A rural landscape from Tunisia (c) Hichem kaouane - shutterstock
Tunisia's increasing energy demand, depleting oil and gas reserves, limited access to foreign currency, and dependence on Algerian gas have significantly strained its energy sector and national budget (Council of Energy Sciences, 2023). Despite these challenges, the country’s energy transition has remained largely stagnant over the past decade (World Bank, 2024). Recent shifts in national governance and geopolitical developments have created conditions that could accelerate the deployment of renewable energy (Al Bawsala, 2024). The rise in authoritarianism under President Saied, following his July 25th coup, and its subsequent influence on the governance of the energy sector appear to have unblocked some long-standing barriers to renewable energy expansion. These political changes align with Europe’s carbon neutrality goals for 2050 and its escalating energy crisis since 2022, which prompted the EU to prioritize “green” energy security and reduce its dependence on Russian gas (EC, 2022). This agenda includes importing renewable energy, particularly green hydrogen, from North Africa—positioning Tunisia as a potentially key player in this evolving landscape.
Against this backdrop, Tunisia has set ambitious goals for its energy transition, aiming to increase the share of renewables to 35 percent of its energy mix by 2030 (MoIME, 2023). Since 2021, an initial wave of concessions approved 500 MW of renewable energy projects (El Amine, 2023). This was followed by the launch of a second phase targeting the installation of 1,700 MW under the 2024–2027 concession scheme (Zawya, 2024). Within this framework, the Ministry of Industry Energy and Mines, in collaboration with international actors, envisions transforming Tunisia into a “green growth engine” (World Bank, 2024). The action plan to meet these targets is driven by large-scale, foreign, and private sector-led projects, as well as investments in green hydrogen initiatives intended primarily for export (MoIME, 2023).
While these developments have been presented as “win-win solutions,” they have not been without contestation. Trade unions and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) initially opposed and blocked this trajectory, citing concerns over job security and socio-economic impacts (Depluche and Poletti, 2021; Ben Rouine and Roche, 2022; Ben Ammar, 2022; Louati, 2022; El Amine, 2023). From strikes, sit-ins, and protests to the blockade of a solar farm project in Tataouine, resistance to large-scale, foreign-led renewable energy projects emerged over the years. In response, there has been an increasing call for alternative energy transition pathways that prioritize energy sovereignty and justice, democratic participation, and community ownership through decentralized solutions (Ben Ammar, 2022).
However, at this point, energy transition pathways remain confined to strategies, agreements, and Memorandums of Understanding with limited tangible outcomes. This gap highlights the need for a critical assessment of potential trajectories, particularly from socio-economic and justice perspectives. In this context, key questions become pertinent: what does Just Transition mean in the Tunisian context? Who are the winners and losers of this transition? Who benefits and who is left behind? How will this transition be financed and who bears the costs? What role, if any, can CSOs play in shaping inclusive and equitable processes and outcomes? Lastly, can a just transition truly occur in the face of Tunisia’s deepening erosion of democracy?
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
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