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Opinion: Russian Propaganda With a Spray Can

A recent investigation by Austria’s Directorate for State Security and Intelligence Services (DSN) has uncovered a large-scale Russian disinformation campaign orchestrated through a suspected Bulgarian spy. The operation aimed to manipulate public opinion in Austria and other German-speaking regions to discredit Ukraine amid the Russian ongoing full-scale aggression against the neighbouring nation.

The campaign, which targeted German-speaking countries with a particular focus on Austria, involved spreading false narratives both online and offline. Tactics included social media manipulation and the use of provocative materials – such as stickers and graffiti – designed to appear pro-Ukrainian but containing extremist content, thereby discrediting genuine support for Ukraine.

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The Bulgarian suspect acted as a liaison for Russian operatives and helped distribute propaganda materials in Austria and Germany. The investigation is ongoing, with confessions from those involved confirming the operation’s ties to Russia.

The uncovered campaign once again highlights that Russian propaganda often extends beyond simply promoting narratives that portray Russia favourably. In some societies targeted by Russian political warfare, this approach may not succeed due to historical or cultural factors.

For example, in countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states, it may actually be counterproductive to spread overtly pro-Russian propaganda or to amplify pro-Russian voices.

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These nations are known for their deep-rooted scepticism of Russia, prompting the Kremlin to adopt a different approach. Rather than promoting “love for Russia” – which would likely have the opposite effect – Russian operatives and agents tend to disseminate messages with either anti-Ukrainian or anti-EU themes.

In the former case, the objective is to undermine social support for Ukraine’s defensive efforts; in the latter, the goal is to cast doubt on EU-level policies towards Russia and its aggression against Ukraine.

At present, it is unclear what specific actions the Russian-sponsored campaign in Austria entailed. However, one particular case appears to align with the DSN’s description of Russian propaganda materials being placed “at symbolic locations such as memorials honouring Russian soldiers”.

On 26 March 2022, graffiti featuring the symbol of the Azov Regiment appeared on a wall painted in Ukrainian national colours behind the Soviet War Memorial at Vienna’s Schwarzenbergplatz. The graffiti also included the word “A$OV” – a distorted version of either the English “Azov” or the German “Asow”. As might be expected, the incident was widely reported by Russian officials and pro-regime media.

If pro-Kremlin agents were indeed behind the graffiti at Schwarzenbergplatz – thus capitalising on Austria’s sensitivity towards symbols associated, within Austrian society, with the crimes of the National Socialist regime – their aim appears twofold.

On one hand, Russian agents sought to pressure local authorities into removing the Ukrainian yellow and blue colours from Vienna’s Schwarzenbergplatz.

On the other, they aimed to reinforce one of Russian propaganda’s most notorious narratives: the false claim that Ukraine is a neo-Nazi state.

The Austrian investigation also points to the direct involvement of Russian state agencies in malign influence operations across Europe, as the DSN has linked the Bulgarian suspect to the Russian intelligence services.

In practice, most recent Russian influence operations in the West appear to be collaborative efforts between Russian private consultancy firms and state agencies. One prominent example of such collaboration is the Social Design Agency (SDA), a Russian PR and propaganda firm specialising in psychological operations and influence campaigns. The SDA has played a key role in crafting and disseminating disinformation to manipulate public opinion abroad, particularly in European societies, with the goal of sowing division and promoting pro-Russian narratives.

The SDA was founded and is led by Russian political consultant Ilya Gambashidze. His team, which spearheads political warfare efforts, includes not only consultants like Nikolai Tupikin and Andrey Perla, but also individuals directly connected to Russia’s Presidential Administration.

For instance, Margarita Klimanova, who is involved in the SDA’s operational work, reports to Sofia Zakharova. Zakharova is not only a project manager at the SDA but also a chief advisor to the Presidential Administration’s Directorate for the Development of Information and Communication Technology and Communication Infrastructure. Zakharova herself is supervised by the Directorate’s chief, Tatyana Matveyeva, who is likely aware of the SDA’s activities, if not involved in assigning its tasks. Higher still, Matveyeva reports to Sergey Kiriyenko, the highly influential First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration.

These hierarchical structures reveal the logistical underpinnings of influence operations such as those uncovered by Austrian authorities.

At the highest level, Russian President Vladimir Putin articulates the overarching foreign policy narrative – that the West is waging war against Russia, and that Russia must respond in kind.

The Presidential Administration then determines how this discourse should be communicated to various domestic and international audiences. Specific departments of the Administration engage with private companies such as the SDA, Structura National Technologies (also run by Gambashidze), or ANO Dialog (led by Alexey Goreslavsky). These firms, in turn, task individual agents with implementing operations on the ground.

The revelations from Austria’s investigation highlight the increasing sophistication and coordination of Russian disinformation efforts in Europe, blending state directives with private actors to manipulate public perception and destabilise democratic societies. As these operations continue to evolve and expand, they pose an ongoing threat to social cohesion and informed public discourse across Europe.

*Reprinted from shekhovtsov.substack.com*. You can find the original article here.**

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

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