If sanctions have proven ineffective at reversing the war or fostering democratic change, what should complement or replace them?
While President Trump pushes for a Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire, Moscow and Washingtonhave commenced discussions on future economic relations. Economic sanctions have been one of the most powerful tools in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal for decades. Restrictions on access to global financial networks, advanced technologies, and lucrative markets have imposed effective economic penalties on targeted states. These measures have also been wielded against individuals, disrupting professional activities, while sanctions against corporations or governments weaken their competitiveness.
The United States has refined its use of sanctions over time. Today’s sanctions are more precise, targeting specific individuals, institutions, and industries while minimizing collateral damage to the American and allied economies to isolate bad actors while avoiding unintended humanitarian crises.
Yet, despite their sophistication, sanctions often fail to achieve their primary objective—compelling changes in the foreign policies of targeted states. The reason is straightforward: foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum; it primarily reflects the ambitions, ideology, interests, and internal political dynamics of state leaders. Sanctions are often imposed on authoritarian states, whose chief priority is preserving the political regime. When targeting a nation with sanctions, the United States positions itself as an existential enemy of that regime, reinforcing the power structures it seeks to weaken and forcing it into a confrontation.
Autocratic leaders thrive on defining external adversaries, real or imagined. In such regimes, unity is often forged in response to a perceived external threat. When Washington imposes sanctions, it hands these regimes a powerful narrative that the targeted nation, threatened by a hostile foreign power, must rally around its leadership. In Russia’s case, sanctions have allowed the Putin regime to deflect blame from its own political and economic failures and mismanagement rather than serving as a form of coercion. This only strengthens internal cohesion, prolongs the Putin regime’s survival, and diminishes the likelihood of any meaningful reform.
What Can Replace Sanctions?
If sanctions have proven ineffective at reversing the war or fostering democratic change, what should complement or replace them? The answer is complex and varies across the geopolitical spectrum. In the case of Russia, Western sanctions did not alter its foreign policy. In fact, the United States is shifting its approach to Moscow.
The ideal Russia, from the U.S. perspective, is a stable, democratic, and constructive state at peace with its neighbors and maintaining a balance of power in Eurasia, especially concerning China. As a “balancer,” Russia could theoretically counter China’s growing ambitions, help address Europe’s economic and demographic challenges, and reorient itself toward economic development rather than geopolitical engagement and confrontation. Russia’s economic, financial, and political isolation has not brought the fulfillment of these objectives any closer, even though they are quite far away. Instead, it has bolstered the entrenched siloviki and the military-industrial complex’s vested interests that benefit from ongoing conflict.
From Punishment to Partnership
After the war in Ukraine ends, lifting economic sanctions and fostering Russia’s economic development would better serve U.S. interests than current punitive measures. Of course, not all factions within Russia would welcome such a shift. The existing sanctions regime has given rise to a parallel “shadow economy.” Russian war profiteers such as Mikhail Shelkov, a majority owner of VSMPO-AVISMA, a leading Russian titanium producer, and Tahir Garayev, the facilitator of Russian oil exports, have benefited greatly from Russia’s war economy, which has effectively dismantled any semblance of competitive capitalism.
For meaningful change to take root, the United States should actively engage with legitimate enterprises run by transparent Russian entrepreneurs, as well as private businesses and economic leaders who have a vested interest in peace. This “lobby for peace” thrives on stability and global integration rather than conflict and isolation. Encouraging economic interdependence could help cultivate an economic relationship with Russia anchored in shared economic values and respect for contractual obligations rather than short-term geopolitical gains.
War profiteers, however, have no interest in a transparent, rules-based economy. They benefit from the status quo, where resource flows are redirected into networks that are insulated from market forces, such as military procurement networks and the shadow economy. Historically, evidence suggests that even those who gain from conflict can be motivated to support economic development, especially when considering the long-term well-being of their futures.
A Second Chance?
The possibility of the war’s end in Ukraine offers a fresh opening to reinvent Russian-American relations. A new approach that prioritizes economic engagement over coercion could pave the way for a stable Russia capable of cooperating with the West.
Such a strategy is not without risks; change will not happen immediately. However, history has shown that strong nations do not respond well to humiliation, and sustainable engagements are built on mutual respect rather than enforced compliance. It appears that President Trump is willing to adjust U.S. policy. He might find an economic partnership in Moscow to benefit American business and make Europe more peaceful.
Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs.
Image: Valery Bocman / Shutterstock.com.