By Zhao Zhijiang
According to media reports, the military government of the West African country Niger has recently expelled three Chinese executives working in the oil sector. These executives were in charge of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the West African Oil Pipeline Company (WAPCo), and the joint venture oil refinery SORA.. The Nigerien authorities stated that the expulsion was due to disputes caused by wage disparities between Chinese employees and local workers. Niger’s cooperation with China began in 2008, with China primarily involved in the country’s oil and uranium industries.
The Sahel region, where Niger is located, has long been plagued by instability, with frequent civil wars and terrorist attacks. For Chinese enterprises and institutions operating in Niger and the broader Sahel region, a crucial question arises: How should China formulate and deploy relevant strategies in the region and across the African continent? Particularly in the context of the U.S.-led global order retreating and France’s diminishing influence in Africa, what kind of flexible mechanism should China establish to maximize its interests? According to ANBOUND’s research, the world is entering an era of fragmented geopolitical spaces, characterized by low-intensity conflicts and small-scale wars. Such conflicts may emerge across the globe, especially in Africa. In regions where conventional military forces are not a suitable option, China can consider establishing a private security group as an effective solution. This approach would require minimal financial input from the state, and providing resources alone would be sufficient to sustain such security groups.
For China, a relevant example worth studying is the Wagner Group’s operations in Niger since July 2023. As a later entrant into Africa compared to China, Wagner’s political, business, and military connections in Niger reflect Russia’s strategy of expanding its influence on the continent through proxy forces.
Wagner was originally an international security company that, with the support of the Russian government, conducted independent operations worldwide, engaging in “commercialized warfare” with its own well-trained military forces and network. Over time, leveraging its ties to Russian intelligence agencies and special forces, Wagner established significant strongholds in Africa and the Middle East. It developed an operational model integrating national resources, military capabilities, and mineral rights into a unified system. This approach proved highly effective in commercialized warfare, allowing Wagner to expand rapidly. Despite suffering setbacks on the Ukrainian battlefield and the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner has maintained its presence and continued to develop in Africa.
Russia has leveraged Wagner to gain significant regional influence in Africa by using security services as an entry point. Wagner has established strongholds and unique relationship networks across multiple African countries. According to media reports, a few years ago, in the capital of an African country, local security personnel could be seen wearing uniforms printed with “Je Suis Wagner”, that is, “I am Wagner” in French. This was an exceptionally rare scene for any military or security organization worldwide. Wagner has provided security protection and military training to politicians and government officials in West and Central Africa. As part of its business transactions, it has also secured control over mines, forests, and other key raw material sources. Given its close ties to the Russian government, Wagner effectively serves as an unofficial yet crucial channel for Russia’s expansion of influence in Africa.
On July 26, 2023, a coup took place in Niger. The military overthrew the democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, and a junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani took power. Following the coup, Wagner quickly expressed its support for the new regime. Prigozhin publicly praised the coup on Telegram, calling it a struggle to break free from “Western colonizers” and offered to deploy Wagner fighters to help maintain order. Reports indicate that General Salifou Mody, one of the coup leaders, met with Wagner representatives during a visit to neighboring Mali after the coup, seeking their support to consolidate power. This suggests that the junta viewed Wagner as a potential external backer.
At the same time, Wagner leveraged anti-French sentiment among Niger’s population to promote pro-Russian propaganda. After the 2023 coup, protesters waving Russian flags appeared on the streets of Niger, demonstrating a certain level of public support for Wagner and the broader Russian influence. This political messaging helped provide a popular foundation for cooperation between the junta and Wagner.
In August 2023， Prigozhin died in a plane crash, marking a turning point for Wagner, which was subsequently reorganized into the “African Corps”. In January 2024, a delegation from Niger’s military government visited Moscow and met with senior Russian officials, further deepening the political ties between the junta and Russia, represented by Wagner-African Corps. By May 2024, Russian forces, including Wagner, were deployed at the Air Base 101 in Niger’s capital, Niamey, coexisting briefly with U.S. troops until the latter withdrew in September of that year. This signified the official entry of Wagner or its successor entity into Niger, providing military training and equipment support. Although specific troop numbers and missions were not publicly disclosed, analysts estimated that Wagner’s initial presence in Niger consisted of a few hundred personnel, focusing on protecting the junta and training local forces. Reports suggested that at its peak, Wagner’s presence in Niger may have reached around 1,000 personnel. As Wagner’s foothold solidified, Niger began expelling Western forces, particularly those from France and the U.S. Over time, similar to the situations in Mali and Burkina Faso, Wagner filled the power vacuum left by departing Western troops. Notably, available data indicate that Wagner’s equipment in Africa primarily consists of Russian-supplied light and heavy weaponry, supplemented by local resources, with an emphasis on practicality and cost-effectiveness. While its armament is not on par with Western conventional forces, Wagner has proven to be adaptable in supporting military governments, combating insurgencies, and securing strategic resources.
After securing political and military influence, Wagner began pursuing economic and resource interests in Niger. Wagner’s typical approach in Africa involves exchanging military services for resource extraction rights. Niger, the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer, holds strategic appeal for Russia. China had been deeply involved in Niger’s uranium mining industry for years, though its operations faced various challenges. While there is no concrete evidence that Wagner has directly taken control of Niger’s uranium mines, analysts speculate that Russia, through Wagner or its successor entities, may be negotiating with the military government for favorable mining agreements. This would weaken France’s influence, with France being a major buyer of Niger’s uranium, while also counterbalancing China’s presence. A similar strategy has already been implemented in the Central African Republic and Mali, where Wagner controls gold and diamond mines to generate revenue for Russia. Beyond resource extraction, Wagner is reportedly engaged in commercial activities in Niger, though the exact scale remains unclear. Given these developments, along with the recent expulsion of Chinese executives by Niger’s authorities, some analysts and public opinion suggest that Wagner may be indirectly influencing Niger’s government in ways that impact Chinese business interests.
It is important to clarify that this is in no way an endorsement of Wagner’s involvement in foreign politics or its exploitation of Niger, nor agreeing with its . The focus here is on the role and impact of private security and military organizations in modern warfare. For China, prioritizing the development of its own private security and military service industry is essential to protecting the safety and interests of Chinese enterprises operating abroad. In parts of the African continent, as long as such security activities align with a local political faction, they are unlikely to face significant international scrutiny. In recent years, violent attacks on Chinese businesses and employees in Africa have become increasingly frequent. Around the time Niger expelled Chinese executives, a serious incident occurred in Zambia where armed criminals robbed a Chinese-owned company, resulting in one death and one injury. Looking further back, in 2024, brutal attacks on Chinese nationals took place in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2023, amid conflicts over gold mines in the Central African Republic, nine Chinese nationals were executed in an incident allegedly linked to Wagner’s influence. To safeguard overseas Chinese citizens and assets without triggering complex diplomatic disputes, a robust private security industry is the most effective solution. With China’s “going global” strategy gaining momentum, the need to protect a growing range of international interests is becoming increasingly urgent. Relying solely on the regular military is both costly and politically sensitive, whereas private security and military service companies present a more flexible and viable alternative. Given China’s political system and governance structure, the development of private security and military service enterprises would not pose a threat to government stability, unlike Wagner’s relationship with the Russian state. Instead, such firms could complement national security strategies and provide effective employment opportunities for retired military personnel. The practical value of establishing an overseas security system lies in creating a strategic tool for safeguarding China’s global interests. This would help prevent financial and human losses among Chinese enterprises and personnel while securing economic and resource interests. Just as Wagner has gained influence over resource distribution and policy implementation in Niger, enabling Russia to negotiate favorable terms, a similar mechanism would be of significant strategic importance to China.
Final analysis conclusion:
ANBOUND has long advocated that in regions like Africa, where deploying regular military forces is impractical, China can consider establishing a private armed security group to serve as a strategic tool for safeguarding its interests. Wagner’s model provides a reference, though China would likely need to approach it in a way that aligns with proper diplomatic principles and international ethical commitments.
Zhijiang Zhao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.