Editor’s Note: Alex Langlois analyzes the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa with a particular focus on the Levant and Syria. He has written for the National Interest, Newsweek, the New Arab, Common Dreams, Inkstick, Real Clear Defense, and Real Clear World and published with Carnegie, the Quincy Institute, the Lowy Institute, and Gulf International Forum among others. He also worked for the International Republican Institute on Syria programming focused on democracy and governance, human rights, and peacebuilding projects. This is his first piece for Stimson.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The new Syrian caretaker government faces many challenges after 14 years of brutal conflict ended with the Assad regime’s abrupt collapse in December. In a country facing a plethora of urgent needs, interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara’a is focusing on improving the economy and stabilizing security – utilizing international diplomacy to achieve these goals while postponing moves toward a democratic transition.
Al-Shara’a quickly appointed an interim government after the Assad regime’s collapse, mostly consisting of former ministers who had governed Idlib province under the rule of the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a Sunni Jihadist faction formerly associated with al-Qaeda. This move initially fostered concerns in Syria and internationally that al-Shara’a’s aim was to install an Islamist government over the entire country. Yet the decision reflected the reality that government entities had become largely defunct and corrupt under Assad. Additionally, al-Shara’a inherited a collage of political and military entities with complex and varying alliances that were failing to provide essential services to the Syrian people. The economy remains collapsed, with 90 percent of Syrians living under the poverty line.
On March 29, al-Shara’a named a new caretaker government that included two mainstream activists, a woman and members of the Christian, Druze, Alawite and Kurdish minorities but kept loyalist Sunni Muslims as heads of the sensitive defense, foreign affairs and interior ministries.
A local source who spoke to this author on condition of anonymity prior to the announcement was blunt: “al-Shara’a has had to rely on officials he can trust as the country remains a failed state with active resistance from Assad loyalists and attacks from neighboring states like Lebanon and Israel. A lack of unified governance would have ended in more war.”
Understanding that deep corruption had hollowed out ministries over decades, the previous interim government began auditing and reforming Syrian institutions to try to root out corruption and establish services capable of addressing Syrian needs. The new authorities have heavily publicized these actions, trying to show average Syrians that even the smallest improvement is meaningful. In this regard, ministry Telegram channels and Facebook pages post daily updates on a wide range of activities like local maintenance work, government engagements with local notables, and efforts to improve government services.
Benjamin Fève, a senior research analyst at Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, a consultancy focused on Syria, said the priority should be to “stabilize the economy and unify and rebuild regulatory frameworks.” Services remain scant given a “widespread liquidity crisis,” according to Fève. He added that “the government needs to stabilize its state finances, external investment, and seek international assistance to prevent economic collapse. It must increase its capacity to provide basic services to its people.”
Security Sector Reform
The security situation remains volatile. Clashes and revenge killings have become common throughout the country, especially in the northwest, home to the Alawite minority that dominated during four decades of Assad rule. Many Alawites accuse the caretaker government of carrying out ethnic-based purges. The northeast is also unsettled as the interim government signs vague and incomplete agreements with other minorities, including the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Al-Shara’a has sought to dissolve every Syrian opposition faction, working to reform and absorb the previous regime’s military, security, and intelligence arms and collect weapons from private hands. The caretaker government defense chief Murhaf Abu Qasra, in extensive interviews, has asserted that the new Syrian Army will promote Syrian unity over sectarianism and create a professional, national army under unitary training, command, and control.
Progress in this effort remains elusive, however. A March uprising by Assad loyalists produced significant violence, including hundreds of civilian deaths branded as ethnic-based revenge killings carried out by former opposition factions and vigilante groups. The violence demonstrated that former Assad loyalists still possess some strength and legitimacy and that nominally dissolved opposition factions remain outside the control of the Syrian state.
Al-Shara’a has claimed that the violence represented isolated attacks and has promised to hold the perpetrators accountable. Future accountability rests on adopting transitional justice best practices applicable to all perpetrators – not just those from the former regime or a specific ethnic group.
Dr. Nanar Hawach, senior analyst for Syria at the International Crisis Group, told this author that “the interim government should quickly hold accountable any forces involved in civilian killings and improve discipline within its forces. The justice process needs to be transparent to address both the recent violence and past crimes from the Assad era.”
According to Hawach, “Only well-trained and properly supervised forces should be deployed in sensitive areas to prevent further violence and instability. It will be important to integrate armed factions into a unified structure and professionalize security forces, which regional backers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could support.”
International Legitimization
To successfully address Syria’s economic and security challenges, the new Damascus government needs to build legitimacy, a difficult task given the regime’s Islamist character and extremist roots.
In this regard, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has been on a sort of victory tour, particularly focusing on Western countries. The decision to engage European and North American states reflects Syria’s need to lift a bevy of sweeping Western sanctions. The country remains among the most sanctioned globally, presenting an enormous challenge to its post-conflict transition.
Al-Shaibani’s meetings with regional leaders also addressed this issue. According to Fève, “The government is engaging multiple actors, including Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, [that] to maintain stability is important.” However, he notes, “improvements have not materialized because the overarching structure remains in place. Exemptions are not enough. If sanctions relief is only for a few months, you won’t invest.”
Sanctions played a major role in impoverishing Syria while deepening corruption within the former regime. They continue to impede the delivery of basic goods and services as well as the investment needed for reconstruction. Europe has provided some sanctions relief in crucial areas such as energy and transport. Washington, however, has provided only limited relief through General License 24 – a six-month freeze that falls well short of addressing Syria’s needs. According to Reuters, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi gave a list of demands for additional relief to al-Shaibani on the sidelines of a Syria donor conference in Brussels on March 18. The demands included destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stores, cooperation on counterterrorism, and information about the fate of disappeared U.S. journalist Austin Tice. Washington has reportedly offered Damascus sanctions relief in return, although specifics are vague.
Syria also remains on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list, which bars a variety of financial transactions, as well as sanctions enacted under the Caesar Act to address egregious violations of human rights under the Assad regime.
While expectations are tempered, Syrians will undoubtedly begin questioning the transition if the country stagnates. Efforts such as a recent National Dialogue Conference and transitional Constitutional Declaration, alongside incomplete security deals with the SDF and other factions, are not sufficient to stem concerns. A missed March 1 deadline set by Al-Shara’a to form a new government is especially worrisome. Al-Shara’a needs to include more diverse powerbrokers to reflect a commitment to a future pluralistic governance model. As the Crisis Group’s Hawach put it, “Damascus should integrate Alawites and other minorities into political and security structures to prevent further marginalization and promote national cohesion.”
Those efforts could help blunt ongoing occupations by Turkey and Israel, which operate so-called “buffer zones” in Syria’s north and south, respectively. By incorporating minority groups, Damascus could simultaneously build international and national legitimacy for the transition period while bolstering sovereignty over its territory and preventing further fragmentation.
Alexander Langlois is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities and analyst focused on the Middle East. Follow him on X @langloisajl and BluSky @langloisajl.bsky.social.