continued arms ban on Israel, arrest warrant for Netanyahu: Poll
Zamir will now face a critical test: whether to comply with the expectations of the prime minister who appointed him over other candidates mainly for political reasons, or to adhere to the professional assessments of the military’s strategic planning divisions, which remain at odds with Netanyahu’s political leadership. This tension may prompt Zamir to carry out broad organisational changes, replacing key personnel with a leadership team more aligned with his vision.
The focus has now shifted to Bar, who was appointed in October 2021 and whose term was scheduled to run through to October 2026.
In the aftermath of the Hamas attack, Bar accepted responsibility and acknowledged the agency’s failure. He became a target for Netanyahu and his political allies, who subjected him to intense public and political pressure culminating in his recent dismissal. He must now wait until the Supreme Court considers a number of petitions submitted in opposition to his dismissal.
Critics often refer to Netanyahu’s propaganda apparatus as a “poison machine”, accusing it of smearing senior security and military officials to obscure facts and rewrite the narrative. Seventeen months have passed since the attack, yet no official commission of inquiry has been established to examine the systemic failures that led to the events of 7 October.
It is important to recognise that Israel’s military, government and leadership all share responsibility for the catastrophic failures of that day. However, Netanyahu has placed personal blame for the stalled negotiations squarely on Bar. His campaign against the Shin Bet head reflects Netanyahu’s long-standing strategy to manipulate public perception, and deflecting blame from his direct responsibility, while hiding behind his position as prime minister and attempting to distance himself from failure.
As Netanyahu continues to portray himself as the only leader capable of withstanding international pressure, he concurrently casts figures within the military and security establishments as obstacles to Israel’s goals in the hostage negotiations with Hamas, blaming their “flawed” decisions for leading the country towards negative outcomes.
It was for this reason that he removed Mossad Director David Barnea as the lead in the ceasefire and hostage release negotiation team. This move sparked deep concern among the families of the hostages, prompted a backlash from the security establishment and — once again — fuelled the ongoing political conflict between Netanyahu’s supporters and his opponents.
Many observers believe that the new head of the negotiation team, Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, will serve merely as a proxy for Netanyahu, a conduit for messages and an uncritical implementer of the prime minister’s decisions.
Barnea’s removal is viewed widely as a disgrace, taking out a man who symbolises the strength of Israel’s intelligence community.
He leads an organisation that has played a central role in safeguarding Israel’s security with operations spanning all six continents. His replacement in the negotiations, by contrast, has never served in uniform, and his primary qualifications appear to be his American background and fluent English, free of any Israeli accent, raising concerns about his fluency in Hebrew. He remains largely unknown to the Israeli public, who question his fitness for such a critical role.
Moving Barnea from the negotiations team came at a time when, according to Netanyahu’s critics within Israel, the state is undergoing a profound collapse. A large segment of the population is burdened by war and finds itself powerless in the face of a predatory government concerned solely with its own survival, even at the cost of endangering the lives of the hostages. This reality has prompted urgent questions and public outcry over the silence of the heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet regarding decisions that directly affect the country’s security and future.
These security officials have a duty to speak the truth and help steer the country away from further deterioration. They are aware of realities unknown to most Israelis about Netanyahu’s conduct, the failures of his government, and the lethargy of a political opposition whose silence and inaction have enabled the government to continue dragging the country towards the point of no return. Barnea and Bar need to speak out, but almost certainly won’t.
READ: Israeli army’s Gaza Division commander resigns over 2023 attack
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
Unless otherwise stated in the article above, this work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. If the image(s) bear our credit, this license also applies to them. What does that mean? For other permissions, please contact us.