My regular update on global conflict. This week: a focus on Pacific security issues including the 'China first' memo, Taiwan defence spending, U.S. missiles in the Philippines & Australia's election.
Image:Australian Army
**For all its apparent placidity, the Pacific seems today to be positioned at the leading edge of any number of potential challenges and crises - whether they relate to politics or economics, to geology, to weather, to the supply of food or to the most basic questions about the number of people that this planet can support.*Simon Winchester,Pacific*, 2015.
Welcome to this week’s edition ofThe Big Five.
This week, The Big Five has a focus on strategic issues and events in The Pacific. In all of my previous editions of this post, I have focused primarily on the war in Ukraine. Today, my main focus is the Pacific and key developments in this massive potential theatre of war. I will return to Ukraine in my next update.
As always, I conclude with my top five recommended war and national security reads from the past week.
The Pacific
China First. For some time, members of the Trump administration have advocated for a China First national security posture. The first Trump administration contained multiple instances where the President and other members of his adminstation advocated for the shift to a focus on China. You can read a compendium of speeches and other documents from this periodat this link.
The second Trump administration’s nomination for Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Elbridge Colby, describes in his book*The Strategy of Denial*that denying China hegemony over Asia is the cardinal objective of US grand strategy. He notes that:
The United States should not size, shape, or posture its military to deal simultaneously with any other scenario alongside a war with China over Taiwan. Its first, overriding priority must be the effective defense of allies in Asia against China.
In August 2024, the Heritage Foundation published a paper called*The Prioritization Imperative*, which described the need for:
A new defense strategy to change that. Under this strategy, America’s military would prioritize defending the U.S. homeland and denying China’s imperial ambitions, most urgently by deterring Beijing from invading Taiwan. At the same time, Washington would empower allies and partners to lead efforts to defend against Russia, Iran, and North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support.
In the past 24 hours, details have emerged of a memo signed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense that provides guidance on how a China First strategy is to be developed and implemented. A 29 MarchWashington Post article described it as follows:
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reoriented the U.S. military to prioritize deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan and shoring up homeland defense by “assuming risk” in Europe and other parts of the world, according to a secret internal guidance memo that bears the fingerprints of the conservative Heritage Foundation.
The document, known as the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance and marked “secret/no foreign national”in most passages, was distributed throughout the Defense Department in mid-March and signed by Hegseth. It outlines, in broad and sometimes partisan detail, the execution of President Donald Trump’s vision to prepare for and win a potential war against Beijing and defend the United States from threats in the “near abroad,”including Greenland and the Panama Canal.
The rationale for this policy is that America is no longer able or willing to devote sufficient resources to guarantee the security of Europe and Pacific at the same time. Priorities are necessary in strategy, and at least for now, the American priority is the competition and confrontation with China. China is certainly the most dangerous adversary America has faced, and unlike Europe, there is no unified military alliance in the Pacific to contain or deter Chinese aggression.
Notwithstanding this rationale, the ‘China First’ has several challenges:
First, this policy is built on America deconstructing the 80 year old military alliance and security architechture in Europe. The first Trump administration began this process and the current administration appears to be accelerating American withdrawal from the Continent. Its lack of any new military assistance packages for Ukraine since its inauguration and discussion about how pathetic Europe is by the Vice President all appear to be leading to what is an inevitable U.S. disengagement from European nations. Not only will this have significant economic impacts for America as European nations reduce buying U.S. weapons, it will encourage Putin to be more aggressive against Ukraine, the Baltic nations and Scandinavian countries.
A second problem is that China is not an isolated challenge - at least not anymore. The closer alignment of Chinese and Russian aspirations for a post-America global system has led to China becoming the key enabler of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It has also led to the first ever deployment of North Korean troops to a European theatre of war.
More chillingly, there is now what I would describe as a “Learning and Adaptation Bloc”, containing Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. This bloc is sharing lessons about battlefield operations, military technology, defence industrial production, hybrid operations strategies, as well as coercion, sabotage and subversion techniques. Crucially, this bloc is sharing lessons on how to learn better and faster. Russia over the past three years has learned how to learn better. These insights are sure to be gained and exploited by all members of this learning and adaptation bloc.
Russia, Iran and North Korea all pose serious challenges, most of which involve American interests somewhere in the world. And, if any of these nations percieve an American focus on China as an opportunity to be more aggressive against their neighbours, they will almost certainly exploit this situation.
Thus, a focus on China alone is unlikely to achieve the strategic impacts that the authors of this policy hope that it will. And as we all know, hope is not a valid national security strategy!
Third, the exclusive focus on Taiwan is dangerous because it limits thinking and planning about other potential areas where China can - and probably will - act aggressively against American partners and allies in the Pacific.
The Chinese are very unlikely to make any grab for Taiwan without ensuring that America and its allies aren’t distracted by other concerns elsewhere. Other scenarios which could also involve American and its allies might include one, or a combination, of the following but this is not an exclusive list:
A Taiwan blockade, not an invasion.
A Senkakus conflict.
Establishment of a Chinese base in the South Pacific.
Increased Chinese influence over PNG/Manus or the seizure of Manus Island.
Chinese aggression against Vietnam.
Major natural disasters.
Japan and the U.S. The American Defense Secretary is visiting Japan and today stated that Japan is indispensable in tackling Chinese aggression by helping Washington establish a "credible" deterrence in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait. Hegseth also noted that "we share a warrior ethos that defines our forces," and described Japan as a "cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific."
Given the very different narrative that the new U.S. administration has used to describe NATO and its European allies, this will be a welcome statement of support from America in Japan and many other parts of the western Pacific. I don’t this this means however that U.S. allies in the region will be given a free ride. It is very likely that there will still be calls for countries in the region to increase defence spending.
China Intrudes in the Senkakus. Just to make my point about non-Taiwan contingencies, the Chinese these weekconducted a sustained intrusion into Japanese waters in the Senkaku Islands. The Japan Coast Guard has stated that four Chinese vessels intruded into Japanese waters over a period of 92 hours. This was the longest intrusion into Japanese waters by Chinese Coast Guard vessels since Japan purchased the main part of the Senkakus from a private Japanese owner in September 2012.
Taiwan’s Defence Spending. President Lai Ching-te last week described how Taiwan will increase its spending on defenceto over 3 percent of its GDP as part of an ongoing transformation of its military structure and posture. However, given Trump administration officials have called for even higher spending by Taiwan, includingsome proposing a figure of 10% of GDP, it is likely that Taiwan will continue to face pressure to increase spending beyond the 3% aiming mark announced by the Taiwanese President. This comes as Chinarecently announced that it would increase its spending on defence by 7.2% this year.
Source:Research Project on China’s Defence Affairs
The Research Project on China’s Defence Affairs this week released its latest update on PLA Joint Combat Readiness Patrols around Taiwan. You cansee this above.
This week, the Taiwanese Coast Guard seized an unmarked fuel freighter in Taiwan’s contiguous zone. The Chinese are suspected of employing vessels like this to refuel other ships operating illegally in Taiwanese-administered waters, including Chinese ships that conduct undersea cable cutting and sabotage. The seized ship had no name, certificate, or port of registry, and attempted to flee rather than comply with the Taiwanese Coast Guard inspection. It had about 500,000 liters of fuel aboard.
Taiwan’s new naval USV. Image:TWZ
In other news from Taiwan, it has unveiled its first domestically designed and built naval uncrewed surface vessel (USV). The Taiwanese military aniticipates deploying it in the Taiwan Strait. Called the*Endeavor Manta,*the USV has a payload of about one ton and a top speed of over 35 knots.
North Korea Military Modernisation. North Korea has announced several interesting force modernisation initiaitves recently. First, there was the leader of North Koreavisiting his country’s new airborne warning and control aircraft, including some nice internal pictures. Recently, North Korea also announced the development and deployment of ‘AI-assisted’ suicide drones. These are almost certainly something that will benefit from North Korea’s learning from the operations of its soldiers deployed with Russian forces to fighting against Ukraine.
Secretary, Typhon and Nemesis in the Pacific. During a visit to the Philippines this week, the U.S. Defense Secretary reaffirmed Washington's "ironclad" defence treaty with the Philippines. He promised to deploy U.S. capabilities to counter Chinese "aggression".
The Philippines recently saw the deployment of second U.S. ArmyTyphon missile system. The Typhon system is able fire both Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles. The first deployment of the Typhon to the Phillippines occued in April 2024, and it has remained there since. The Typhon missile system is deployed in northern Luzon.
On Friday, the U.S. Defense Secretary announced the deployment of the advanced Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, called NMESIS, along with what he termed “highly capable unmanned surface vessels”. The NMESIS (Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) mobile ground-based anti-ship missile system will be deployed for Exercise Balikatan (a U.S.-Philippines military exercise) next month. The NMESIS missiles will increase U.S. missile strike power in the Philippines. The NMESIS anti-ship missiles are precision, sea-skimming missiles with a range of about 160 kilometres.
Of course, the Chinese Communist Party is unhappy about this, primarily because the U.S. is able to conduct anti-access and area denial operations againt the PLA with these systems.
Russia in the Pacific. This week, thePLA Tracker released its assessment of Russian operations around Japan in the past year. The data includes Russian warships and aircraft, and examines trends over the past five years in the operations of the Russian forces proximate to Japan. You canread the report here.
Australia’s Defence. This week, the Australian government handed down the budget in advance calling the federal election for 3 May 2025. Despite the bringing forward of around A$1 billion, the Defence Budget remained largely unchanged from its previous trajectory and is currently set to maybe just fall over the line into 2% of GDP. It will be hard to increase defence spending however given the projected budget deficits over the coming years. That said, deficits are not in themselves an obstacle to increasing defence spending.
The key issue in Australia is perception of threat. Unfortunately, one of the impacts of Australia’s geography is that people believe that its location at the bottom of the world, and that the country inhabits an entire continent surrounded by sea all by itself, is incredible complacency about defence.
Australia’s first HIMARS launchers arrived this week and are headed for the 10th Fires Brigade. Image: Australian Army
That complacency is no longer warranted. In an era where our potential adversaries are building and deploying an expanded long-range missile force able to hold Australian infrastructure at risk and coerce Australian policy, continuously conducting cognitive warfare against Australian citizens, and engaging in aggressive military actions against Australian warships and aircraft across the Western Pacific (includingoff the Australian coast), the need for a more comprehensive deterrent regime and military capability for Australia is clear. And it is needed faster than current plans that might see this arrive in the mid 2030s.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 2024 China report
There are many problems in Australia’s Department of Defence, which have become increasingly clear as the pace of adaptation has sped up in the past few years. The explosion in the use of uncrewed vehicles, across all domains, also appears to have taken the Department of Defence by surprise. Aside from a few small, exquisite programs, it has underfunded uncrewed weapon systems in all the services, and is yet to introduce any armed drones.
Despite this, the biggest challenge for Australia in its defence enterprise is leadership. As I explain ina new article for theSydney Morning Herald today, the lack of risk tolerance and creativity, combined with a bloated, committee-centric strategic leadership structure, means that despite the best efforts of the amazing soldiers, sailors, airmen and women in the operating forces, Australian defence planning and deployment of new force structures and technologies is simply too slow. There is also minimal investment in new uncrewed systems and an inability of the over centralised HR oligarchy to stem the continuing fall in numbers of full time personnel.
Perhaps a new government might be able to fix this. But I am not holding my breath.
The Pacific. The Pacific covers such a massive proportion of the earth’s surface that is sometimes hard to come to grips just how big it is, and diversity in the array of cultures and perspectives of the people that live along its periphery. Returning to Simon Winchester’s terrific book about the Pacific region, he writes that:
It is the most turbulent ocean in the world, and an expanse of sea that should be central to all our thoughts. Is the ocean to be a place of coming war? Is it to be our eventual saviour, a place so beautiful and fragile that its sheer vastness will one day demand that we pause in our careless and foolish behaviour in the rest of the world?
That concludes my Big Five edition focussing specifically on The Pacific. Next week, I will return to my normal format that examines Ukraine first with a following section on Pacific security affairs.
*****
Now, let’s turn to this week’s recommended readings.
This week, I have included the new report from the U.S. Intelligence Community as well as a report publication that explores Cognitive Warfare. I have also included the Swedish citizens handbook to prepare them for crisis, a story about Russia’s declining police force, and finally, a story from the Kyiv Independent on the potential for a new Russian spring offensive in Ukraine.
As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.
Happy reading!
1. New U.S. Intelligence Community Threat Assessment
This week, the U.S. intelligence community (IC) released its annual threat assessment. Two key elements stood out for me. First, that the assessment puts non-state actors up front in the documents. The 2023 edition put China, Russia and other state actors first, followed by health security and climate change issues. Non-state actors did not make an appearance until late in the document. Same with 2021. The other important section is the topic of collaboration between authoritarians. I have been writing about this Iran-Russia-China-NK learning community for a while. It is good to see the IC focusing on it. You can read the full reportat this link.
2. Cognitive Competition, Conflict, and War
Over the past few years, the literature on the concept of cognitive warfare has expanded considerably. Cognitive warfare has roots in strategies of deception and influence of political and military activities, exemplified by tactics from ancient times like Sun Tzu. It is different from information warfare: infowar focusses on controlling the dissemination of information whereas cognitive warfare strategically aims to shape and manage the reactions of individuals and groups to that information. This latest report from Robert Bebber offers a way ahead for western nations on this topic, andcan be read here.
3. Guidance to Citizens in Case of War
In November 2024, the government of Sweden published a new document that aimed to provide guidance to all of its citizens in how to prepare for, and act during, national crises. These crises could include war, national disasters, terrorist attacks, pandemics or significant cyber attacks. It is an excellent example of a government having a mature discussion with its citizens about security challenges that might impact the entirety of society, and is a useful model for other nations to follow. You can read the full publicationat this link.
4. Russia’s New Offensive?
According to the government of Ukraine, Russia is planning to launch a new offensive campaign in Ukraine. This time, it expects the main effort to be the Ukrainian regions of Kharkiv and Sumy. The Kyiv Independent has a story about all the latest developments in this potential Russian offensive, which you can readat this link.
5. A Police State without Police
Russia is facing a shortage of police officers at a time of rising, increasingly violent crime. This situation is predicted to to get worse with the return of veterans of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is a useful article that explores one of the interesting implications of Russia’s mobilisation as a ‘war state’. You canread the article here.
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