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For the first time since 2021, a high-ranking U.S. official—hostage envoy Adam Bohler—has visited Kabul. In exchange for the release of an American citizen in captivity for over two years, Washingtonagreed to lift financial bounties on certain Taliban leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani of the notorious Haqqani Network. The US previously led atwo-decade-long campaign after the 9/11 terror attacks to destroy Al-Qaeda, and by association the Taliban, in Afghanistan. Today, that story has a very different sequel, one of talks, negotiation, compromise, and some might argue, an implicit admission of defeat.
The idea of a military defeat of non-state militant groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and now the Houthis, is not new.Seeking kinetic victory using overwhelming military might, and concepts such as ‘shock and awe’, were popularised by the Bush administration. This was employed in Iraq when Washington justified the removal of Saddam Hussein based on concocted intelligence about the country's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. Scholars such as Joe Dransfield and Kevin Rowlands have furtherargued that as warfare evolves, so does shock and awe.
President Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US elections was partly based on making America more insular, perhaps even isolationist, at least in comparison to the superpower’s role it has fulfilled in the global order so far.
Notably, Saddam’s offering to the West was similar to what Bashar al-Assad in Syria would attempt to emulate later. Saddam, a dictator, marketed a veneer of secularism asthebasis of his state’s political blueprint, along with offering asecurity order where he would take on extremist Islamist groups in exchange for absolute power. However, it was Saddam’s domestic policies which eventually led to his undoing, with mass executions, denial of justice, and the stifling of citizens' rights.. There was a fundamental flaw in what the offerings of foreign policy were amidst the domestic realities.
Today, both the US and Israel are undertaking campaigns to degrade multiple non-state militant actors and terror groups alike. The geographies and theatres are different to Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the fundamentals of countering non-state militant threats remain rooted in strategies and thinking built in the 2000s. Much like in the mid-2000s, when successes of outright ‘military might’ were celebrated boisterously by involved states, a similar paradigm is at playconcerning the kind ofdestruction faced by the likes of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. While the kinetic strategies are almost stagnant from the previous eras, technologies have evolved and more consequentially, politics has perceptually moved on, chastising the era of ‘forever wars’. President Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US elections was partly based on making America more insular, perhaps even isolationist, at least in comparison to the superpower’s role it has fulfilled in the global order so far. This part of Trump’s campaign is already being challenged asfresh air strikes begin against the Houthis in Yemen, tensions with Iran continue to build, and American boots remain on the ground in Syria.
Much like any other policy challenge, in countering terrorism, how policy is constructed for unstructured and disorganised militias is a perpetual battle.
A part of the argument for deploying unparalleled military power to push a militant group into submission is that hierarchical degradation can at least fracture, if not eliminate, structure. Such fractures, specifically by removing ideological heads, can send an undercurrent of confusion amongst cadresand spark a rush for power and influence amongst localised heads and commanders, opening doors to build newer outreach and circles of influence. This was seen within Al-Qaeda after the elimination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. His successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, did not have the same command over the group as Bin Laden did. Other charismatic leaders within Al-Qaeda, such as Anwar al Awlaki, an American citizen, were alsoassassinated by US drone strikes. Since then, Al Qaeda has become a mere shadow of its former self, due to wide-ranging factors beyond hierarchical uncertainties. Nonetheless, the group persists, and there remain no guarantees that itwill not consolidate and rise again.
Unlike Al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS orDaesh in Arabic) turned out to be much less hierarchically regimented. Even under its founding caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, oncebayat (pledge of allegiance) was offered, there was arguably much more operational room to manoeuvre for local ISIS commanders if they remained within the bounds of the group’s larger ideological and strategic aims. Compared to ISIS, Al-Qaeda was more rigid, and for lack of a better term, old school in its construct. ISIS relied on the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) approach, alternately noted as ‘entrepreneurial’ by the 2025 National Threat Assessment released by the US Director of Intelligence. This meant it offered locally ingrained ideological Islamists, groups and individuals alike, a brand to incubate around. Much like any other policy challenge, in countering terrorism, how policy is constructed for unstructured and disorganised militias is a perpetual battle.
Both Hamas and Hezbollah, however, pose different challenges to Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The political and geographical goals of Hamas and Hezbollah are determined. Both have also fought elections, something inherently against the ideologies of Al-Qaeda and ISIS alike. Their political aims often supersede ideological and theological ones. This metamorphosis towards pragmatism comes with its own set of challenges, as beingfaced by the Taliban in Afghanistan, with one arm in Kabul looking for pragmatic engagement with the world, while the other in Kandahar, adamant on remaining true to its roots of ideological ultra-conservatism. If states faceapolicy crisis incounter-terrorism, terror groups often haveapolicy crisis of their own.This occurs when they achieve strategic and tactical victories and are forced to govern a state. The latter is not as well-equipped as the former in dealing with these intricacies, ranging from governance to even the idea of fair justice.
For both Israel and the US, taking on Hamas and the Houthis predominantly using air power has its ownset of limitations. In Yemen, air campaigns conducted over the past months have unclear outcomes on what was targeted and how much damage the Houthis suffered. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the top officials within the US administration seeminglyremain unclear about who the Houthis are. Air power is the only viable option, as ground operations—even clandestine ones—carry immense risks. They also contradict Trump’s campaign against extending US involvement in far-away conflicts. As the Taliban and nowAhmed al Sharaa (himself a former Al-Qaeda and ISIS member) in Syria solidify their rule, both will eventually also look to solidify their armed forces. This will include inducting air defence systems amongst other similar equipment.
In the event of further dilution of US capacities, likely to be designed by Washington itself, there remains no clarity on how countering terror groups, instead of compromising with them, can be taken forward in the long term.
There is little doubt that both Hamas and Hezbollah have suffered institutional loss of capacity and leadership. There is also no doubt that the capacity to challenge these groups is up to match, as shown by Israel’soperation to rig Hezbollah’s communication pagers with explosives last year. However, the political side of thingshas much to learn from the 2000s decade, where the US moved fromcounter-terrorism tostate-building in both Afghanistan and Iraq, spending trillions of dollars, losing thousands of troops, only to hand over Kabul back to the Taliban, andhanging on to some influence in Baghdad by a thread to this day.
As both geopolitics and modern conflicts enter a phase of the unknown, militant groups will find much more space for themselves to work with both politically and ideologically. While the US remains the world’s premiercounter-terror force with unmatched global reach, no other power withinthevisible periphery has the political intent or military bandwidth to take up this role. Inthe event of further dilution of US capacities, likely to be designed by Washington itself, there remains no clarity on how countering terror groups, instead of compromising with them, can be taken forward in the long term.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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