by Martha M. Bradley, Marko Svicevic | Mar 31, 2025
DRC
Enveloped in a myriad of armed conflicts, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) recently witnessed a significant escalation of hostilities when the March 23 Movement (M23) seized the provincial capital Goma. The situation received particular scrutiny given the deaths of some twenty members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), deployed to the DRC as part of the South African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). SAMIDRC first deployed to the DRC on December 15, 2023, to “neutralize negative forces and armed groups,” including the M23. The escalation of hostilities and seizure of Goma has understandably caught the attention of the public and politicians alike.
Consequently, one question has arisen: given Rwanda’s assistance to the M23, including direct combat support, is SAMIDRC involved in an armed conflict with M23 or Rwanda (or both)? In South Africa, another question is whether the country is “at war” with Rwanda given the M23 seems to operate as Rwanda’s proxy.
An escalation of tensions between South Africa and Rwanda accompanied the seizure of Goma. In a press release on January 29, 2025, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa responded to concerns surrounding the losses of SANDF troops, saying,
South Africa’s military presence in the eastern DRC is not a declaration of war against any country or state. …The presence of the SAMIDRC forces demonstrates a commitment of [Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)] member states to supporting the DRC in its efforts to achieve lasting peace and stability and ultimately, create an enabling environment for sustainable development and prosperity.
In contrast to the President’s comments, the concept of a declaration of war has fallen into disuse. In its 2024 “Conflict Classification Opinion Paper,” the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed that “International humanitarian law (IHL) applies to situations of armed conflict; a de facto state of hostilities dependent on neither a declaration nor recognition of the existence of ‘war’ by its parties” (emphasis added). Whether SAMIDRC is engaged in an armed conflict in the DRC depends on an objective and factual test.
Establishing whether SAMIDRC is a party to an armed conflict in the DRC is therefore no easy task and requires considerations of the nature of its mandate, the nature of the M23 as an armed group, and the relationship between the M23 and Rwanda. It is also worth noting the divergence of opinions as to whether the conflict between M23 and States parties aligned with the DRC constitutes an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international armed conflict (NIAC).
A NIAC Between SAMIDRC and the M23?
SAMIDRC may qualify as a party to the pre-existing NIAC between the DRC and the M23, in part given its offensive mandate (p. 69). In a previous Articles of War post, Jennifer Maddocks gave a historical overview of the earlier armed conflict involving the M23, the DRC, and Rwanda. Since November 2021, the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) have been engaged in a NIAC with the M23. Additionally, since December 15, 2023, and at the request of the DRC government, SAMIDRC forces have been present in the DRC and have actively engaged the M23 (see here and here).
According to the ICRC’s support-based approach, an entity intervening in a pre-existing NIAC—including an international organization such as SADC and its SAMIDRC deployment—may become a party to that conflict (see here, p. 16). The requirement is that the support offered by the external entity must have “a direct impact on the opposing party’s ability to carry out its military operations.” Indirect forms of support that would allow for the build-up of military capabilities for the benefactor, for example, are therefore insufficient to lead to participation in the conflict.
The ICRC has elaborated on the threshold of external backing required to satisfy the conditions of the support-based approach. The outside party to the pre-existing NIAC must be “pooling or marshaling military resources or coordinating actions with one of the belligerents of the pre-existing NIAC in order to fight a common enemy” (p. 16). Applied to the conflict in the DRC, this consideration must take into account the very nature of the SAMIDRC deployment. Despite numerous suggestions to the contrary, in particular by South African officials, there is no doubt that the SAMIDRC deployment is offensive in nature.
We have recently argued elsewhere that SAMIDRC is primarily a peace enforcement operation rather than a peacekeeping one. The SAMIDRC mandate confirms its offensive nature, with the operation tasked to “neutralize negative forces and armed groups” in the DRC. Additionally, the operation’s basis in collective self-defense in line with the SADC Mutual Defence Pact suggests SAMIDRC’s presence in the DRC is in response to what SADC considers an armed attack against one of its Member States. Given SAMIDRC’s numerous offensive operations against the M23, it seems evident that its intervention in the DRC is meant to directly impact the M23’s ability to carry out military operations. As such, SAMIDRC is a party to the NIAC between the DRC and the M23.
An IAC Between SAMIDRC and Rwanda (by Proxy)?
Moreover, the conflict between the M23 and SAMIDRC (and by extension SADC contributing countries) may qualify as an IAC. The classification of the fighting relationship between the M23 and SAMIDRC depends on defining the nature of the relationship between the M23 and Rwanda. Simply put, if M23 acts under the overall control of Rwanda, then SAMIDRC may be a party to an IAC in which Rwanda is the opposing State party. The DRC alleges that the M23 is under the overall control of Rwanda, an allegation it recently included in its referral of the situation to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and a letter transmitted to the UN Security Council. Both the M23 and Rwanda deny these allegations. Despite the contested nature of these claims, we have previously suggested (e.g., here) that the M23 may act under Rwanda’s overall control.
To this end, it is worth recalling the definitional criteria of the term “overall control.” According to the ICRC, when one State exercises overall control over an organized armed group that is fighting the armed forces of another State, the situation is classified as an IAC (see here, p. 12). In other words, two States are engaged in an armed conflict, one of which is fighting the organized armed group deploying its own armed forces, and the other is indirectly engaging the former via an organized armed group under its overall control. The concept of “overall control” requires greater State involvement than merely providing “financial assistance or military equipment or training” to the armed group (Prosecutor v Tadic, para. 137). However, “overall control” does not necessarily mean the State issues the organized armed group with specific orders or directs its military operations. As the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadic explained:
Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group.
The final report of the UN Security Council’s Group of Experts on the DRC seems to confirm that Rwanda exercises overall control over the M23. Among other things, the report points to “unequivocal evidence of external combat support for M23, mainly by [the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF)], constituting a violation of the arms embargo.” Such support includes the provision of mobile short-range air defence systems (para. 47) and drone-borne mortar shells (para. 52). In addition, the report provides evidence of Rwanda having a role in the execution of military operations (paras. 40–45). M23 combatants and two RDF officers interviewed by the group of experts reported that M23’s operational capacity to launch parallel military operations “depended on RDF military and strategic support” (para. 44). The report also includes several examples of “joint” operations to achieve territorial expansion (paras. 32–33). As we have previously argued, such evidence strongly suggests that the M23 indeed acts under Rwanda’s overall control. Therefore, it appears likely that SAMIDRC is party to an IAC with Rwanda.
The Alternative: SAMIDRC as a Party to a Parallel IAC and NIAC?
Finally, SAMIDRC may be engaged in a parallel IAC and NIAC in the DRC. This is the case if the evidence points towards Rwanda’s direct involvement in the conflict but not its exercise of overall control over the M23. On February 21, 2025, the UN Security Council explicitly called on Rwanda to withdraw its troops from the DRC (UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025), para. 4). Set alongside the report of the group of experts, which estimates that up to 4,000 Rwandan troops are present in the DRC, this is the strongest indication to date that in addition to participating in the hostilities via the M23, the RDF is present and fighting in the DRC.
If M23 and the RDF are indeed allied in fighting SAMIDRC in the DRC, and SAMIDRC has clashed directly with the RDF, then the consequence is twofold. On the one hand, SAMIDRC is party to a NIAC with the M23, and on the other, it is also a party to an IAC with Rwanda. To date however, while there are numerous reports of hostilities between SAMIDRC and the M23, there is as yet no confirmation that SAMIDRC has directly engaged Rwandan forces.
Conclusion
The situation in the DRC and the recent and significant escalation of hostilities in January 2025 warrants a cautious approach. Questions of conflict classification must take into account the deployment of SAMIDRC to the DRC. The mission’s offensive mandate, combined with targeted operations against the M23, suggests that in line with the ICRC’s support-based approach, SAMIDRC is a party to the pre-existing NIAC between the DRC and the M23. Particularly important to this assessment is the fact that SAMIDRC’s operations aimed to impact the M23’s ability to carry out military operations.
Concerning the conflict between SAMIDRC and Rwanda, much depends on how one views the relationship between the M23 and Rwanda. If the M23 is indeed acting under Rwanda’s overall control, then SAMIDRC is engaged in an IAC with Rwanda. In the event that Rwanda does not exercise overall control over the M23, SAMIDRC may nevertheless be engaged in parallel conflicts against both the M23 and Rwanda, due to Rwanda’s direct involvement in the conflict.
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Martha M. Bradley is Associate Professor in the Department of Public Law at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
Marko Svicevic is a Lecturer and Researcher at the Centre for International Humanitarian and Operational Law, Faculty of Law, Palacký University in Olomouc, the Czech Republic.
The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War*, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.*
Photo credit: Thabiso Doyisa
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