A small group of US officials were granted exclusive access and documented their closely monitored visits before the joint program ended
The extreme secrecy and stringent security surrounding Russia‘s nuclear weapons have long fuelled unsettling speculations and fostered a chilling allure.
Accessing Russia’s secret nuclear storage sites from the outside world is nearly impossible, yet insights gained from on-site visits and direct communications are invaluable.
After years of negotiations and meticulous planning, a select group of American officials was granted access to these top-secret sites to help safeguard the thousands of nuclear warheads stored there.
Training site in the city of Sergiev Posad, northwest of Moscow All photos were taken by Bill Moon and are courtesy of the Stimson Center
Training site in the city of Sergiev Posad, northwest of Moscow (Photo: William Moon/Stimson Centre)
The official who led the US team, William Moon, made more than 70 trips to Russia over the course of 30 years, meeting with the top generals in charge of the nuclear arsenal.
“It took a long time to develop trust with one another,” said Moon, who served as the Russian Nuclear Security Programme Manager for the Co-operative Threat Reduction Program at the US Department of Defence.
“There were about seven years of negotiations before we even came close to actually visiting a Russian warhead store site.”
The programme was launched in 1995, but actual visits didn’t begin until July 2003. It ended in 2013, and there has been no similar level of co-operation since.
Securing a vast nuclear arsenal
The joint Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme was developed by the US Congress and aimed at helping Russia secure the massive nuclear arsenal it had inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Nearly 30,000 nuclear warheads, some of which were previously stationed in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, had to be consolidated in Russian facilities with proper safety measures, according to Moon, currently an independent consultant.
Russia’s nuclear weapon storage sites are spread across the vast country, according to research by Russianforces.org
Some of the old warheads had to be dismantled, said Moon, who also served as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Team Lead for the US European Command from 2016 to 2019.
“The first engagements were, of course, pretty difficult,” he said. “It took a lot of patience and persistence on our side.”
“Over time, they came to see that our motivation was truly to help make sure that their warheads were as secure as our warheads. And that it was, in fact, in the US interests and Western interests that those warheads be secured,” said Moon.
"Supercontainers" secured on a pull-out tray of a Russian Defense Ministry nuclear warhead transport railcar All photos were taken by Bill Moon and are courtesy of the Stimson Center
‘Supercontainers’ secured on a pull-out tray of a Russian Defence Ministry nuclear warhead transport railcar (Photo: William Moon/Stimson Centre)
The warheads were stored at 12 large central locations, as well as at about 30 additional smaller facilities adjacent to military bases, according to Moon and UN research. The smaller bases stored dozens of warheads that could be fitted to missiles, aircraft, ships, or submarines.
“Their sites were extremely secretive,” Moon said.
“What we agreed to was simply to have cooperation and technical exchanges. It wasn’t like they came out and said, oh, we need your assistance.”
Russia has the largest nuclear stockpile in the world, totalling approximately 5,500 nuclear warheads, with around 4,380 operational and 1,710 “deployed” or ready for use, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
The United States comes second with a total of about 5,300 nuclear warheads, 1,670 of which are deployed, according to FAS.
The other two nuclear states on the European continent, France and the United Kingdom, have total nuclear inventories of around 290 and 225 warheads, respectively.
Getting Putin’s approval
Following extensive negotiations, initial access to the sites was ultimately granted by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The US team was communicating with the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence, abbreviated in Russian as Gumo – the command handling the nuclear arsenal.
General Colonel Igor Valynkin was Chief of the 12th Gumo at the time. His deputy was General Major Vladimir Frolov.
Moon said one of the most powerful moments from communicating with the Russian side was getting a phone call from General Frolov, who told him that access had been granted.
City of Sergiev Posad, about 73 km (45 miles) northwest of Moscow? Access gate from a Russian nuclear security training site in the city of Sergiev Posad that simulated an actual storage site All photos were taken by Bill Moon and are courtesy of the Stimson Center
Access gate from a Russian nuclear security training site in the city of Sergiev Posad that simulated an actual storage site (Photo: William Moon/Stimson Centre)
“In that phone call, he informed me that President Putin had approved Gen. Valynkin’s request for us to go to their sites,” said Moon.
“Having that phone call was extremely memorable, because of how much work went into finally getting that approval. And it was Putin that approved it.”
After access was granted, Moon and his team, consisting of only four people, started travelling to the secret storage facilities.
Moon said he visited about a dozen sites as part of the cooperation program.
Navigating uncertainty
There were “a lot of unknowns” during the initial visits as the small US team didn’t know what to expect. “A lot of anxiety, I would say.”
They were not allowed to carry phones and take notes, and had to turn in their passports.
“We also felt somewhat vulnerable,” said Moon. “And until we had done this a few times, there was a lot we didn’t quite understand until we arrived at the sites.”
Control room in a Russian nuclear security training site in Sergiev Posad that simulated an actual storage site All photos were taken by Bill Moon and are courtesy of the Stimson Center
Control room in a Russian nuclear security training site in Sergiev Posad that simulated an actual storage site (Photo: William Moon/Stimson Centre)
The 12th Gumo personnel were very professional and “also very cautious.”
“When we dealt with them, we would involve those forces on the US side that are responsible for security on our sites as well,” he said. “And you could see that there was professional respect for one another.”
Another eerie and unforgettable moment for Moon and his team was their very first visit to a site. They travelled in a van with fully blacked-out windows to a site containing nuclear warheads in the southwestern city of Saratov.
“Just emerging from the van and realising you are right there – at the warheads storage site.”
“To finally achieve that visit, and to look at what the surroundings were and see, you know, the guards, sometimes with dogs, surrounded by trees. And just taking all that in.”
Part of a document written in English and Russian about the visits to the nuclear sites All photos were taken by Bill Moon and are courtesy of the Stimson Center
Part of a document written in English and Russian about the visits to the nuclear sites (Photo: William Moon/Stimson Centre)
Throughout the years, the team also made frequent visits to a training site in the city of Sergiev Posad, about 73 km (45 miles) northwest of Moscow.
The nuclear storage facilities had code names to preserve their secrecy and safety, Moon said.
As he and his team were not allowed to take notes, they had to remember everything they saw and write it down later.
Hosting reciprocal visits
As part of the Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme, Russian officials also made reciprocal visits to US nuclear facilities.
During one of these visits, a Russian delegation headed by Gumo Chief General Colonel Igor Valynkin, travelled to the Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in 2000.
The Russian representatives observed a demonstration of US Air Force convoys escorting the ground transport of nuclear weapons.
“The times we brought the Russians to our bases were also quite memorable, showing Gen. Valynkin how the US nuclear convoys were set, how the response teams operated,” and seeing his reactions, Moon said.
Bill Moon with General Major Vladimir Frolov, Deputy Chief of the 12th GUMO, before a visit to Francis E. Warren Air Force Base All photos were taken by Bill Moon and are courtesy of the Stimson Center
William Moon (Left) with General Major Vladimir Frolov, Deputy Chief of the 12th Gumo (Right), before a visit to Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in the US (Photo: William Moon/the Stimson Centre)
With the expiration of the co-operation program in 2013, the visits and that level of cooperation ended.
“We wanted to extend the agreement to enable continuation of our technical exchanges directly with the 12th Main Directorate. We thought that would be stabilising to our relations overall,” he said.
But the Russian side “adamantly refused to allow continued direct discussions with the 12th Main Directorate.”
“Just having discussions president to president, even if they are friendly, that’s not the same level of trust,” he said.
“Unless there are exchanges up and down the organisation, you really aren’t going to have trust between our countries.”