Editor’s Note: Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a specialist on security issues involving the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. He has written previously for Stimson on maritime threats in the Persian Gulf and the role of the Houthis as well as about arms and drug trafficking in the region.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Since the Taliban seized power over all of Afghanistan in August 2021, the country’s de facto rulers have sought to solidify their grip by asserting firm control over state institutions and intensifying engagement with neighbors and foreign powers.
The policy has had some success. While the Taliban are still not recognized by the UN and many member states as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, several countries in Central Asia and the Middle East as well as Turkey, Japan, India, Russia, and China, have re-established a diplomatic presence in Kabul. Additionally, the Taliban have gained control of an increasing number of Afghan embassies, replacing personnel who had been appointed by U.S.-backed governments.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with Pakistan, were the only nations to recognize the Taliban’s first government, in power from 1996-2001. Overall, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries remain cautious about granting full political recognition to the second iteration of Taliban rule, considering the backlash that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which was planned by al-Qaeda members given sanctuary by the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time, GCC nations have pursued dialogue with the Taliban and distanced themselves from Western efforts to isolate the regime.
Qatar has been among the most influential actors. Since 2013, Doha has been home to a Taliban political office, giving the group a secure space to negotiate with the international community, notably the 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement that laid the groundwork for U.S. withdrawal, which Qatar also facilitated. More recently, Qatar has brokered the release of three Americans jailed by the Taliban after the U.S. left. However, Qatar’s ability to influence the group’s behavior has limitations, as underscored by the failure of 2020-2021 intra-Afghan reconciliation talks.
After the Taliban regained power, Doha continued engaging with senior Taliban representatives, as illustrated by a reported meeting between the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and the Taliban supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, in May 2023. However, the Taliban has also sought to reduce its reliance on Qatar by enhancing ties with other GCC members, such as the UAE.
On January 21, 2025, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) met with Sirajuddin Haqqani, a senior Taliban leader and de facto minister of interior, in Abu Dhabi, marking their second encounter in seven months. According to the Emirati state-run news agency, bilateral cooperation and efforts to promote reconstruction and stability in Afghanistan were at the top of the agenda. Abdul Haq Wasiq, the Taliban’s intelligence chief, was also present, indicating that security matters were addressed.
Since the Taliban takeover, the Emirates has aimed to strengthen intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation with the new regime, as underscored by an earlier meeting between MBZ and acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob in Abu Dhabi in 2022. For the UAE, preventing Afghanistan from turning into a safe haven for Islamist terrorist organizations is a top security interest, while the Taliban are determined to eradicate the Salafi-Jihadist Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K), which contests its rule through insurgency tactics.
January’s MBZ-Haqqani meeting followed high-level talks between the UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and his counterpart Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in early January 2025. They agreed to strengthen relations by upgrading Afghanistan’s diplomatic representation in Dubai to a general consulate and establishing a joint committee to streamline visa issuance for Afghans living in the Emirates.
Discussions also focused on enhancing commercial cooperation, with an agreement to increase collaboration in the banking sector. The UAE also committed to launching a logistics center to boost Afghan exports and to provide technical support for civil aviation training. Abu Dhabi also pledged to give Afghanistan $400 million in humanitarian relief this year.
The UAE’s expertise in the aviation industry has proved instrumental in securing commercial links and facilitating people-to-people contact. For instance, in 2022, GAAC Solutions, an Emirati state-run airline services company, signed a ten-year contract to manage ground and security services at airports in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. Additionally, the UAE-based low-cost carrier FlyDubai became the first international airline to resume flights to Kabul’s international airport following the Taliban’s rise to power, operating an average of two flights per day.
While the Emirates resumed consular services at its Afghan embassy in November 2021, the Gulf country hesitated to recognize Taliban-nominated consular staff. That changed last year with the UAE’s decision to accept Badruddin Haqqani as ambassador. That made the UAE the second country to recognize a Taliban envoy after China.
While previously on the sidelines of GCC-Taliban diplomacy, Oman handed over Afghanistan’s embassy in Muscat to Taliban-appointed diplomats in mid-September 2024.
More recently, on March 10, 2025, Afghanistan’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Muttaqi, met with Oman’s diplomacy chief, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, in the Sultanate, marking the first acknowledged visit of a senior Taliban official to Oman since the group’s takeover. The two leaders discussed trade and investment, food security, and education and training. Oman also confirmed its willingness to assist the Taliban in reducing the country’s diplomatic isolation.
Compared to the other Gulf monarchies, Oman’s financial influence is limited, restricting the country’s potential involvement in reconstruction and development initiatives in Afghanistan. Due to its longstanding neutral foreign policy and reputation as a discreet regional mediator, however, Muscat maintains cordial diplomatic ties with a diverse range of powers from both the West and the Global South that could prove useful to the Taliban. As the Trump administration escalates demands for the return of U.S. military equipment left behind during the hasty evacuation from Afghanistan, for example, Oman could play a go-between role.
Oman is also looking to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation with the Taliban after a rare terrorist attack on a Shi’ite mosque in Muscat in July 2024. The deadly assault was carried out by Omani nationals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS).
Historically a diplomatic heavyweight in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia has maintained low-level engagement with the Taliban compared to GCC neighbors. Significant meetings between Saudi and Taliban leadership have taken place mainly during the Hajj season, including a meeting by Saudi Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman with Mullah Yaqoob in June 2023 and with Haqqani in July 2024.
Saudi Arabia, which is home to the Islamic Development Bank and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, has advocated programs aimed at assisting the struggling Afghan population and strengthening its relationship with the Taliban regime through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center.
Returning to Kabul in July 2024, the Saudi ambassador to Afghanistan, Faisal Talq al-Buqami, has served as the primary channel for outreach to the regime. Buqami has met with de-facto Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi as well as Foreign Minister Muttaqi. Riyadh’s Kabul embassy resumed consular services in December 2024.
More recently, the Saudi ambassador held talks with Muttaqi to discuss increasing the Umrah and Hajj quotas for Afghan pilgrims. Additionally, the Taliban’s de-facto Minister of Justice, Abdul Hakim Sharei, took part in a two-day conference in Mecca on intra-Islamic religious dialogue.
Despite the Taliban’s push to diversify interlocutors, Qatar remains the venue of choice for the group to challenge diplomatic ostracism. Doha’s recognition of Suhail Shaheen as the Taliban’s diplomatic envoy confirms this trend as did a U.S.-Taliban detainee exchange deal brokered by Qatar in January 2025 and the release in March of a long-detained Delta Airlines mechanic. However, while the Taliban attended a United Nations-sponsored meeting in Doha last June, the group’s decision to condition participation on the absence of Afghan civil society representatives underscored the limitations of Doha’s influence.
The Taliban is not a monolithic group, and divisions persist between factions. Some senior leaders have become increasingly vocal in expressing dissent toward the Akhunzada-led faction’s consolidation of power and hardline policies on women.
Prominent dissident voices within the group appear to have enjoyed prolonged stays in Gulf countries over the past few months, likely leaving Afghanistan temporarily to let the pressure subside. Although Taliban officials minimized political divisions and attributed these overseas trips to medical care or diplomatic motives, they reveal some underlying discomfort within the group.
The de facto normalization of relations between GCC nations and the Taliban reflects the Gulf’s interest in seeing Afghanistan stabilize. Officials appear to hope that more pragmatic members of the Taliban can play a decisive role in the country’s integration into the international community, the development of the Afghan private sector, and the reduction of repressive social policies.
Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is an independent research analyst who focuses on the security and defense affairs of the Persian Gulf region. He is also an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. Leonardo tweets at @mazz_Leonardo.