AbstractPolitical actors may resort to drastic measures, including election-related violence, to pursue electoral victory. While free and fair elections are fundamental to any democratic system, electoral violence threatens the integrity of this process and poses a serious challenge to democracy. Such violence manifests in various forms, including harassment, intimidation, assassination, and threats. It remains prevalent as a strategic tool for political figures struggling for power. This paper contends that incumbents, particularly unpopular ones, frequently use electoral violence to retain power, viewing it as a necessary means to secure victory. Focusing on Nigeria’s 2019 elections, this study examines the electoral violence reportedly perpetrated under the Buhari administration. Drawing on data from respected international and local election-monitoring groups, the ACLED dataset, and surveys from Afrobarometer, the study finds that when public dissatisfaction and mistrust in government are widespread, incumbents may increasingly resort to electoral violence to ensure regime continuity. The paper concludes with an analysis of the impacts of electoral violence on democracy, emphasizing how it not only obstructs democratic processes but also gradually erodes democracy.
IntroductionElectoral malpractice and manipulation are a challenge to the legitimacy of election results, and electoral violence is a distinct form of electoral malpractice that aims to manipulate the election process (Birch, 2019; Lehoucq, 2003). The issue of electoral violence poses a challenge to democracy, and democratic experts have tried to suggest ways to ensure fair and peaceful elections, free from any form of violence. Electoral violence is a form of political violence aimed at influencing electoral processes and outcomes to benefit specific candidates, encompasses actions such as assassination, intimidation, threats, theft, destruction of voting materials, and the deployment of thugs to disrupt voting and intimidate voters (Okafor, 2015; Fischer, 2002; Onapajo, 2014; Adigun, 2019; Nwolise, 2007; Omotola, 2010). In many African countries, electoral violence has become a significant factor in democratic transition (Wasserman and Jaggard, 2007; Onapajo, 2014; Nwolise, 2007; Adigun, 2019), with Nigeria experiencing this pattern in nearly every election since gaining independence in 1960 (Omotola, 2010). Incumbents in Nigeria have been able to introduce well-designed, systematic violence and have integrated it into the electoral process, thus, manipulating the outcome of elections.This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on who dominates the use of violence as a means to rig elections and advances the suggestion that the incumbent is dominant in the use of election-related violence based on findings from the 2019 Nigerian elections. This article argues that electoral violence is a strategic tool for the incumbent in the struggle to retain power, mainly an incumbent that has become ‘unpopular’ (explained below), as they view it as a crucial strategy to win elections. Since incumbents possess executive power, they engage all necessary institutions including the police, against opposition during the elections. Incumbents possess a greater financial advantage due to their access to state funds, which enables them to finance various forms of electoral violence. The 2019 election is very significant because it tested if the incumbent APC party, who came into power for the first time in 2015 since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, defeating the longstanding incumbent PDP, could maintain the seat of power. The argument in this article further shows that the nature of power possessed by the executive in Nigeria contributes to the incumbent’s use of violence to rig elections.This article starts with a theoretical discussion on electoral violence and democracy and debates on which political actors use electoral violence more in the electoral race. This article progresses to its case study, the issue of electoral violence in the 2019 election, and the role of the incumbent. The article concludes with a discussion on the intentional rise in unemployment and poverty as strategies employed by incumbents to recruit ‘political war dogs’ for election-related violence, concluding with an analysis of the impact of such violence on democracy.Democracy, electoral violence, and electionsCountries can use more than one type of democracy (Diamond, 2002) and the post-Cold War era has seen increased literature on hybrid regimes. Over the years, there have been many variations of democracy practiced by governments all over the world, for example, former President of Nigeria; Olusegun Obasanjo, recently called on Africa to adopt what he called ‘Afro-democracy’ as he insisted that the system of liberal democracy introduced by the West seems not to be compatible with African cultures and therefore not working for Africa. By Afro-democracy, he meant an ‘African-styled’ democracy that can reflect the African continent’s culture, traditions, and beliefs (Vanguard, 2024).Literature on democracy has tried to categorize regimes based on their democratic practice. Maurice Duverger (1959), categorized political parties as ‘cadre parties’ which according to him are organized by those with social and economic influence in the society, and ‘devotee parties’ which he says are led by a religious or charismatic leader (Duverger, 1959). Scholars like Anifowoshe (2004) in line with Duverger (1959), argue that the Nigerian democratic party system follows either the part of a ‘religious devotee’ system or the influence of those with powerful economic status. Scholars like Diamond (2002), who have followed Nigeria’s democratic transition categorized its practice of democracy as ‘elite based’ and hegemonic in operation. Kirchheimer (1966), in his writings, categorized a democratic social order controlled by the bourgeois, as described by Karl Marx. Similarly, Nigeria’s democracy is heavily influenced by elites, godfatherism, and cabals, who fiercely compete for positions, either for themselves or by supporting their loyalists. This is reflected in the degree of violence throughout election periods, increased insecurity, and political instability, which hampers the election outcome. This complicated democratic system has led scholars like Diamond to classify Nigeria’s political system as ambiguous (Diamond, 2002). Levitsky and Way (2002) argue a political system they described as ‘competitive authoritarianism’ where elections are actually held and generally free of massive fraudulent activities, however, incumbent through the use of state institutions and resources significantly skew the competing field against opposition, including monitoring and controlling information from the media.Existing studies indicate that electoral violence represents a special form of political violence, different from others in timing and who/what it targets (Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009, p. 289). Electoral violence is a technique employed to ‘disable and disrupt’ the opposing party (ies) from succeeding at polling units, impair the election result by undermining its integrity, or attempt to influence voters’ choices through intimidation and threats (Albert, 2011). Electoral violence is any ‘violence (harm) or threat of violence aimed at any person or property involved in the process of election, or at disrupting any part of the electoral or political process during the election period’ (Okafor, 2015). Igbuzor (2009) defines electoral violence as ‘any act of violence perpetuated during political activities, including pre, during and post-election periods, which includes thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral processes or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with the electoral process.’ Thus, electoral violence is a crisis fueled by the anticipation of an election to influence voters or the voting process through force, to obtain a result in favor of a particular political party or group.Electoral violence can be carried out by both state and non-state actors (Taylor et al. 2017). Non-state actors including extremist groups, or anti-governmental organizations like Boko Haram, may carry out electoral violence for personal agenda. State actors, which is the focus of this article, employ electoral violence to influence the electoral process and outcome through forceful means (Bekoe, 2012; Onapajo, 2014; Höglund, 2009; Omotola, 2010). It takes various forms such as assassination, kidnaping, harassment, threat, stealing of ballot box and election materials, and armed attacks on voters and electoral officials (Nwolise, 2007; Omotola, 2010; Adigun, 2019). These activities occur at any time during the election period (Seeberg et al. 2018; Söderberg and Bjarnesen, 2018) and are directly connected to the electoral process. The targets of this violence include; “electoral stakeholders (voters, candidates, election observers, election officials, media), electoral information (registration data, voting results, campaign materials), electoral facilities (ballot boxes, polling stations) and electoral events (campaign rallies, voter-education exercises, vote-counting exercises)” (Fischer, 2002, p. 9).Studies on election-related violence have argued on which political actors engage majorly in this form of violence, that is, whether it is the opposition that is invested in deploying electoral violence in the struggle to win elections, or it is the incumbent that engages electoral violence in a bid to retain power. Empirical studies have generally argued that incumbents are the main actors sponsoring violence during elections (Onapajo, 2014; Chaturvedi, 2005; Straus and Taylor, 2009). However, in a contrary argument by Collier and Vicente (2008), using their proposed model experiment on the 2007 Nigerian general elections, their findings showed that oppositions are more likely to result in violence during elections because they see it as the only option they have to challenge the tactics (vote-buying and vote-miscounting in this case) of the incumbent during elections. Their study gave rise to debates, and scholars like Onapajo (2014) in an attempt to interrogate their findings, examined the same 2007 Nigerian general elections using a different methodological approach which involves collecting and analyzing reports from independent election observers with a record of reliability and integrity.Onapajo (2014) in his study also analyzed the 2009 Nigerian elections in Ekiti state, and based on empirical evidence argued that incumbents are more violence-oriented during elections and use it to keep the opposition down. He argued that; ‘incumbent, by the enormous and unchecked power it possesses over the use of force, does have the capacity to unleash terror on the opposition and others to win elections and retain power’ (Onapajo, 2014). Straus and Taylor (2009: 15) carried out a broader study on electoral violence in Africa from 1990–2007 with findings that the incumbent much more than the opposition, engages in and sponsors violence during elections to maintain power. Their study reported that “out of the 124 cases of any violence, incumbents were the primary perpetrators in 105 of the cases; by contrast, oppositions were the primary perpetrators in only 18 of those cases.” Incumbents in a democratic system can operate a system called ‘politics of enemies,’ either through their language or sponsored election-related violence, thus affecting the electoral process and societal stability (Ignatieff, 2022). Taylor et al. (2017) estimated that over 80% of electoral violence is perpetrated by the incumbent, including pre-, during, and post-electoral violence. Daxecker’s (2014a,b) study on elections in Africa from 1990–2009, argued that the presence of international observers influences the incumbent to shift the use of election-related violence to the pre-election period.Opposition may engage in post-electoral violence in the form of violent protests, as a reaction to the electoral process or outcome, including responding to accusations of electoral fraud by the incumbent. Thus, when the opposition perceives the incumbent has manipulated the electoral outcome, they may engage in post-election violence to express their anger or displeasure (Young, 2020; Akowuah, 2024; Smidt, 2016; Borzyskowski, 2019; Daxecker, 2012). Young (2020) for example, using Zimbabwe as a case study sought to test the reactions of opposition after a series of state-sponsored electoral violence, and found that instead of fear, opposition and their supporters tend to express anger, leading to post-electoral violence. Smidt (2016) and Daxecker (2012) made findings that when reports of international observers reveal incumbent involvement in electoral fraud, there is an increased chance of post-electoral violence by the opposition, with Smidt (2016) analyzing about 230 elections in Africa from 1990–2009.Electoral violence is integral to most elections in sub-Saharan Africa (Hegre, 2014; Wasserman and Jaggard, 2007; Bekoe, 2012). Countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Congo, have faced violent challenges to their democracy and have continued to struggle to contain violence especially election-related violence like that of Ethiopia’s 2005 elections, Kenya’s 2007 elections, and Zimbabwe’s 2008, with consequences of economic collapse, instability and civil war (Lamin, 2011; Bekoe, 2012). Kenya for example, is known for serious violence during elections as a result of power monopoly by the incumbent, with post-election violence in 2007 resulting in more than 1000 deaths (CIPEV, 2008). Elections in Zimbabwe since 2000 have been overwhelmed with incumbent-sponsored violence, including using the police and military to intimidate, harass, and kill opposition members and their supporters by Robert Mugabe’s government (HRW, 2008). Data from the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD) reported that between 1990–2012 about 390 elections were conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, 132 were disrupted by pre-election violence, and 91 experienced post-election violence (Salehyan et al. 2012). Also, African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD) (Straus and Taylor, 2009) reported that at least 60% of elections conducted in Africa between 1990–2008 were marred by electoral violence.In Nigeria, elections including gubernatorial, local government, and presidential experience different forms of electoral violence including; voter intimidation, threats, stealing of ballot boxes and materials, destruction of polling units, harassment, thuggery, deployment of state security against opposition and supporters (Onapajo, 2014; Nwolise, 2007; Omotola, 2010; Okafor, 2015). The violence that shaped the electoral process of the 2019 presidential elections was on the increase compared to the 2015 election which was recorded as generally free, fair, and peaceful (IRI/NDI Final Report, 2019, pp. 8–9, EU EOM, 2019; SBM, 2019; HRW, 2019; THISDAY, 2019). Over 96 election incidents occurred from November 2018 to election day, February 23, 2019, which resulted in about 361 known deaths (NCSSR, 2019). The report further stated that 29 out of the 36 states were affected, covering all the geopolitical zones.This article contributes to the literature on electoral violence by presenting empirical evidence from Nigeria’s 2019 presidential election, arguing that electoral violence serves as a strategic tool for the incumbent to maintain power when they perceive it as a necessary means for regime survival, especially an incumbent who has become ‘unpopular.’ Here, unpopular refers to a scenario where the electorate has lost confidence in the incumbent, usually due to unfavorable government policies, economic decline, high unemployment, corruption, and public dissatisfaction. In response, the incumbent may sponsor various forms of violence, including the use of thugs to intimidate the opposition, ballot rigging, threats, and even assassination, to secure electoral victory. As Hafner-Burton et al. (2018) noted, unpopular incumbents frequently resort to violence to limit competition out of fear of losing power to popular opponents. In Nigeria, the high centralization of power on the executive, allows the president to exert significant influence over the security agents to suppress opposition through harassment and arbitral arrests (Ashindorbe, 2018). Consequently, the election deepened public mistrust and eroded confidence in the electoral process, with surveys indicating that over 78% of Nigerians had little to no faith in its fairness (Afrobarometer, 2019a; NCSSR, 2019; EU EOM, 2019).Data and methodologyData for this article were obtained from reports of reliable and trusted independent electoral observers (both domestic and international) who have monitored and analyzed elections in Nigeria and worldwide over the years. These observers have proven to be impartial, thorough, and transparent in their analysis. They include; the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), the USA National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI) which is a nonpartisan and nongovernmental organization aimed at promoting democracy, operating in over 100 countries on election observation and other democratic issues. These organizations disperse observers across all 6 geo-political zones in the country covering both remote areas that may be overlooked, up to 6 months before the elections to study the election atmosphere, campaigns, inclusivity, and violence amongst other issues. This makes their report crucial to the analysis of this article.ACLED, an authoritative source that collects and codes reported political violence including the nature and actor involved, documented various incidents of election-related violence in Nigeria’s 2019 elections. Although ACLED remains a renowned source, the author compared data obtained here to that of domestic and foreign observers. Studies have indicated that some incidents reported by ACLED may not be election-related and, therefore, do not qualify as electoral violence. Scholars like Oyewole and Omotola (2022) thoroughly screened 2177 electoral violence incidents reported by ACLED in the 2019 Nigeria general election and found that only 267 were election-related violence.Data from the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room (NCSSR) was also instrumental in this article. The NCSSR is a group that ensures elections in Nigeria are transparent and credible. They partner with various remarkable organizations known for pursuing democracy, monitoring and documenting political violence, groups such as the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), and over seventy other civil society organizations. Over the years, data from the Situation Room have proven to be trusted and reliable. The author has utilized it, especially in documenting the types, nature, and actors involved in the violence. Also, in recording the number of deaths, casualties, and violent incidents during the election cycle, data was drawn from SBM Intelligence, a firm focused on socio-political and economic developments, monitoring and analyzing violent incidents in Africa.Analysis and reports from sources like Human Rights Watch (HRW) have also contributed to this article as they have monitored Nigeria’s electoral process in line with their allegiance to civil liberty and fairness over the years, conducted surveys, and obtained witness reports from polling units nationwide. Survey reports from Afrobarometer were used to assess the perception of voters concerning the state of the country since Buhari came into power and how they felt about his capacity to lead the country and keep his campaign promises. There are also reports included from major newspaper and media outlets such as ThisDay, AriseNews, and Guardian, however, the author was careful to analyze these reports and has not based the findings on them, with the awareness that a news station or newspaper can be paid by any party in the election to say or write things against the other party (ies).Electoral violence and incumbent battle in the 2019 elections: a regime survival strategyAfter three failed democratic attempts cut short by a military takeover, Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999 marking her 4th republic, and has continued with uninterrupted ‘competitive’ elections. However, Nigeria’s democracy has faced many challenges, with some scholars classifying the democratic practice in Nigeria as flawed and illiberal (Onapajo, 2014; Ogundairo et al., 2020). Other political analysts and sources have classified Nigeria as operating a hybrid system; mixing democratic and authoritarian rule (Freedom House, 2022; Democracy Index, 2022; Diamond, 2002).The contribution of the opposition in violence during elections cannot be ruled out nor denied, however, this study argues that the majority of violence pre-, and during the election period is sponsored mainly by an incumbent that has become unpopular. It is essential to point out that Nigeria’s electoral process can be encumbered with violent disruptions by insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, for the propagation of personal agenda.The 2019 election, if won by the incumbent, would secure Buhari’s second term in office. Buhari first became President in 2015 after defeating the then-incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, marking the first time an opposition party had defeated an incumbent since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. This outcome supports Diamond’s assertion that “the ability to turn the ruling party out of power is a crucial threshold for democratization” (Diamond, 1999). The 2015 election was hailed as one of Nigeria’s most peaceful, with Jonathan graciously accepting his defeat and calling to congratulate Buhari on his victory. This act of statesmanship was widely praised as a demonstration of democracy at its best, and Jonathan was honored with several peace awards for his conduct. The 2019 election presents an opportunity for a deeper analysis of the role of political actors in electoral violence. It highlights two key issues: the struggle of a defeated opposition who held power for 16 years before being overthrown by the incumbent in 2015, and the challenge faced by the incumbent who despite having recently assumed office, was facing loss of public confidence. Perceptions of dissatisfaction and disappointment with his leadership, particularly with the promise of change during his 2015 campaign, raised concerns about his chances for re-election. This election thus serves as a critical test of the incumbent’s ability to maintain power amidst growing disapproval from the public.The public generally expressed dissatisfaction with Jonathan’s administration, particularly in 2013 and 2014 when a sharp global drop in oil prices severely affected Nigeria’s petroleum-dependent economy (Lewis and Kew, 2015; Afrobarometer, 2019b). The Jonathan administration under PDP also faced various accusations of high levels of corruption, lack of transparency, reckless spending by government officials, weakness especially with regards to the overwhelming Boko Haram insurrection, insecurity causing heightened public unrest and widespread fear (World Bank Report, 2020; NBS, 2017; Adetoro, 2012). In regards to security, the abduction of about 276 Chibok school girls by the Boko Haram terrorist group in April 2014, led to both a national and an international outcry, causing the people to question the capability of Jonathan’s administration to protect lives and property in the country, with some making claims that the Boko Haram insurgency was linked to the corruption of his administration (Tella, 2015; HRW, 2012; Bintube, 2015; Nkwede, 2013; Odo, 2015). This incident set social media ablaze with the hashtag ‘bringbackourgirls’ making rounds on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram with even the former first lady of the United States, Mitchell Obama, posting it on her official Facebook handle. These issues became intolerable, hence, the candidacy of Buhari under the APC party gave hope to many Nigerians, as a one-time military leader in the 1980s who was firm against corruption and deemed capable of tackling insecurity because of his military background.Buhari’s campaign promised to tackle and eradicate corruption, ensure government transparency, and reduce reckless spending on the part of political office holders stirred electorates towards him. His popularity and reputation for integrity grew, especially in the northern states, with people hoping that he was the man to curb corruption in government, hold government officials accountable, restore security especially as he was a military leader, and ensure economic growth which was one of his main campaign promises. It was reported that during his campaign, Buhari stated that he would make ‘naira equal to dollar in value if voted in’ and he would ‘crush Boko Haram within three months and recover all territories they have seized’ (Vanguard, 2015; Dataphyte, 2015). Buhari, referred to as Nigeria’s ‘broom’ president, as a broom was the symbol of his party and mission to sweep out corruption and bad leaders. He came in with lots of promises during his campaign, however, the end of his first tenure seemed worse than that of his predecessor as many Nigerians expressed unsatisfaction and disappointment, with issues of failure to obey the rule of law, increased ethnic and religious divisions, ethnic marginalization and unemployment (API, 2019, HRW, 2018) (Table 1).Table 1 Place and nature of violence with the party involved.Full size tableA survey by the Africa Polling Institute in 2019 revealed that about 45% of Nigerians lament about the ethno-religious divisions as opposed to the last 4 years, 70% say that there are a set of people under Buhari’s regime who are “above the law” which opposes his campaign promise to respect and ensure every person holding political position is subject to the rule of law. The report further showed that 80% of people believe that the government favors one ethnic group over another, and 74% accuse the government of discriminating against their religious group (API, 2019). Human rights abuses also marked the end of Buhari’s first term, corruption allegations and scandals, economic recession, worsened insecurity, increased hardship, currency devaluation, spike in food and transportation prices, increased poverty, increased unemployment, increased tax amidst hardship, media and press suppression as opposed to his inauguration speech where he promised freedom of the media, ethno-religious divisions and conflicts (BBC Africa, 2019; Freedom House, 2020; HRW, 2019). It was reported that Under Buhari’s administration, Nigerians faced the highest food prices since 1999, as food inflation surged dramatically (Okafor, 2021). Nigeria experienced the worst economic decline since Buhari came into power, with a two-time recession in 2016 and 2020 (Premium Times, 2020).Under Buhari’s first tenure, on the corruption perceptions index (CPI) Nigeria rose from 136 position to 150 out of 180 countries (Statista, 2019), defeating Buhari’s number one agenda to fight corruption, and further implicating his government as more corrupt than that of his predecessor. Reports show that Nigeria lost about $174 billion to corruption at the end of 2015, a few months after Buhari’s ascension to office (Akinmutimi, 2016). Concerning insecurity, in 2017 alone, “Boko Haram carried out 135 attacks” (IRN/NDI Final Report, 2019, p. 17), with military bases as the main target continuing till 2019. This is counter-reflective of his promise to crush the group within the first 3 months if elected. These issues combined to inform the voters’ choice, making the incumbent unpopular, especially amongst the youth, and the incumbent being aware of this general perception of dissatisfaction was ready to take any measure to ensure they won the elections. Survey revealed that many electorates were disappointed with the first four years of Buhari’s administration (USIP Special Reports, 2018; API, 2019). Hence, a major strategy deployed was electoral violence, to keep the opposition and their supporters from participating in the elections and forcing electoral officials to manipulate figures (IRI/NDI Final Report, 2019; EU EOM, 2019; HRW, 2019) (Figs. 1 and 2).Fig. 1: Showing Nigeria’s exchange rate decline according to CBN data.Source: CBN https://www.dataphyte.com/latest-reports/facts-contradict-buharis-claim-of-fulfilling-2015-election-promises/.Full size imageFig. 2: Showing Nigeria’s low GDP growth rate between 2015–2019.Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).Full size imageNature of electoral violence in the 2019 electionsVarious election observers, both international and local, duly monitored the 2019 election. The observers included; The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Observer mission (led by former Liberian President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf), the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the African Union observation team, National Democratic Institute, and International Republican Institute (NDI/IRI) joint observer mission, The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria (EISA) led by former Zambian President, Rupiah Bandah, Amnesty International (AI), Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room (NCSSR) and several small independent observer groups including journalists representing various media houses.Contrary to the 2015 presidential election which saw a peaceful transition of power and sent a positive signal throughout Africa for other heads of state to emulate (EU EOM, 2015; NCSSR, 2019, p. 1; Vanguard, 2019), a general observation by various monitoring groups was that the 2019 presidential electoral process was shrouded with highly orchestrated and organized election-related violence which was politically motivated as opposed to the expectation of building on the path set by the 2015 elections (IRI/NDI Final Report, 2019; API, 2019; NCSSR, 2019; EU EOM, 2019; HRW, 2019; EISA, 2019). The EU EOM reported that about 150 people were killed as a result of the 2019 electoral violence in several parts of Nigeria, stating that; ‘the elections became increasingly marred by violence and intimidation, harming the integrity of the electoral process and may deter future participation,’ because electorates had expressed fear for their lives as to the uncertainties that await them while they go to cast their votes at their various polling units (EU EOM Final Report, 2019, p. 23). SBM Intelligence and NCSSR reported 626 election-related deaths, with 161 violent incidents across the six geo-political zones (SBM, 2019; NCSSR, 2019). There were reports of the assassination of opposition candidates, kidnapings, mysterious disappearances, opposition candidates receiving threat letters and emails, acts amounting to intimidation including using security agents for unlawful arrest, and detention of opposition supporters during peaceful campaigns (IRI/NDI Final Report, 2019, pp. 8–9; HRW, 2019; Vanguard, 2019; EU EOM, 2019).One of the first major issues of the 2019 election, which was a strategy of the incumbent to discourage opposition voters, was the impromptu postponement of the elections on election day. The 2019 general election which was set to take place on the 16 February 2019 for the Presidential and National Assembly, was postponed by INEC (the body for organizing elections) a few hours before the voting time without prior notice, to the 23 February and 9 March, respectively, with the major reason being logistic problems such as lack of transportation for voting materials and election officials in some parts of the country (BBC, 2019; Vanguard, 2019). However, on the later date that the election was scheduled, there were still issues of late arrival of electoral officials and materials in many parts of the country, with elections going deep into the night for many units exposing them to the risk of thugs who forced voters to vote for the incumbent (Vanguard, 2019, IRI/NDI, 2019; Guardian, 2019a). This action was a clear move to discourage the initial voter apathy. It was met with heavy condemnation from the general public, election observers, civil rights organizations, and electoral candidates, especially the PDP candidate, Atiku Abubakar, calling it a move by the incumbent to influence the outcome of the election, stating in a tweet that ‘it was an attempt by the administration to disenfranchise the electorate.’ INEC received about ₦143 billion (around $500 million as of then) as the budget for the elections (Daily Post, 2018), hence the excuse of logistics such as transportation and insufficient voting materials is questionable. It is important to point out that the INEC chairman, Mahmood Yakubu, was appointed by Buhari towards the end of 2015.Uche Secondu, PDP chairman, accused Buhari of still wanting to ‘cling onto power even when it’s obvious to him that Nigerians want him out,’ stating that the delay was ‘dangerous to our democracy’ (Vanguard, 2015; The Guardian, 2019b). Voters were generally angry and frustrated by the postponement; Musa Abubakar in Daura said ‘he couldn’t believe the postponement after having traveled about 342 miles to vote.’ Another voter in Kano said she was ‘greatly disappointed’ and Ibrahim in Abuja said ‘I came all the way from my home to cast my vote this morning, I am not happy, I’m very, very angry’. Some voters also expressed their suspicion of incumbent involvement, Adamezie in Warri said ‘I see this postponement of the election as a ploy to rig.’ Chukwueze said; ‘Nigeria has shown that it is corrupt, and next Saturday we are not going to come out’ (BBC Africa, 2019). The postponement of the elections resulted in a low voter turnout of 35%, marking the lowest recorded since 1999 rating the lowest in the continent, revealing a mistrust in the electoral process (Ojetunde, 2019). Incumbents can secure an electoral advantage by ensuring that fewer opposition supporters can vote, either by making strict laws regarding obtaining the voter’s card or by discouraging the initial voter apathy through things like procrastination, which makes voters conclude that their votes will not matter or elections will be rigged.From the above discussion of the events that took place in Buhari’s first term in office, it is seen that the incumbent has lost favor in the sight of many electorates and the factors of ‘change, fight against corruption, and “new hope”’ which contributed greatly to Buhari’s success in the 2015 elections was now being presented to the dissatisfied electorates by his strongest opposition, Atiku of PDP. Postponing the elections on no other time than a few hours before the election was a strategy to reduce the number of people that will come out to vote on the next fixed date, discourage monitoring groups as it will cost them more while giving the incumbent more time for election manipulation and rigging opportunities. It was also an intentional act of the incumbent to create a heightened atmosphere, achieved by angry electorates, especially the youths, using the opportunity to perpetrate various forms of electoral violence with reports of thugs intimidating opposition supporters, tearing down opposition posters especially that of PDP (ICG, 2019; HRW, 2019; Guardian, 2019a). In summary, the postponement by INEC allowed the incumbent to introduce well-integrated electoral violence of various forms and manipulate the electoral process (Birch; Lehoucq, 2003).About three weeks before the elections, Buhari suspended the Chief Justice of the Federation, Justice Walter Onnoghen, based on a false declaration of personal assets before assuming office in 2017. However, this action faced condemnation as many election observers both foreign and local, political analysts and activists described it as unconstitutional and an illegal act that fails to follow due process, pointing to its adverse effect on the future of democracy in Nigeria (EU EOM, 2019; AI, 2019; HRW, 2019). The role of the judiciary is very sensitive in overseeing election-related matters such as result disputes, and the incumbent would not give a chance to any obstacle that would during the elections. This action raised concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary and respect for the rule of law, deemed also as ‘untimely, politically motivated and a dent of electoral process’ (NCSSR, 2019, p. 4).The nature of election-related violence perpetrated in the elections includes; abduction and mysterious disappearances, arbitral arrests and detention of journalists by police, attack on electoral offices and officials by political thugs, destruction of electoral materials, snatching of ballot boxes, intimidation and harassment of voters, sexual harassment and assassination of opponents, hate and threatening utterances by incumbent, use of security agents for violence against opposition (HRW, 2019; ACLED, 2019; SBM, 2019; NCSSR, 2019; Vanguard, 2019; CDD, 2019).The Situation Room reported its concerns over the activities of security agents, mainly the police and military, operating as a partisan unit (NCSSR, 2019; EU EOM, 2019; IRI/NDI, 2019). Security agents, instead of operating independently and ensuring peace in various polling units, assisted APC thugs in hijacking and destroying voting materials, and disrupting the counting of votes, especially in places like Rivers State (Vanguard, 2019; AI, 2019; NCSSR, 2019). In Abonnema for example, security agents just stood and watched when APC thugs attacked voters; ‘soldiers at the INEC center, during the distribution of voting materials for various polling places, did nothing to stop thugs with APC banners from harassing and intimidating voters’ (HRW, 2019). Violence done by the police and military was reported in Delta, Plateau, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Anambra, Lagos, and Rivers State amongst others (NCSSR, 2019). The Nigerian civil society led campaigns against security agents like the Department of State Security Services (DSS) and the Police Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) for extrajudicial and partisan activities amounting to human rights abuses including acts such as arbitrary arrests of opponents, unlawful detention and torture. At the end of 2018 leading up to the election in 2019, the DSS and the police were involved in harassment and unlawful detention of journalists who criticized the government, especially on issues of corruption and insecurity during the election period. Reports revealed that several civilians who granted interviews and gave information on military misconduct and bad governance to NGOs and election monitors were threatened and, in some cases, harassed by military officials (NCSSR, 2019). The Niger Delta Watch (NDW) reported that in the Niger Delta region alone, there were 35 cases of intimidation, detention, and mysterious disappearances of mainly opposition candidates and members of the civil society (NDW, 2019, p. 4).The role played by the police and military in places like Rivers State was alarming to many monitoring groups (EU EOM, 2019; HRW, 2019; AI, 2019; CDD, 2019), with reports from INEC officials accusing security agents of refusing to intervene when thugs disrupt polling units with opposition strongholds but when voters protest against the disruption by thugs in their centers, they are violently dispersed or teargassed by the police and military (HRW, 2019). ‘Four armed DSS officials and seven police officers sat in their car and did nothing to stop or arrest APC supporters as they intimidated voters at the unit,’ a 26-year-old election official in Gama said observers from Human Rights Watch. In Kano, an independent election observer said that ‘about 15 police officers stood and did nothing when he and his team were threatened by APC thugs and commanded to leave the unit’ (HRW, 2019). Voters were chased from their polling units if they were not voting for the incumbent, and observers and media agencies were either chased or denied access to collation centers by thugs and even security personnel (CDD, 2019).Voters, INEC officials, and observers were subjected to intimidation by security agents and political thugs (CDD, 2019, p. 5). Voters were exposed to harassment as there was no voting secrecy in many units especially those in the rural areas, and places like Ogbomosho, Oyo State, thugs forced voters in Ward 4 to reveal their ballot papers before casting it into the ballot boxes, and those who did not vote for the incumbent were beaten thoroughly (NCSSR, 2019). In states like Rivers, Lagos, and Kano, many electorates were prevented from voting if they wanted to vote for the opposition (NBA, 2019; Ibeogu and Nwusulor, 2021). In an interview, a voter said; ‘we know the thugs were sponsored by the APC because the next day during the supplementary elections the thugs were targeting people attempting to vote for the PDP at polling units,’ another 44-year-old voter in Gama said; ‘they didn’t allow people vote if they were not voting for the APC’ (HRW, 2019, Vanguard, 2019). INEC officials were forced to compromise election results to favor the incumbent. Some eye-witnesses in Emuoha and Bonny, Rivers State, said that armed men with machetes destroyed voting materials and assaulted INEC officials who did not cooperate with ‘orders from above.’ One official said; ‘the attackers beat and slashed a female colleague with a knife,’ another official said that she was forced to sign election results showing the incumbent victory whereas she had no clue about those results (HRW, 2019). Opposition party members and leaders were also victims of violence, with the case of sexual harassment on the PDP vice-chairman in Ikwo LGA, Ebonyi State, who was beaten and molested by APC thugs.The way political leaders view political positions contributes significantly to the use of violence during elections, and this can be seen in hate speech and verbal threats during campaigns. These practices are usually ignored as constituting violence but have been shown to have psychological effects on victims and represent a form of structural violence. Electoral violence can be physical, structural, or psychological (Nwolise, 2007), and the threat of violence has a direct effect on opposition supporters by reducing their intention to vote in that election by over 50 percent due to fear (Bratton, 2008, p. 625). During the election campaign, it was alleged that Buhari said that if he loses ‘heads will roll.’ Another example was the statement made by the former governor of Kaduna state, Nasir El-Rufai of APC, who threatened international observers that they would leave in ‘body bags,’ making this statement when the opposition called for the international community to intervene in the elections due to the degree of electoral violence and fraud (Vanguard, 2019). The highest death rate as a result of electoral violence was recorded in the northwest with 172 deaths, and the northeast followed with 146 people killed while the South–south and North–central recorded 120 and 111 deaths, respectively, the southwest recorded 63 deaths, and 14 in the southeast with many of these killings alleged to be carried out by the incumbent party (Sanni, 2019; NCSSR, 2019).The use of electoral violence to rig elections and its impact on democracy in NigeriaElection, which is a core foundational principle of democracy, ought to be reflective of the people’s choice, but through electoral violence, it becomes a forceful imposition of a government on the people, even when it is clear they have rejected that government. Electoral violence of any kind impedes democracy but has unfortunately remained the reality of elections in Nigeria (Nwolise, 2007; Onapajo 2014). A culture of electoral violence makes it difficult for a democracy to thrive as it is counter-reflective of the choice of the people, Ake (2001) stated; ‘a culture of elections that is marked by violence and warfare is thus totally anathema to the possibilities of development’ (Ake, 2001). The incumbent in the 2019 elections viewed it as ‘warfare’ against the opposition and their supporters, recording one of the highest election-related violence with about 65 reported attacks in 2019 alone, including assault on electoral officials, arson, theft, abduction, assassination, and shootings (ACLED, 2019).Freedom House report (2020) ‘The 2019 Presidential and National Assembly elections of Nigeria, which saw Buhari re-elected and the All-Progressives Congress (APC) regain its legislative majority, were marred by irregularities.’ EU EOM in their report stated that the conduct of the 2019 election was poorly done and ‘marked by severe operational and transparency shortcomings, electoral security problems, and low turnout’ (EU EOM, 2019). Incumbent use of electoral violence gave room for other forms of electoral manipulation like figure manipulation, with empirical evidence showing that ‘the elections did not meet the credibility threshold based on the patterns of abuse of the process and the consequent lack of integrity observed’ (EU EOM, 2019, p. 4; NCSSR Final Report, 2019, p. 1). A further democratic decline is evident in the increased dispute against election results, which can be seen in the high number of petitions by aggrieved candidates and parties, with about 766 petitions filed in the 2019 election against the incumbent party across the country as reported by the Court of Appeal (ThisDay, 2019) majorly on the issue of government-sponsored violence which dampened the electoral process and results (Yahaya, 2019).The effects of electoral violence on ‘Nigeria’s political image has been most damaging to the country’s path to democratic consolidation’ (Adebisi and Loremikan, 2013), and the use of electoral violence to retain power has caused citizens to lose trust in the electoral process (EU, EOM 2019; APl, 2019), with the government viewed as the ‘enemy of the people’ (Bekoe, 2011). On June 12, 2024, Nigeria celebrated 25 years of unbroken democracy, but the question remains; how democratic is the democracy in Nigeria?ConclusionElection gives the ability to the people to express their choices and will, therefore, the electoral process must be free and fair to see the true reflection of the people’s desire and attain a true representation of the people. However, elections are sometimes interrupted by violence, to control and determine the electoral outcome based on the perpetrator’s interest. This article empirically argued that electoral violence is mainly sponsored by the incumbent, especially an incumbent that has become unpopular because they view it as a necessary strategy to win elections and ensure regime survival. However, this paper does not ignore the role of the opposition in electoral violence and notes that non-state actors such as Boko Haram, may perpetrate electoral violence in pursuit of various personal interests.Studies on electoral violence have debated whether the incumbent or opposition is the primary perpetrator of electoral violence, with most scholars arguing that the incumbent is the primary sponsor of pre-election and election-day violence, which can influence the electoral outcome. On the other hand, literature purports that the opposition may engage in post-election violence, which does not affect the election outcome. This they do to assert or express their anger when evidence reveals that the incumbent manipulated election results. Using the case of Nigeria, the findings of this study strengthen the argument that the incumbent, especially one that has become unpopular, is the primary sponsor of electoral violence to control the electoral process, win elections, and ensure regime survival.This article highlights that the extensive nature of the executive power in Nigeria is significant in explaining the incumbent’s dominance in electoral violence, as well as other structural issues such as high unemployment, and poverty. The 2019 election portrayed the incumbent’s weaponization of unemployment and poverty especially of the youth population, using them as “political war dogs” to carry out violent acts such as voter intimidation, ballot box snatching, and even assassination, in exchange for small financial incentives. Furthermore, the deployment of state power, including security forces and other institutions, to suppress opposition and control the electoral process reflects the extensive power of the incumbent in Nigeria, and its ability to wield violence as a political tool. The opposition would find it difficult to match the incumbent’s violence even if they tried. The violent manipulation of elections leads to democratic backsliding, where the very institutions that should safeguard democracy are used to eliminate political opposition.
Data availability
This research did not analyze or generate any data.
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