The Nordic and Baltic region is now NATO’s front line. The war in Ukraine and growing uncertainty over the US commitment mean that the so-called Nordic-Baltic Eight group are at the heart of European defense. Like a heart, they are both critical and vulnerable.
The group has cooperated on defense for decades but often lacked urgency. Early efforts focused on practical steps like joint training, logistics, and cyber defense to boost resilience without duplicating the alliance structure.
That worked in a more stable world. But since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the strategic environment has changed. Finland and Sweden ended their long-standing neutrality and joined NATO in 2023 so that, for the first time, all eight countries are part of a single military alliance, creating an integrated northwest flank and transforming the region into a coherent defense zone.
Despite its preoccupation with Ukraine, Russia continues to menace its neighbors through large-scale drills whose main purpose is to practice an invasion. The strategic exercise Zapad 2025, scheduled for the fall, is expected to simulate a large-scale conflict with NATO and will likely feature cyberattacks, nuclear signaling, and pressure across the Baltic Sea and High North.
Hybrid threats haven’t slowed either. Russia routinely jams GPS satellite signals in the north, targets infrastructure like undersea cables, spreads disinformation and uses migration flows as a form of pressure.
These threats were manageable while the US stood behind NATO. But it is clear that things are changing — a March 29 Washington Post report stated that a Pentagon memo signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the US was “unlikely to provide substantial, if any, support to Europe in the case of Russian military advances,” though the nuclear umbrella would remain in place.
Washington’s pivot to Asia is real. Critical capabilities — air defense, intelligence, and logistics — still depend heavily on US assets. Europe must prepare for scenarios where US leadership is absent or delayed. For the Nordic-Baltic region, that means building resilience, and capacity. Immediately.
The three Baltic states have responded decisively, committing to increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP, while the Nordics are also taking action.
Finland and Sweden have long-established total defense models that blend military and civilian readiness. Norway and Denmark focus more on state continuity and infrastructure protection. The Baltics, influenced mainly by Finnish thinking, are reintroducing conscription, investing in civil defense, and building physical barriers.
Differences in how defense is organized could hamper cross-border efforts but shared threat perception is driving a growing convergence.
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The accession of Finland and Sweden has indeed redrawn the defense map of Northern Europe. NATO can now operate across land, sea, and air. The Suwałki Gap — once a narrow lifeline — is now one of several reinforcement routes. The island of Gotland gives Sweden control over key sea lanes, and Finnish territory connects the Baltics to the Atlantic through Norway.
This brings clear advantages, but also new exposure. Longer frontlines increase the need for coordinated planning and rapid mobility, but NATO must be prepared to defend a much larger operational space.
In 2014, NATO adopted new regional defense plans to guide operational readiness and response. This established forward presences, which have since been expanded. Germany leads the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalion in Lithuania (aiming for a new brigade size unit), Canada does so in Latvia, where Sweden now also contributes substantially, and the UK in Estonia. Allies also operate NATO Air Policing missions in Lithuania and Estonia. There are currently also rotational US forces in Lithuania and Estonia.
The Nordic-Baltic Eight should coordinate closely with all these nations to ensure seamless defense across national borders.
The EU’s evolving defense ambitions also offer opportunity. The White Paper on European Defence and ReArm Europe are signs of a more serious approach. EU funding could help close regional capability gaps in mobility, air defense, and ammunition, could also support regional defense industries.
The so-called NB8 group also must play an active role in shaping the EU defense agenda, ensuring European tools complement, rather than replace, NATO efforts.
The need for deeper regional cooperation is growing fast. The NB8 format supports practical defense cooperation, while the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) offers a military tool for rapid deployment in the Baltic Sea and High North. Regional defense cooperation also benefits from the joint NORDEFCO format.
The Nordic Baltic countries are Ukraine’s strongest supporters (the top six aid providers by GDP are all from the group) and understand that if Ukraine falls, the balance of power in the region collapses. All eight have signed long-term security agreements with Kyiv, committing to military aid, economic support, and political backing. Nordic states lead in air defense and artillery support, while Norway (which decided in March to more than double Ukraine aid to $7.8bn for 2025) is investing oil revenues into Ukraine’s defense industry.
Northern Europe now confronts its most serious security challenges in a generation. The NB8 countries have to accept this and identify exactly how to respond.
The key imperatives are as follows:
Maintain NATO commitments to the region, but if transatlantic unity fades or frays, build capacity to act on a Europe-only level.
Invest in total defense and resilience — military, civil, and societal.
Using new and existing EU tools and funding to strengthen defense industries, mobility, and supply chains.
Deepen cooperation with and between the NB8, NORDEFCO, and JEF, along with other key players like Germany and Poland.
Provide sustained military and political support to Ukraine.
The Nordic-Baltic region is no longer NATO’s weak point. It’s becoming one of its most resilient areas. But strength alone isn’t enough. Strategic maturity — and the willingness to lead by example — is what the moment demands.
Eitvydas Bajarūnas is an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Europe Policy Analysis (CEPA). Assessments and views expressed in the article are those of the author and should not be treated as the official position of the MFA of the Republic of Lithuania.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.* *CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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