The Indo-Pacific has become the focal point of great power competition, where naval dominance is a decisive factor in shaping the regional balance of power. At the heart of this contest is the stark contrast between China’s surging shipbuilding capabilities and the United States’ struggles to maintain its maritime superiority. A closer examination of both nations’ shipbuilding capacities reveals the extent to which China is outproducing the United States, particularly in military vessels, with serious implications for regional security.
China’s Expanding Naval Production
China’s meteoric rise as a maritime power is backed by its rapidly advancing shipbuilding industry. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the world’s largest navy in terms of fleet size, boasting over 370 battle force ships, with projections indicating it will exceed 435 ships by 2030. This expansion is driven by China’s extensive network of state-supported shipyards, many of which have dual-use capabilities, allowing commercial shipbuilding infrastructure to be converted for military purposes.
A critical factor in China’s shipbuilding supremacy is the synergy between state-owned enterprises and the military-industrial complex. The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) merged in 2019 to form a behemoth that streamlines production and enhances efficiency. This integrated system enables China to produce warships at an unprecedented rate, with a capability that far surpasses that of the United States. In 2024 alone, China built more naval tonnage than the entire U.S. industry has since World War II.
China’s shipbuilding advantage is further reinforced by significant government subsidies, access to a massive pool of skilled labor, and direct party-state oversight to ensure rapid completion of naval projects. Moreover, Chinese shipyards have shown remarkable efficiency in producing advanced platforms, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious assault ships, at a pace that the U.S. cannot match.
United States’ Declining Shipbuilding Capacity
In contrast, the United States’ shipbuilding industry faces serious structural and operational challenges. The U.S. Navy currently operates around 296 battle force ships, with plans to expand the fleet to over 350 ships by the 2040s. However, achieving this goal is fraught with difficulties. The U.S. has only a handful of operational shipyards capable of building large warships, a stark contrast to China’s vast production network. The U.S. shipbuilding workforce has also declined significantly, dropping from 120,000 to about 72,000 over the past two decades.
Another major hindrance to U.S. naval expansion is the high cost and lengthy timelines associated with warship production. The construction of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, for example, takes roughly four years, whereas China can build a Type 052D destroyer in nearly half that time. U.S. shipyards are further burdened by bureaucratic inefficiencies, complex procurement processes, and a lack of coordination between government and private industries.
While efforts are being made to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding sector—including initiatives to integrate commercial and military shipbuilding and invest in workforce training—these measures are unlikely to yield immediate results. The constraints on U.S. shipbuilding raise concerns about the Navy’s ability to sustain its forward presence in the Indo-Pacific, especially in light of China’s rapid fleet expansion.
Implications for Indo-Pacific Defense
The disparity in shipbuilding capabilities between China and the United States has significant ramifications for Indo-Pacific security. China’s ability to rapidly produce and deploy naval assets enhances its capacity to enforce maritime claims, conduct power projection, and challenge U.S. naval dominance in critical waterways such as the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The recent dual-aircraft carrier drills conducted by the PLAN underscore its expanding operational reach.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy’s relative decline in fleet size and shipbuilding capacity limits its ability to counterbalance China effectively. With global commitments stretching its resources thin, Washington faces mounting pressure to reinforce its military posture in the region through partnerships and alliances. The AUKUS pact and QUAD initiatives, which aim to enhance maritime security cooperation with Australia, Japan, and India, reflect a strategic pivot to mitigate China’s naval expansion.
However, alliances alone may not be sufficient if the U.S. cannot accelerate shipbuilding and fleet modernization. A prolonged failure to address its industrial limitations risks ceding greater strategic space to China, allowing Beijing to dictate the maritime order in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
The ongoing naval arms race between China and the United States is marked by Beijing’s ability to outproduce Washington in warship construction at an alarming rate. China’s state-backed shipbuilding sector, coupled with strategic investments and production efficiencies, has enabled the PLAN to expand at a scale unmatched by the U.S. Meanwhile, the United States grapples with shipyard limitations, cost overruns, and a shrinking workforce, all of which hinder its ability to compete in naval production.
If the U.S. is to maintain its naval preeminence in the Indo-Pacific, it must undertake a fundamental restructuring of its shipbuilding industry. Failure to do so will not only weaken America’s strategic position but also embolden China’s maritime ambitions, reshaping the balance of power in the region for decades to come.