As European leaders boost defence spending, strengthen European security cooperation and contemplate a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, they need to bring voters on board. They may worry about citizen objections and public attitudes changing at a slower pace than governmental policies—but Europeans are keeping up. Their opinions are, at the very least, in flux.
The public’s changing and adaptable consensus provides European leaders with an opportunity to shift the debate, and develop greater societal support for security and defence issues
The public’s changing and adaptable consensus provides European leaders with an opportunity to shift the debate, and develop greater societal support for security and defence issues. In order to be successful, European leaders need to make the argument that both guns and butter are equally important in their national political priorities—and that these can be reconciled.
But this, in turn, requires solid financial arrangements between European countries and its institutions. Only then can each policymaker develop these arguments credibly and sustainably at a domestic level.
Tailoring the arguments
The nature of this challenge depends on the country, especially regarding its geographical distance from Ukraine and Russia, the strength of its traditional transatlantic bond, and any history of pro-Russian sympathies.
People living in Poland or the Baltic states are well aware of the importance of investing in defence: the bigger difficulty is persuading them that, with a less reliable America, these populations should place more trust in European security cooperation. A recent Le Grand Continent survey, conducted soon after the Oval Office debacle between presidents Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, showed just 29% of Poles view Trump as “Europe’s enemy”. This is much lower than the 51% average across the 10 EU countries polled.
Conversely, Italians are dubious about the need to spend more on defence—even when they agree that, under Trump, the US is not a dependable ally. According to the same survey, Italians stand out from the European crowd in their strong opposition to significantly higher defence spending. Another survey carried out by Italian publication Corriere Della Sera confirms this, when most people asked were against the European Commission’s ReArm Europe plan.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution. In some countries, people are receptive to the message about the imminency of the Russian threat, while elsewhere the economic benefits afforded by the “re-armament” of Europe might change their minds. Different countries require tailored arguments, which must respond to their specific domestic context.
Furthermore, countries can seize on their own individual opportunities to shift the debate. National elections are often a prime target, thanks to the greater interest in domestic politics generated by these events. But elections can also constrain decision-making if leaders fear their positions could backfire and then cost them electorally. Here, Germany and Spain offer illustrative case studies.
German’s second Zeitenwende
In Germany, there is robust public support for re-armament efforts: according to Politbarometer, 75% favour increased spending on the national army, even if this leads to a growing deficit. Two factors seem to have made this possible.
On the one hand, the likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has offered strong leadership in the face of geopolitical upheaval. In his first intervention after the Christian Democratic Union’s electoral victory in February 2025, Merz said that Europe needs to become more independent from the US. He also secured the parliamentary majority necessary to reform spending rules—even if most Germans also found him dishonest about the debt break reform.
On the other hand, German politicians in the burgeoning coalition have smartly merged security arguments with economic ones. They are promising investments not just in defence, but also in the country’s ailing infrastructure. Germany is undergoing a second Zeitenwende, marking the end of fiscally hawkish policies and a commitment to the neglected investments. With Germany home to several major defence companies, and enjoying a strong fiscal situation compared to much of Europe, its politicians could credibly present Europe’s re-armament as an opportunity for both Germany’s embattled industry, and its economy more broadly.
Spain’s cautious approach
Meanwhile, Spanish prime minister Pedro Sanchez appears to be over-cautious in his approach to the issue. He publicly downplays the Russian threat, saying that Russia will never reach the Pyrenees. He has promised an increase in the country’s defence spending—aleit starting from a very low base—but suggests that it could instead be spent on border controls, fighting terrorism and cyber attacks. This smacks of “defence-washing”. Sanchez also considers the Russian threat as chiefly concerned with the abstract “multilateral order”. While many academics and think-tankers might applaud this view, it will hardly capture the public’s imagination.
Ironically, Sanchez is not wrong. Vladimir Putin’s army will not march 4,172km across Europe to attack Spain. But if Putin crosses the border into a Baltic country and occupies even a village for one month, the political repercussions could tear the EU apart. All in all, Sanchez is missing an opportunity to reframe the national debate about the broader necessity of investing more in defence to prevent war—even more surprising given that a national majority favours raising defence spending.
But Sanchez’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party voters are the least supportive of this move. At a time when the parliamentary majority hangs in the balance, this might partly explain Sanchez’s reluctant approach.
No empty words
As Europe bids farewell to the peace dividend, defence spending needs to rise in the long-term. This necessitates continuous public debate. But developing conditions mean that this might become trickier to conduct: if a future ceasefire in Ukraine coincides with generalised complacency about the unreliability of the Trump administration, the European public will once again rest on its laurels. This makes the job of policymakers difficult: they need to be assertive in their communications and think carefully about which signals to give out in the coming weeks and months.
It is the task of national leaders to communicate effectively with their country’s public about the necessity of Europe’s greater investment in defence. The popular view that there exists a necessary trade-off between the welfare state and the warfare state—that a country can have either guns or butter—is a powerful reason behind some leaders’ fear about speaking openly on increasing European defence spending.
Even when European politicians are willing to advocate for higher defence spending, this drive will fail if they appeal only to abstract notions such as solidarity with fellow Europeans—or, in the vein of Sanchez, to the defence of multilateralism. Instead, like Merz, leaders should spell out which economic incentives are brought about by higher defence spending and explain how this increase could also benefit society.
But they cannot effectively communicate with empty words. When the French, Italian or Spanish governments oppose European Commission defence spending plans because they fear adding too heavy a burden to already high national debts, or when some in Italy argue that other countries’ industries are set to disproportionally profit from Europe’s re-armament efforts, those arguments cannot be easily dismissed.
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If the EU wants capitals such as Rome and Madrid to convince their national publics about the need to ramp up European defence spending, fellow bloc members and institutions in Brussels should help them create the financial conditions for these arguments to be credible and sustainable domestically. Only then can Europe’s re-armament become an effective and concerted effort.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.