What is CHNV?
CHNV is four humanitarian parole programs that allowed certain individuals from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to be considered for a two year stay in the United States. Under U.S. immigration law, parole grants individuals permission to stay in the United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.
The mechanics of CHNV—particularly the online application process—was modeled on the United for Ukraine (U4U) program that began in the spring of 2022 after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine displaced millions of people. The CHNV process required a U.S.-based sponsor to prove they had the financial means to support the particular CHNV national (referred to as a beneficiary) and to explain why the beneficiary merited parole. If the beneficiary passed background checks, they received authorization to travel to a U.S. airport where they were individually considered for parole by Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
In 2022 and 2023, the Department of Homeland Security laid out the rationale for the programs in notices to the federal register. Each notice detailed the country conditions that indicated parole was an urgent humanitarian imperative. For example, the notice for Nicaragua discusses escalating “repressive tactics” by the government in 2021 and 2022 that led thousands of people to flee the country seeking protection. The notices also explained that the parole programs were in the public interest because they would reduce reliance on smugglers to cross between land border ports of entry and instead allow for pre-vetted migration through airports to supporters in the United States. The federal register notices for the programs explained that, during the two-year parole period, “individuals [could] seek humanitarian relief [such as asylum] or other immigration benefits for which they may be eligible, and…work and contribute to the U.S. economy as they do so.”
What was the Impact of CHNV?
As soon as it was announced in January 2023, interest in CHNV by U.S. supporters was significant, and applications for the program far exceeded the set cap of 30,000 parolees permitted to enter the United States each month. Most supporters applied to sponsor relatives and friends, but other supporters were employers or faith groups.
Applications were processed in part based on how long they were in the queue and in part randomly. This means that, by the summer of 2023, some supporters who had applied the day the program began were still waiting for processing. On the other hand, the program was not accessible to all CHNV nationals eager to come to the United States. Many had trouble getting passports required for the program. Parents and close relatives could not sponsor children beneficiaries unless there was a parent or guardian to travel with the child to the United States. Many CHNV nationals did not have sponsors. Research by Refugees International in the summer of 2023 found this was true of Venezuelans, whose U.S. diaspora was newer than that of the other nationalities. Also, fewer Nicaraguans in the United States could serve as sponsors because they lacked temporary protected status (available to Haitians) or green cards (available to Cubans through the Cuban Adjustment Act).
Despite these limitations, in 2023, the CHNV program successfully led to a dramatic decline in the number of unauthorized border crossings by CHNV nationals. CHNV parolees arrived in U.S. communities, united with friends, and filled labor shortages, especially in critical industries such as construction, transportation, food and health services. In August 2023, Refugees International spoke to a Haitian woman who arrived through the CHNV program just two months earlier. She already had her work permit, was working as a health aid for the elderly, and was about to begin a second job as an assistant to a first grade teacher*.*
By late 2024, 110,240 Cubans, 211,040 Haitians, 93,080 Nicaraguans, and 117,320 Venezuelans had arrived and were granted parole through CHNV – almost 532,000 people in total.
Challenges to CHNV During the Biden Administration
Refusing to acknowledge the success of the CHNV program, Texas and several other states sued the Biden administration in 2023, arguing that CHNV was a drain on state resources. A Trump appointed judge disagreed and ruled the states had no standing to claim CHNV caused them injury.
In 2024, House Republicans argued in a report that a small percentage of fraudulent sponsor applications discredited the entire CHNV program and, without any evidence, claimed some supporters were “potentially” sex traffickers. (The House Republicans did not disclose the DHS analysis they relied upon, presumably because the analysis did not find “rampant” fraud in the program).
The House report reiterated the inflammatory argument that Haitian parolees negatively impacted communities across the country like Springfield, Ohio – an argument emphatically denied by both the Republican mayor of Springfield and Republican governor of Ohio.
Indeed, a 2024 survey revealed that people seeking safety in the United States through CHNV dispersed across the country with the help of American sponsors and were economically self-sufficient: working and relying on family for assistance – thereby lowering the costs incurred by welcoming cities and states.
Finally, the House report made the unfounded argument that the CHNV program “pulled” migrants to the United States. There is no evidence for this. A survey conducted of intending Venezuelan migrants in 2023 found that the vast majority of them did not know about the program and, if they did, were traveling irregularly because they did not have a sponsor or valid passport required for CHNV.
In October 2024, the Biden administration announced that it would not create a re-parole process for CHNV parolees. This made it imperative that parolees apply for an alternative immigration benefit or status such as asylum, Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a visa, or a green card. The Biden administration should have announced this earlier and helped parolees understand what they were eligible for and how to apply because some parolees believed other statuses were incompatible with their parole. A survey conducted by Refugees International in late 2024 of more than 400 CHNV parolees found that most parolees wanted but had not yet applied for another benefit and needed support to do so. The survey also found a majority of parolees were still waiting for relatives to come to the United States through the program.
Trump Administration Announces End of Parole Programs
President Trump issued two executive orders on January 20, 2025, terminating “all categorical parole programs,” and specifically CHNV, as contrary to his policies. The same day, acting Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Huffman issued a memo that was not made public and that decried “abuse” of the “very narrow” parole authority and directed agencies to “pause, modify, or terminate, effectively immediately, any parole programs.” No further justification was offered for ending CHNV. Processing of all applications by sponsors—over 2 million of which are pending—and issuing of travel authorizations to beneficiaries immediately stopped.
Stopping the processing of CHNV applications left many parolees separated from their families, including one Haitian man Refugees International interviewed who has been waiting for over a year on applications for his wife and three-year-old daughter, who are living in danger in Port au Prince where the security situation has sharply deteriorated over the last two months, forcing repeated and record displacements.
A January 23 memo by acting Secretary Huffman that was made public directed DHS to evaluate to what extent individual parolees in the United States could be placed into deportation or fast-track expedited removal proceedings. While no parolee was safe from potential removal, “in the short term,” the memo suggested, DHS “may wish to prioritize aliens eligible for expedited removal who failed to apply for asylum” within one year of arriving. This memo spread fear and confusion because people with parole are usually exempt from the one-year filing deadline for asylum. Further, as noted above, many parolees had not been able to find legal support to help them apply for asylum and other immigration statuses in 2024. Further, some Haitians and Venezuelans who had arrived on CHNV were still waiting for TPS applications they had filed months earlier to be processed.
The January 23 memo encouraged many CHNV parolees to continue applying for asylum and TPS so as to avoid being prioritized for removal. But Secretary Noem soon announced she was ending TPS designations for certain Venezuelans (on April 7, 2025) and Haitians (August 3, 2025). Others began receiving notices that processing on their applications was paused. This was because, on February 14, Andrew Davidson, acting deputy director of USCIS, issued a memorandum (that was not made public) “pausing the adjudication of benefit requests” by people paroled into the United States on CHNV as well as U4U and family based parole programs. Davidson justified this pause by asserting (without any evidence) that vetting of CHNV beneficiaries was inadequate, though even the 2024 House report, which focused on fraud by supporters, did not raise this specter.
Legal Challenges: Doe v. Noem and CHIRLA v. Noem
People have a right to seek asylum in the United States, and the administrative pause on adjudication of applications by parolees is unjustified. This is an argument raised in litigation against the Trump administration parole policies in the case Doe v. Noem in Massachusetts federal court. The suit claims that both the administration’s narrow interpretation of the parole authority and its refusal to adjudicate applications for immigration benefits by parolees violate immigration law.
It also argues that the policies will wreak irreparable harm on parolees and their sponsors. Plaintiffs in the lawsuit include members of a family whose relative was tortured by the Nicaraguan government and who have been threatened for their political activism in Nicaragua. Another plaintiff is an American who generously sponsored 77 Venezuelan nationals through CHNV. The latter spent a great deal of time and resources supporting these beneficiaries, including finding them housing, paying for their work permit applications, and paying for attorneys to help them apply for asylum and TPS.
Indeed, many U.S. based supporters who have housed and helped parolees find work – and the numerous employers who have hired parolees – are also hurt by the Trump administration policy changes and dismayed that a program they invested in and that is working so well is in danger of disruption. Even if they are not placed in removal proceedings when their parole is terminated, beneficiaries will lose their authorization to work (unless they have received a work permit through their TPS or asylum seeker status). According to a study by FWD.US, an estimated 240,000 people who entered under CHNV are currently in the U.S. labor force, including 40,000 in manufacturing, 30,000 in leisure and hospitality, 30,000 in construction, and 30,000 in health services.
Another lawsuit, CHIRLA v. Noem, challenges the use of expedited removal against people who have entered the country through parole. The complaint notes that the Trump administration has issued conflicting directives as to which parolees can be subject to expedited removal and the legal authority for doing so. One February 18 memo, which has not been released publicly, suggests that after their parole is terminated, former parolees can be placed in expedited removal regardless of how long they have been in the United States.
There have already been summary arrests of Haitians and Afghans who had CBP One appointments, were paroled at land border ports, and have ongoing proceedings in immigration court. The organizational plaintiffs in the lawsuit – CHIRLA, UndocuBlack, and CASA – have thousands of members who fled their home countries, were given parole through CBP One, CHNV, and other parole programs like U4U and Operations Allies Welcome (for Afghans), and are now living with relatives and working in U.S. communities. The threat of arrest and removal has made them fearful of leaving their homes or sending their kids to school. Many are eligible for asylum in the United States and worry that they could be deported to danger given the flaws in the screening process for those placed in expedited removal. As Refugees International has documented, expedited removal frequently does not provide people with a meaningful opportunity to request protection since it depends on referrals by enforcement personnel to asylum officers and allows for little opportunity to gather relevant documents, present evidence, or consult counsel.
Trump Administration Terminates CHNV
On March 25, 2025, the Trump administration published a notice in the federal register about the ending of CHNV and termination of parole for all beneficiaries (regardless of when they entered the country) effective April 24, 2025. Though the notice concedes that the program led to reductions in irregular entry between land border ports of entry by CHNV nationals, it explains that the Trump administration opposes all migration by CHNV nationals, including through ports of entry, and is devoting its foreign policy to negotiations with other countries to facilitate their deportation. The notice also asserts that CHNV parolees proved to be a burden on interior U.S. communities. This is refuted in an amicus brief submitted by the District of Columbia and 15 states (NY, IL, CA, CT, HI, ME, MD, MA, MN, NJ, OR, RI, VT, WA, WI) in Doe v. Noem. The brief argues that parolees in fact make substantial economic and social contributions to the states.
The federal register notice says that DHS plans to issue non-confirmations for all pending sponsor applications, rescind confirmation of previously confirmed applications, and cancel all pending applications for advance travel authorization by beneficiaries. DHS intends to send notice of termination of parole to each CHNV parolee in the United States through their USCIS account. The March 25 federal register notice also says that, after April 24, 2025, DHS intends to “remove promptly” former CHNV parolees who do not have any lawful basis to remain in the United States, prioritizing those who had not filed an immigration benefit application before March 25, 2025.
Preserving Parole and Pushing Back
As Refugees International has argued in policy reports, expert declarations, and amicus briefs, there have been numerous previous parole programs across both Democratic and Republican administrations, and the use of parole to create pathways for humanitarian populations who have sponsors, particularly relatives, in the United States has a long history. In particular, parole programs for people from Cuba, Vietnam and Cambodia, and the former Soviet Union spanned many decades and were supported by Congress, including after amendments to the immigration law in 1980 and 1996 requiring that parole not be used for people who qualify as refugees and that parole applications be considered case-by-case. There have also been past uses of parole on a large scale—including the parole of tens of millions of foreign visitors in 2000—for the significant public benefit of the U.S. economy and foreign relations.
Both the January 20 Huffman memo and March 25 federal register notice terminating CHNV misportray past use of parole and its legislative history. For example, the January 20 Huffman memo argues that parole should not be used to facilitate the entry of those with prima facie asylum claims. But this is precisely how it has been used in the past, such as when parole was used to allow Iraqi Kurds evacuated to Guam to seek asylum in the United States in 1996. Both the Huffman memo and the federal register notice cite a 1996 House Report recommending more narrow uses of parole that Congress emphatically rejected in the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Since then, Congress has expressed its approval of parole programs in legislation several times, including during the first Trump administration. What is clear from the legislative history is that Congress intended parole to facilitate the admission of foreign nationals to advance U.S. foreign policy. The Trump administration’s anti-immigrant foreign policy cannot justify upending the law.
The Trump administration’s ending of parole programs is similar to its ban on refugee admissions and revocation TPS for Venezuelans and Haitians. These policies end critical pathways for humanitarian immigration. They also de-legalize people who cannot safely return to their home countries, and will lead to exploitation in the underground economy of people who lose work permits. Termination of CHNV lays the groundwork for mass deportation of hundreds of thousands of people who are currently living with family and friends and productively working and contributing to U.S. communities.
Beyond challenging termination of CHNV (and TPS designations) in court, people who have their parole terminated have the right to seek asylum in the United States and to have interviews about their fear of return to their home countries. Anyone placed in removal proceedings must assert this right, tell DHS officers of their fear of removal, and request an interview. Supporters of parolees must be vigilant in monitoring enforcement by the Trump administration and ensuring due process and access to asylum for parolees.
It is also important to urge Congress not to roll back parole based on mischaracterizations of the CHNV program and humanitarian parolees. In passing the Laken-Riley Act, Congress gave states like Texas standing to sue the federal government when they oppose the use of the parole authority, regardless of the frivolousness of the states’ arguments, thereby hampering any future administration’s use of parole.
Congress should absolutely reject any further limitations on the parole authority (like those that were included in the Secure the Border Act). If enacted, restrictions on parole would make it impossible for future administrations to use it to quickly help vulnerable allies and populations like Afghans and Ukrainians. It would eliminate a crucial tool used to manage the processing of asylum seekers at land border ports of entry, a key component to creating a workable U.S. asylum system in the future.
Indeed, just as it did in the mid-twentieth century, parole can serve in the years ahead as a basis upon which to build an enhanced protection system that meets the needs of the twenty-first century. Especially at a time of increased forced displacement, including as the result of the impacts of climate change, a flexible parole authority must be preserved.