When, in 2019, Latvia introduced its comprehensive defense model, the world was a different and safer place. No perceived internal threat to transatlantic military cooperation could be identified, and Russia still had not launched its bid for the full-scale destruction and conquest of Ukraine.
With hindsight, one could say that by highlighting comprehensive defense — the idea that every element of society must be engaged in its protection — Latvia was building an essential pillar to its security architecture, the others being the National Armed Forces, NATO’s collective defense, and international cooperation. Now, almost six years later, the decision looks to have been very far-sighted.
The years of Soviet occupation between 1940 and 1991 have left a lasting and negative imprint not just on Latvia’s statehood, economy and population, but also on its civic culture. The Soviets taught their people, including those in occupied territories, total reliance on the state, which implied that citizens are not expected to take the initiative, but should instead wait for the state and the Communist party to show the way.
Obedience went hand in hand with an acquired attitude of helplessness. It’s true that not all individuals submitted to this approach, and Latvian society never lacked dissidents, but the destruction of the civic space has had its consequences — one of which is a refusal to take responsibility for the public good.
The change came at the end of the 1980s, when the national movements in the Baltic states dared to challenge Soviet hegemony, and won back their independence with the help of the West.
But the economic turmoil of the 1990s, which saw rising inequality and social strains, have robbed many of the little confidence they managed to pluck up in the years of awakening. In the case of Latvia, the cleavage between the Latvian-speaking majority and the Russian-speaking (and Russia-leaning) minority was still very tangible at the end of the 1990s, and this led to a society that was hard to inspire to joint action, let alone to mobilize for defense.
Fortunately for those of us who were born and grew up in the Baltic states just before national independence was re-won, those years also saw a long peace on the European continent. Young Balts of the 1990s, like myself, were free to pursue their individual (and individualistic) aspirations, without giving too much thought to the need to ensure the sustainability of our societies beyond EU integration and NATO membership. These, it was believed, would make us safe and prosperous.
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That mood changed in the mid-2000s, with a rising awareness that modern democratic statehood requires citizens ready to stand up for the rule of law against corruption and oligarchy. After the first Russian invasion in the Donbas and Crimea in 2014, a new strand of civic activism emerged — the awareness that Latvians may need to defend their country against Russia, and that such a need may arise in our lifetime.
Latvia’s Defense Concept (2023) highlights that “understanding of shared values and strengthening of civic activities and participation form the basis for the resilience of society” and proposes “extensive involvement of citizens and communities in defense.” The actual policy does not always live up to these lofty aspirations, but there are several areas of progress: volunteering for the National Guard and military service is on the rise, and civil society is increasingly interested in building resilience from the bottom up.
Defense spending has increased to 3.45% of GDP this year from a low of 0.9% in 2014. It is on track to reach 5% by 2027.
Growing civic awareness has been noticeable in recent years. After a peak in its membership in the 1990s, the National Guard (Zemessardze) has seen the number of its volunteers dwindle, but by 2023 their number again rose to 10,000.
There is very little doubt that the target of having 12,000 National Guards by 2027 will be easily surpassed well before that. There are many Russian-speakers among the National Guard, as the old ethnic cleavages are gradually giving way to a less divided society. Re-introduction of (limited) military conscription in 2023 was met with divided feelings by the Latvian society (Lithuania reintroduced it in 2015), but there is no shortage of volunteers joining the armed forces.
Comprehensive defense, however, is not merely about more people willing to take up arms to protect the country. It is primarily about societal resilience, consisting in awareness of risks and preparedness to respond. The response may be highly specific and requiring professional skills — e.g. joining the Cybersecurity Unit of National Guard, supported by the national Ciber Incident Response Institution. Or it may be much broader, engaging local communities in districts of big cities like Riga.
In March this year, I helped conduct hybrid crisis simulations in two of Latvia’s biggest municipalities — Riga and Daugavpils. While the difference between the two could not be bigger at the political level, in both cities I found a number of civil society organizations willing to ensure that their neighborhood was better prepared to monitor and prevent the risks of sabotage and disinformation.
Some of these NGOs are actively learning the basics of crisis resilience and cooperating with the armed forces. And increasingly, they are demanding a similarly responsible attitude from their municipalities, including those closest to the borders of Russia and Belarus.
It is crucial that this demand for coordination and resilient communities is supported by political leaders at all levels and also by all municipal administrations, building societal resilience from the bottom up.
Marija Golubeva is a Distinguished Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) She was a Member of the Latvian Parliament (2018-2022) and was Minister of the Interior from 2021-2022. A public policy expert, she has worked for ICF, a consultancy company in Brussels, and as an independent consultant for European institutions in the Western Balkans and Central Asia.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.* *CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Comprehensive Report
By CEPA International Leadership Council
CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.
February 10, 2025
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Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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