Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attends Nowruz events in Tehran, Iran on March 21, 2025 [Iranian Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency]
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attends Nowruz events in Tehran, Iran on March 21, 2025 [Iranian Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency]
The United States has once again escalated its threats of military action against Iran and its nuclear programme. Recent reports indicate an increased concentration of US fighter jets and refuelling aircraft in the region, signalling a policy of brinkmanship aimed at forcing Iran into submission. However, this strategy carries a serious risk: instead of coercing Iran into abandoning its nuclear ambitions, it could push Tehran towards developing nuclear weapons as a viable deterrent against US threats.
For years, the Islamic Republic has insisted that it does not seek nuclear weapons, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei even issuing a religious decree (fatwa) against their use. Yet, as external pressure has intensified, Iranian officials have hinted increasingly at reconsidering this stance. The latest — and perhaps most striking — statement came from Ali Larijani, the former Speaker of Iran’s Parliament and special envoy to the Supreme Leader, who warned that if the US or Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear facilities, Tehran would have no choice but to pursue nuclear arms. More significantly, he framed it as a demand of the Iranian people, arguing that national security concerns would force the government’s hand.
While Iranian leaders have long dismissed nuclear weapons as being incompatible with their strategic doctrine, there has been a gradual but clear rhetorical shift in recent years. The first major public acknowledgment of this shift came in February 2021, when Iran’s then-minister of intelligence warned that if Iran were “pushed in that direction, the responsibility would lie with those who pushed us, not with Iran itself.” This statement was unprecedented at the time, as it linked external pressure directly to the possibility of Iran revisiting its nuclear doctrine.
Then, in May 2024, Kamal Kharrazi, senior advisor to Khamenei and head of Iran’s Foreign Relations Council, stated that if Iran’s nuclear facilities were attacked or if the country’s survival was at risk, “Iran would be left with no choice but to reconsider this doctrine.”
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More than just political rhetoric, Iranian public opinion has also shifted toward nuclear armament. According to a June 2024 IranPoll survey, a majority of Iranians now support their country acquiring nuclear weapons in stark contrast to previous years when public sentiment was more divided. This growing popular support for nuclear weapons challenges the assumption that Iran’s leadership can maintain a policy of nuclear non-proliferation indefinitely under increasing external threats.
In November last year, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi warned explicitly that if the European troika of France, Germany and the UK triggered the snapback mechanism and re-imposed UN sanctions, Iran would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This statement signalled the regime’s willingness to cross a critical threshold that could lead to an irreversible nuclear weapons programme.
Some argue that Iran has been weakened too much to pursue nuclear weapons, pointing to its deteriorating regional influence. The collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the assassination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the diminished offensive capabilities of Iran’s proxy forces, and the relentless US air strikes against the Houthis in Yemen are all cited as evidence that Iran’s regional power is in decline.
Moreover, critics highlight recent claims — such as those made by Trump administration official Steve Witkoff in an interview with Tucker Carlson — that Iran’s air defence systems suffered severe damage in Israel’s April 2024 air strikes, leaving Iranian airspace vulnerable. They conclude that Iran lacks the capacity or strategic leverage to make good on its nuclear threats.
However, this analysis is deeply flawed. If Iran perceives itself as weakened, it will be even more, not less, likely to seek nuclear weapons.
History demonstrates that states facing existential threats sometimes resort to extreme measures. If Tehran concludes that conventional deterrence is insufficient and that diplomatic negotiations are futile, the cost-benefit analysis of nuclear armament shifts.
Iran’s leadership understands that threats alone are not enough to deter US or Israeli air strikes. Without nuclear weapons, Iran remains vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks on its infrastructure and military capabilities. However, if Iran were to develop a nuclear arsenal — or even reach the threshold of nuclear capability without crossing the line into weaponisation — it could fundamentally alter the strategic calculus in the Middle East. The mere perception that Iran has a nuclear deterrent could make military intervention against it significantly riskier for the region.
This is precisely the scenario that US policymakers should seek to avoid. Yet, Washington’s insistence on maximum pressure and its unwillingness to negotiate a swift, realistic deal may push Iran over the edge.
The United States faces a critical decision: continue escalating threats and risk forcing Iran towards nuclear weapons, or pursue a diplomatic path that offers Iran incentives to maintain its non-nuclear stance.
In any event, Washington’s current brinkmanship strategy is unsustainable.
Every indication suggests that Iran is on the verge of fundamentally reassessing its nuclear doctrine. From government officials to public opinion, the shift is clear: if Washington does not change its approach soon, Iran may cross the nuclear threshold, not out of ambition, but out of necessity.
If the US truly seeks to prevent a nuclear Iran, it must abandon its maximalist demands and engage in serious negotiations before the situation spirals out of control. Otherwise, the very policies meant to stop Iran’s nuclear programme may end up accelerating it, turning a hypothetical threat into a strategic reality.
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