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An overview of the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase showing the seven completed 40-meter-wide UAV hangars, March 28, 2025 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Key Findings
Last week, Kim Jong-un observed a test flight of a variant of the Saetbyol-4 class strategic uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) at Panghyon Airbase in Kusong-si, Pyongan-buk-do. Panghyon Aircraft Factory and Panghyon Airbase are North Korea’s only known sites for the production and flight-testing of large strategic UAVs.
This new CSIS satellite imagery report provides the most up-to-date detailed information on strategic UAV development activities at these sites and preliminary information concerning the organization of production and operational control for these UAVs.
Despite widespread claims that North Korea has been building copies of U.S. drones such as the RQ-4B Global Hawk and the MQ-9A Predator, the North Korean drones are not clones: they merely mimic the airframes of U.S. UAVs and are presently determined as not carrying advanced equipment similar to that found in U.S. UAVs.
Satellite images show the completion of additional UAV hangars. This and the establishment of a small experimental and test unit of strategic UAVs suggest a continued production run of this class of UAVs. It remains unknown how large a production run of such strategic UAVs North Korea is contemplating.
If North Korea successfully develops and deploys a Saetbyol-4 class strategic reconnaissance UAV along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with South Korea and within its air defense identification zone (ADIZ), it will significantly increase the scope and timeliness of the nation’s situational awareness in and around the Korean Peninsula.
Panghyon: “The Motherland” for Strategic UAVs
In 2023, a knowledgeable source referred to Panghyon Airbase as “the motherland for large UAVs.”1 As best as can be presently determined, the production of North Korean UAVs is concentrated at two locations: the 6 January Factory (Panghyon Fabrication/Assembly Plant) and an unidentified factory in the Pyongyang-Pyongsong area. Although the 6 January Factory has produced smaller tactical UAVs in the past, such as the Panghyon-1 and Panghyon-2, it is now believed to be primarily responsible for manufacturing larger Saetbyol-4 class, Saetbyol-9 class, and other undisclosed strategic UAVs.
An overview image showing the major components of the 6 January Factory (Panghyon Fabrication/Assembly Plant) located 5.2 kilometers south of Panghyon Airbase, February 18, 2025 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Until 2024, the strategic UAVs observed at Panghyon Airbase were assessed as prototype or pre-production models in the RTD&E phase rather than fully operational systems.2 As such, the spotted models have undoubtedly undergone numerous design changes and will likely continue to do so.
A September 18, 2024, overview of the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase. Construction of seven 40-meter-wide UAV hangars began sometime during July-August and are seen with their walls in place. Also visible are the preexisting 50- and 24-meter-wide hangars, shops and support building, preexisting hardened aircraft shelter, and the northeast corner of Panghyon Airbase Repair Base 4 April Factory, September 18, 2024 (Copyright © 2025 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
In March 2025, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korean troops stationed in Russia are receiving training in modern drone warfare tactics, including strike and reconnaissance UAV operations.3 While the impact of these lessons or the level of its cooperation with Russia on strategic UAV development remains unclear, it is highly unlikely that North Korea would let such an opportunity go to waste. This suggests North Korea’s concerted effort to enhance its overall UAV capabilities, likely incorporating Russian battlefield experience. Similarly, North Korea’s desire to learn and apply technology also extends to Chinese UAV development of strategic UAVs.
UAV Production
Available information indicates that the development and oversite for the production of UAVs is under the purview of the “Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex,” which is subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department. While North Korea uses the term “complex” in the title, it appears to be an organization rather than a specific facility, as it is reported to have an unknown number of subordinate research and development institutions and enterprises.4
Once a strategic UAV is manufactured at the 6 January Factory, which is also subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department, it is disassembled and transported to the 4 April Factory (Panghyon Airbase Repair Base, 39.912539 125.215189). From there, it is moved to the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase (39.918195 125.212730), where it is reassembled and flight-tested. The staff conducting this assembly and flight testing are likely drawn from the 6 January Factory, Korean People’s Air and Air Defense Force, and the research and development institutions and enterprises subordinate to the Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex. At present, no reliable figures are available for the number of strategic or tactical UAVs produced by North Korea.
In July 2024, a construction program commenced at the UAV support area to build seven additional 40-meter-wide UAV hangars capable of accommodating the existing SB-4, SB-9, and similar class strategic UAVs.5 This development suggests a continued production run of these or similar-class UAVs, as well as the establishment of a small experimental and test flight consisting of 8 to 16 strategic UAVs. It remains unknown how large a production run of strategic UAVs North Korea is contemplating.
There is speculation that North Korea may be interested in acquiring access to the Iranian Shahed 171 Simorgh UAV, which is an Iranian copy of the stealthy US RQ 170 Sentinel UAV. However, this remains to be confirmed.
A close-up view of the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase, showing ongoing construction of the seven 40-meter-wide UAV hangars and the preexisting 50-meter and 24-meter-wide hangars, September 18, 2024 (Copyright © 2025 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The sales opportunity for North Korean-produced strategic UAVs seems limited, as most foreign demand can be more readily and reliably met by established, proven designs from other countries.
One of the early images of a Saetbyol-9 class UAV in front of the preexisting 24-meter-wide hangar in the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase, September 25, 2022 (Copyright © 2025 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
An image of the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase showing a Saetbyol-9 class UAV, June 2, 2023 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A Saetbyol-9 class UAV on the runway of the Panghyon Airbase. Probable support vehicles are seen on the adjacent taxiway and on the side of the runway, June 3, 2023, (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A close-up view of the Saetbyol-9 class UAV on the runway of the Panghyon Airbase, June 3, 2023, (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
One of the early images of a Saetbyol-4 class UAV on the runway of Panghyon Airbase. A probable support vehicle is seen on the adjacent taxiway, June 14, 2023 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
While it is unclear if it also took place at Panghyon Airbase, Kim also provided guidance during March 25-26 to a demonstration of newly developed “suicide attack drones to which new artificial intelligence was applied.” While undoubtedly a forward-leaning statement or the direction that North Korea is planning to take its UAV programs, it was reported that “unmanned equipment and artificial intelligence should be top-prioritized and developed in modernizing the armed forces, he stressed that it is important to work out a correct long-term national plan for promoting the rapid development.”6
Command and Control & Operations
Until 2023, it was believed that the command and control of UAV operations was segregated by the size and mission of the UAV.7 Smaller UAVs were believed to be under the control of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, while the larger strategic UAVs were under the control of the Korean People’s Army. However, this division of control is likely in flux, and it is unclear which organization currently controls the inventory of strategic reconnaissance and attack UAVs.
A more recent view of the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase showing a Saetbyol-4 class UAV and the framing for the roofs of the seven 40-meter-wide UAV hangars now in place. Also visible are the preexisting 50- and 24-meter-wide hangars, January 22, 2025 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A close-up view of a Saetbyol-4 class UAV in front of the preexisting 50- hangar, January 22, 2025 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
An overview of the UAV support area at Panghyon Airbase showing the seven completed 40-meter-wide UAV hangars, March 28, 2025 (Copyright © 2025 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contactimagery@csis.org.
While the existing SB-4 and SB-9 class UAVs are believed to have sometimes been flown to and from other bases of the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF), Panghyon Airbase is considered their home base and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Among the reasons for this are the proximity to both the manufacturer (the 6 January Factory) and the depot-level maintenance facility at the airbase (the 4 April Factory), as well as the ongoing construction of specialized UAV hangars and the development of support services in the UAV support area.
While the specific type and class of UAVs are unknown, it is reported they have often been observed in association with KN-09 300 mm rocket artillery units and are likely being employed for target acquisition.8
If North Korea successfully develops and deploys a Saetbyol-4 class strategic reconnaissance UAV along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with South Korea and within its air defense identification zone (ADIZ), it will significantly increase the scope and timeliness of the nation’s situational awareness on and around the Korean Peninsula. However, such operations will undoubtedly reveal operational challenges that North Korea has yet to encounter in detail (e.g., airspace deconfliction, reliable long-distance high-speed communications, etc.).
If North Korea successfully develops and deploys a Saetbyol-4 class strategic reconnaissance UAV along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with South Korea and within its air defense identification zone (ADIZ), it will significantly increase the scope and timeliness of the nation’s situational awareness on and around the Korean Peninsula. However, such operations will undoubtedly reveal operational challenges that North Korea has yet to encounter in detail (e.g., airspace deconfliction, reliable long-distance high-speed communications, etc.).
Historical Background
North Korea’s interest in UAVs dates to the 1970s, when the U.S. used AQM-34Q UAVs for flying missions along both coasts of the nation to monitor communications.9 This early interest led to the North Korean acquisition of small quantities of target drones and small UAVs from China.10
Over the next two decades, North Korea conducted small domestic production runs, essentially copying the acquired systems and attempting to design small indigenous systems. Production of these early UAVs was undertaken at two known locations—the Panghyon Aircraft Factory (also known as the 6 January Factory or Panghyon Fabrication/Assembly Plant, (39.872806, 125.264266) at Panghyon (방현), Kusong-si (구성시), Pyongan-bukdo (North Pyongan Province, 평안북도) and an unidentified factory in the Pyongyang-Pyongsong area.
According to a knowledgeable source, element(s) of UAV production may have also been established at an unidentified factory in the Sinpo (신포) area of Hangyong-namdo (South Hangyong Province, 함경남도) sometime around 1993. The first domestically designed and produced UAV was reportedly tested in 1997.11 Since then, at least a dozen small UAVs with a wingspan of 2 to 5 meters have been identified in North Korean media or have crashed in South Korea.
In early January 2021, Kim Jong-un declared in a report to the Seventh Central Committee of the Party that “…the designing of various electronic weapons, unmanned striking equipment, means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed… “12 In doing so, he signaled that North Korean UAV research, test, development, and engineering (RTD&E) programs had entered a new phase, expanding to include strategic UAVs.13
Exposure in North Korean Media and Inaccurate Assessments
The expanded RTD&E effort built upon the progress made by developing a large attack UAV, sometimes known as the MM-1, which appeared during the April 2012 and April 2015 military parades in Pyongyang. These parade appearances were accompanied by a propaganda broadcast that showcased a training exercise, demonstrating the system’s capabilities in March 2013.
The North Korean MM-1 attack UAV displayed during the April 2012 Pyongyang Military Parade (KCNA)
Early public assessments that this attack UAV was a copy of the U.S. MGM-107A UAV are incorrect. The North Korean UAV had a slightly shorter and wider fuselage, a longer wingspan (approximately 5.27 meters compared to 3.01 meters), as well as different turbojet and sensor mountings.
A comparison of the US MGM-107A (red) and the North Korean MM-1 (Black) UAVs. Copyright © 2012-2025 by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
However, these developments increased foreign concerns over what would later be understood as a significant long-term North Korean effort to develop and deploy domestic strategic UAVs. They also indicated concerted North Korean efforts to acquire and/or develop both small turbofan and turbojet engines and advanced sensor technologies.
Little is known about the North Korean RTD&E effort on strategic reconnaissance and attack UAVs over the next eleven years. In 2021, a knowledgeable source indicated that North Korea was—not surprisingly—experiencing challenges with the development of strategic reconnaissance and attack UAVs that were larger than the previously observed MM-1.14
Two years later, on July 27, 2023, North Korea showcased two strategic UAVs during Kim Jong-un’s attendance at the “Weaponry Exhibition 2023” in Pyongyang, alongside Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.
Kim Jong-un and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu at the “Weaponry Exhibition 2023” (KCNA).
The UAVs featured in the image above resembled the US RQ-4B Global Hawk and MQ-9A Predator. North Korean media later identified these drones as the Saetbyol-4 (샛별-4, Morning Star-4) and Saetbyol-9 (샛별-9, Morning Star-9). While the Saetbyol-4 (SB-4) reconnaissance drone is often described as a clone of the U.S. RQ-4B Global Hawk family of UAVs, this description is inaccurate. Although the airframe of the Saetbyol-4 bears a strong resemblance to that of the RQ-4B, it is not identical and appears slightly shorter, measuring approximately 12 meters in length, compared to the RQ-4B’s 14.5 meters.[15/ The SB-4 is also similar in size and overall shape to the Chinese WZ-7 Soaring Dragon UAV.] Additionally, the UAV is presently determined as incapable of carrying the advanced reconnaissance and communications equipment found in the RQ-4B.15
Likewise, the Saetbyol-9 (SB-9) is often inaccurately described as a clone of the MQ-9A Predator. However, the SB-9 appears slightly shorter, measuring approximately 9 meters in length, compared to the MQ-9A’s 11 meters. In addition, it is unlikely to carry the advanced targeting and communications equipment found in the MQ-9A Predator. The mimicking of these U.S. UAVs was likely undertaken to expedite development by utilizing proven airframe designs. Additionally, from a propaganda perspective, the North Korean designations may imply a level of capability that North Korea wants the world to believe that they have achieved.
Two images of Saetbyol-9 attack UAVs on transporters during the military parade in Pyongyang, July 27, 2023 (KCNA).
Rodong Sinmun, on March 27, 2025, reported that on March 26 – 27, Kim Jong-un provided guidance for defense science research work of the “Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex and the detective electronic warfare research Group” atPanghyon Airbase. During this event, he observed a test flight of a variant of the Saetbyol-4 class strategic uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV)—potentially a variant of the Saetbyol-4 class UAV observed in front of a hangar at Panghyon Airbase on January 22, 2025. His visit here reportedly “confirmed the innovative performance of a new-type strategic reconnaissance drone with the detective ability to track and monitor different strategic targets and enemy troops’ activities in the land and sea.”16
A close-up view of a variant of the Saetbyol-4 class UAV seen on the runway of Panghyon Airbase. March 27, 2025, (Rodong Sinmun).
A nose-on view of the variant of the Saetbyol-4 class UAV seen on the runway of Panghyon Airbase. March 27, 2025, (Rodong Sinmun).
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is a Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Victor Cha is President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is an Associate Fellow and Project Manager for Imagery Analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image Copyright © 2024 by Planet. Special thanks for John (Jongwon) Bae for research support.
References
Interview data acquired by Joesph S. Bermudez Jr. ↩
Ibid.; and Zwirko, Colin and Jeongmin Kim. “New drones conduct flyovers as North Korea shows off nukes at military parade,” NK News, July 28, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/07/new-drones-conduct-flyovers-as-north-korea-shows-off-nukes-at-military-parade/. ↩
Anton Sokolin, “North Korean troops in Russia are learning modern drone warfare tactics: Seoul,” NK News, March 6, 2025. ↩
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Defence Science Research Work,” Rodong Sinmun, March 27, 2025. ↩
Within the UAV support area there has been a hangar with a 40-meter-wide door since at least 2002. ↩
Ibid. ↩
Interview data acquired by Joesph S. Bermudez Jr. ↩
Ibid. ↩
Many of these UAV missions were flown from Osan Air Base, South Korea. Arkin, William, M., “Spying 24/7 365,” Washington Post, April 6, 2002; and Wagner, William and Sloan, William P. Fireflies and other UAVs, (Arlington: AeroFax), 1992, pp. p. 9. ↩
For background on North Korean UAVs see: Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. “North Korea Drones On,” 38 North, July 1, 2014, https://www.38north.org/2014/07/jbermudez070114/; and Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. “North Korea Drones On: Redeux” 38 North, Janaury 19, 2016, https://www.38north.org/2016/01/jbermudez011916/. Some small commercial UAVs were apparently also acquired on the international market. ↩
Interview data acquired by Joesph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jennifer Jun. ↩
“Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style,” Rodong Sinmun, January 10, 2021. ↩
Interview data acquired by Joesph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jennifer Jun. ↩
Ibid. ↩
Both the dimensions and equipment capabilities remain to be confirmed. ↩
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Defence Science Research Work,” Rodong Sinmun, March 27, 2025. ↩
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