At the Munich Security Conference in February, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described his country as a “steadfast constructive force in a changing world.” In other words, the US may change from one election cycle to the next, but China will not.
Following on the heels of speeches by German President Frank Steinmeier, and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, Wang Yi’s message that “China has always seen in Europe an important pole in the multipolar world” as well as his insistence that “the two sides are partners, not rivals” slotted neatly into the larger theme of the “multi-polarization of the world” that was the banner headline for this year’s top-level political gathering at the Bayerischer Hof.
The message was straightforward: In a transatlantic relationship marked by growing tensions between Washington and key European capitals, especially Berlin, China stood ready to assume the role of reliable partner as a country committed to creating an “equal and orderly multipolar world” (translation — a world “freed” of a preeminent US).
Beijing has reason to be pleased with the state of its relations with key European countries. For nearly a decade China was Germany’s number one trading partner, and while it slipped in 2024 on account of contentious automobile exports, the overall economic relationship between the two countries continues to loom large.
In fact, Berlin voted against EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles even though they flouted the World Trade Organization’s rules to offset China’s automotive subsidies. The reason was straightforward: Germany wants to protect its vehicle exports to the People’s Republic as vital to the country’s economic recovery. Berlin’s decision reflected the fact that certain sectors of its export-driven economy have become highly reliant on the Chinese market, and that what was once touted as a path to neoliberal “complex interdependence” has morphed into the straightforward dependence of Germany on China.
Much like Germany, albeit not to the same extent, France remains deeply dependent on its ties to the Chinese economy. In 2024 China’s surplus in its trade with the EU reached €1 trillion ($1.1 trillion), raising alarms in Paris and Brussels.
The situation is not much better across the European Union (EU), with the picture even more challenging when it comes to R&D and research in AI and quantum computing, areas where the Europeans continue to lag. In cutting-edge industrial research, Europe is playing catch-up with China and the United States, with no clear path forward.
Europe’s economic dependence must be weighed against what until recently appeared to be the strong and growing resistance to Chinese influence articulated at the 75th NATO anniversary summit in Washington, particularly when it comes to “de-risking” from Beijing. But with growing tensions across the Atlantic, China is now well-positioned to exploit its strong economic position as Europe’s increasingly indispensable economic partner.
China calculates that it has significant leverage. No other power or trading bloc can match its sheer heft. And given the increasingly difficult transatlantic relationship and the incoming chancellor’s publicly stated position that Germany — and Europe overall — must become more self-reliant and less dependent on the United States for security, Beijing will likely position itself as a “disinterested party.”
It will make the case that it is geographically removed from the continent yet invested in its welfare and intent on shaping Europe’s transition to a world in which the American global commitment to European defense and free trade are no longer a given. This will be a powerful position, especially if the United States ends up in a trade war with the EU, imposing tariffs on its exports to the US as the Trump administration recently threatened.
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What sort of reception does this get in Europe? Europeans appear divided. Friedrich Merz, the incoming German Chancellor, has spoken of the need for “independence from America,” while Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer has instead convened a summit to chart a course on the future of Europe’s assistance for Ukraine while refusing to match US tariffs on UK steel.
If China seeks to offer hard security — with Beijing’s potential peace-keeping role in post-war Ukraine a real possibility — this would carry with it the seeds of a fundamental remaking of Europe’s security architecture, with long-term implications for the Atlantic theater and the peace and stability of Eurasia.
In such a scenario, China would become a broker in the conflict as well as a de-facto “peacemaker,” potentially serving as the power ultimately underwriting the freezing of — and possibly even ending — the Russia-Ukraine war.
The war in Ukraine has already seen several “firsts” when it comes to China and its allies playing an outsize role in a conflict in the European theater, including Chinese supplies to Russia and North Korean personnel deployed in combat on Moscow’s side. These are in and of themselves dramatic indicators of the extent to which traditional assumptions about what is conceivable when it comes to Europe’s security have been turned on their head.
Should China become a behind-the-scenes broker of peace in Ukraine and a guarantor of Europe’s stability and security — even if only partly — this would amount to a dramatic change in Europe’s security and defense landscape.
We are at a potentially historic moment, both when it comes to the future of Europe and the transatlantic alliance as well as the role that a great Asian power may play on the continent.
Nothing is preordained, and relations between Washington and its European allies could stabilize in the coming months. Perhaps the current storm will clear, and the relationship will remain within its traditional parameters.
Even then, however, China’s growing economic influence in Europe has now been augmented by a heretofore absent hard security enabler, i.e., the role Beijing can play as a mediator to bring an end to the most brutal, full-scale war on the continent since 1945.
Should China successfully leverage this opportunity, it will become a “power in Europe,” regardless of its geographic and cultural distance.
This would truly be a revolution in European security affairs, with the consequences reverberating both across the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Chels Michta is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former CEPA Title VIII Fellow and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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