Editor’s Note: Diogo Ives is a scholar at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, where he works on governance, climate action, and sustainable development for the Latin American region. He has published several books and articles on intra-regional cooperation among Latin American countries as well as their relations with external actors such as China
Telojo “Valerie” Onu is Managing Director at Quintessence Consulting Inc. She is globally recognized as an economist, financial innovator, and strategic advisor. She has over two decades of international experience, spanning the Caribbean and Africa, with a focus on the intersection of finance, technology, climate resilience, and alternative investments.
Prabhat Upadhyaya serves as Advisor for G20 and multilateral affairs at the African Climate Foundation. Having worked in government, think tanks, academia, NGOs and consultancy across Asia, Africa and Europe, he brings a nuanced understanding of different perspectives on some of the most contentious issues in climate and energy policy.
By Aude Darnal, Research Analyst, Reimagining US Grand Strategy
The second Donald Trump administration is already having a significant impact on global efforts to address the climate crisis. In the early days of his second term, President Trump withdrew the United States from several international commitments — including the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization — and suspending U.S. international assistance through the Agency for International Development. These decisions pose serious challenges to the international climate response, particularly as most of the world remains committed to a green transition and vulnerable countries are urgently seeking international financing. While the Joe Biden administration did not meet global expectations on climate action, it was still considered to be an issue of high priority. In contrast, the current administration has signaled disengagement from efforts to combat climate change, both in terms of financing and advancing reforms within the Bretton Woods institutions.
Within this context, countries and civil society actors committed to advancing climate action must now consider how to operate without U.S. contributions and possibly in the face of active U.S. resistance. With South Africa presiding over the G-20 and Brazil hosting both COP30 and the BRICS summit this year, Global South countries have a rare opportunity to set bold climate agendas and reshape engagement with their Northern counterparts.
Brazil as a Climate Leader
Diogo Ives, Deputy Coordinator and Researcher, South American Political Observatory State and Researcher, Interdisciplinary Observatory on Climate Change, University of Rio de Janeiro’s Institute of Social and Political Studies
In the wake of Donald Trump’s return to power in the United States, Brazil is expected to insist on defending multilateralism to tackle climate change. As the host of COP30 in November 2025, the Lula administration will remain a strong supporter of the Paris Agreement and is likely to encourage climate actions by subnational authorities, such as governors and mayors from member countries, as an alternative to states’ withdrawing from the treaty — as the United States did and as Argentina is reportedly considering. Furthermore, Brazil approved the creation of its regulated carbon market in 2024 and is likely to support the continuation of the debate at COP30 on creating an internationally regulated market to expand funding for climate action for the Global South.
Brazil also holds the presidency of BRICS+ in 2025, which has recently expanded to include important oil producers — Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. A BRICS summit among heads of state in July 2025 could further advance existing collaboration on energy transition, for instance, on strategic minerals mining and biofuels. Such a summit could also help leaders coordinate their support for Brazil’s demand that Global North governments comply with their climate financing promises — US$ 300 billion per year until 2035 — even if the Trump administration reneges on U.S. government commitments.
In short, Brazil tends to stand as a promoter of collective actions through its diplomacy, including among its neighbors in South America. However, doubts persist about the Lula administration’s capacity to secure approval for its national environmental agenda in the National Congress (where the rural caucus, connected to agribusiness, often acts as a veto player); combat organized crime in the Amazon; protect indigenous communities; commit to the gradual abandonment of oil as an energy source; and weaken the strong connections between far-right political forces in the United States and Brazil.
Nonetheless, there are opportunities for further cooperation between Brazil and pro-climate actors in the United States to advance Brazil’s strategy. The U.S. environmentalist public can pressure American national and subnational authorities to:
Increase U.S. financing to governments in the Global South so they can implement stronger policies to achieve a green transition;
Monitor American transnational companies that import commodities produced in deforested areas (land conversion-related activities account for almost half of Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions);
Combat domestic drug consumption to reduce foreign drug cartels’ power, whose activities contribute to land degradation in the Amazon; and
Regulate American big tech companies to address anti-climate disinformation campaigns spurred by far-right groups worldwide, including in Brazil.
Bridging Climate Finance Gaps for SIDS: The Bridgetown Initiative and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index
Valerie Onu, Managing Director, Quintessence Consulting Inc.
Systemic Challenges in Climate Finance for Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
Small Island Developing States face disproportionately high climate adaptation costs because of their high coastal erosion risks and economic fragility. On average, these nations require about 3.4% of GDP annually for climate adaptation — more than double the 1.4% needed by other developing nations. However, current public finance flows cover only about 28% of the required funds, leaving a 72% shortfall. In addition, 83% of climate financing is provided as loans, exacerbating debt-to-GDP ratios, which already exceed 100% in Barbados and Maldives, for instance.
The Bretton Woods institutions’ reliance on GDP metrics harms SIDS because of their structural disadvantages. For instance, pre-pandemic GDP growth figures in Antigua and Barbuda (5.3% in 2019) masked underlying vulnerabilities, such as an 89% dependency on food imports. Meanwhile, borrowing costs remain prohibitive: while OECD nations access credit at 1–4% interest, SIDS pay 12–14% interest for climate-resilience projects.
The withdrawal of the United States from efforts to address the climate crisis further amplifies SIDS’ challenges, given that the U.S. was a major contributor to climate financing. This commentary explores two key mechanisms — the Bridgetown Initiative (BI) and the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) — that offer potential solutions but also face implementation hurdles.
The Bridgetown Initiative (BI): A Blueprint for Reform
Two of the BI’s flagship reform recommendations gained traction at COP28. On the one hand, the proposal to redirect $500B in special drawing rights (SDRs) — the International Monetary Fund’s reserve assets — to climate-vulnerable nations aims to prevent debt traps and promote lower borrowing costs. However, in 2021, the IMF allocated $650 billion in SDRs, with wealthier nations receiving the majority of these funds because of quota-based distribution. Wealthy nations pledged to re-channel $100 billion (15.38%) of their SDRs to vulnerable economies, but as of November 2024, only $6.5 billion (≈1%) had been effectively shifted through the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust and Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. The IMF’s 2024 report on SDR reallocation highlighted the need for quota reforms to ensure equitable access. On the other hand, the BI advocates for climate-linked debt pauses: When a country experiences a disaster in which over 20% of its national infrastructure is damaged — such as Dominica’s 225% GDP loss from Hurricane Maria in 2017 — debt service would freeze for 24 months. Pilot programs under the G-20 Common Framework could prioritize SIDS with high debt, potentially unlocking financing for adaptation.
Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI): From Theory to Practice
Although the BI offers a financial reform blueprint, Antigua and Barbuda’s 2024 U.N. resolution, which was adopted at the SIDS4 conference, highlights the MVI as a tool to address the structural disparities inherent in GDP metrics. Indeed, GDP-based measures fail to account for a country’s climate and economic vulnerability, and social inequity. As a result, those countries that have higher GDPs but are vulnerable to climate change are excluded from Official Development Assistance (ODA) and concessional financing, as highlighted in the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS, 2024. In contrast, the MVI assesses the aforementioned vulnerabilities by integrating environmental exposure, economic dependency, and social adaptive capacity, thereby enabling high-GDP but vulnerable countries to qualify for ODA-related climate finance flows.
However, implementation faces data challenges, such as outdated population census figures and inconsistent vulnerability monitoring, both of which delay MVI-based fund allocation by the IMF and multilateral development banks. Artificial intelligence (AI)-backed valuation initiatives, such as the Global Initiative on Resilience to Natural Hazards through AI Solutions%20boost%20resilience%20to%20natural), which is led by the International Telecommunication Union, in collaboration with the U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Universal Postal Union, and World Meteorological Organization, could address this challenge by updating vulnerability metrics in real time, while creating economic cooperation opportunities between developed and developing countries.
Conclusion
Just as the world rallied to address COVID-19, a similar sense of urgency is needed to develop climate resilience for vulnerable nations. The Bridgetown Initiative and MVI offer actionable pathways, but success depends on multilateral cooperation, data innovation, and geopolitical leadership and engagement from developed nations. In the case of the United States, by framing climate support as a bipartisan, high-value economic opportunity, U.S. policymakers can advance resilience goals while aligning with the priorities of the international community.
Strategies Toward Climate Sustainability
Prabhat Upadhyaya, Advisor, African Climate Foundation
The transactional approach of the Trump administration is finding expression internationally in the United States’ pulling itself out of global governance processes, notably the Paris Agreement. This is no doubt a setback for climate action; even though there is an element of déjà vu to it, the scope and extent of the withdrawal seems to go beyond that of the 2019 U.S. withdrawal. The differences between now and then are reflected in spheres of climate science and business, as well as in the international arena.
In light of these developments, Global South countries should draw lessons from the evolution of international forums following the withdrawal of a major power. For example, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017 under the first Trump administration, the TPP quickly evolved to become the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which still functions today. The negotiations to create the CPTPP faced last-minute hiccups, with some disagreements with Canada over culture, French-language rights, and auto parts, for example, but Australia, Japan, and New Zealand played important roles in finding common ground.
With the TPP to CPTPP example in mind, Global South countries need to recalibrate their options and priorities for safeguarding the climate agenda. They can do so by:
First, shoring up climate science and documenting evidence of climate impacts. This is important not only to ensure preparedness for any extreme climate event, but also to safeguard climate science and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change process broadly. Documenting proof is not only a fundamental tenet of science, but in climate science it is also going to be an important source for establishing attribution of climate impact.
Second, making clean energy investment, support for a just transition, and enhancement of infrastructure resilience efforts domestically attractive. The energy transition under way has developed enough momentum for market forces to fill in the vacuum that has been created by the U.S. retreat. This can be further enabled by making Nationally Determined Contributions (national climate action plans by each country under the Paris Agreement) implementation and climate action inherent to economic planning, rather than as a desirable add-on.
Finally, engaging in the future of multilateralism with multipolarity as its core tenet byidentifying and investing in areas of direct cooperation and collaboration through country platforms (government-led partnerships that aim to align national and international goals). The African Climate Foundation, for example, has been actively supporting these efforts, and could be a useful model to keep the momentum going on climate action. A prominent example of the country platforms has been the Just Energy Transitions Partnership in South Africa, where developed countries and South Africa are working together to enable a just transition away from South Africa’s dependence on coal.
Although 2025 is not the first time that the United States has abrogated membership in the Paris Agreement, the inability of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter to provide leadership will have significant ramifications. The prospects for fostering cooperation with the United States have been dampened, prompting Global South countries to invest in adaptation and long-term relationships with other countries that want to engage in climate action.