On March 17, Syria’s foreign minister Asaad al-Shibani shook hands with EU leaders in Brussels, becoming the first Syrian official to do so since 2007. On the same day, international donors, including European countries, pledged €5.8 billion ($6.2 billion) to support Syria’s transition. The moment, and the reactions surrounding the event, underscored the challenging yet hopeful road ahead of Syria.
“Cautious optimism” was the most common sentiment I encountered during my visit to Syria in January. The release of tens of thousands of prisoners, the possibility of regaining political freedoms, and recent political agreements between the Syrian administration and its rivals provided reasons for optimism. However, the administration’s background, the deadly violence in the Syrian coast, the fighting on the Lebanese border, and the ongoing Turkish and Israeli bombings and incursions underscored the need for caution.
The EU’s approach to Syria mirrors this sentiment of cautious optimism. Thus far, the EU has maintained a largely constructive stance, despite criticism for moving either too slowly or too quickly. Many observers have drawn lessons from Libya’s descent into lasting instability after the 2011 uprising, and the EU should also reflect on its own experiences there.
A new beginning for the European Union
Even before Assad’s fall, there were growing calls within the EU to resume ties with Syria to facilitate the return of refugees and to secure business opportunities for European companies. However, several EU members, including Germany and France, opposed normalization with Syria at that time due to Assad’s alliances with Russia and Iran, as well as the brutality of his regime.
While different states and political parties across the EU have varied interests in post-Assad Syria, public statements, parliamentary debates, and internal strategies confirm that the EU’s interests align with its Mediterranean Strategy: stabilization, migration control, counterterrorism, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals, and seizing economic opportunities.
The fall of Assad presents a historic opportunity for the EU to advance these objectives. A political transition leading to a stable Syria—marked by effective territorial control, economic potential, respect for the rule of law, a functioning political and civil life, and close ties to Europe’s Gulf allies—would lay the groundwork for EU-Syrian relations. Such a scenario would be particularly advantageous for Europe’s embattled political center, as it would signal the voluntary return of some Syrian refugees, new business opportunities, and energy cooperation.
While the primary responsibility lies with Syrians, there are valuable lessons the EU can draw from its experience in Libya
Conversely, European policymakers are deeply concerned about potentially destructive outcomes: a fragmented Syria serving as a battleground for internal and external actors, an extremist government that harbors or exports radical violent actors, a regime closely aligned with Turkey, Russia or China, or a haven for terrorist groups and traffickers. Such scenarios would only provide political ammunition for Europe’s rising anti-democratic forces on the right.
Fourteen years ago, the EU faced similar dilemmas in Libya, where the ousting of Muammar al-Gaddafi initially inspired hope during the Arab Spring. However, that optimism soon faded as Libya descended into a protracted crisis that lingers until today. Syria does not have to meet the same fate. While the primary responsibility lies with Syrians, there are valuable lessons the EU can draw from its experience in Libya.
Investing in the future
In Libya, the EU lacked a long-term strategy, relying instead on short-term fixes for security, migration, and energy priorities. Despite being aware of this issue, EU leaders never managed to develop an effective strategy. Countless assessments of the EU’s policy toward Arab countries post-2011 uprisings highlighted the absence of a coherent plan.
In Syria, while EU leaders profess their commitment to supporting the country’s recovery, emphasizing the importance of political inclusion, economic reconstruction, the role of civil society, and accountability, it remains to be seen whether they can follow through. In Libya, former EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stressed in 2017 that the EU’s engagement went beyond migration, focusing on political inclusiveness, supporting the Government of National Accord, and delivering services to Libyans. Yet, inter-European competition, pressure on center parties to take hardline stances on migration and counterterrorism, and powerful energy interests hindered the EU from developing a constructive vision for Libya’s future.
In Syria, the EU must learn from these mistakes and work toward a sustainable long-term strategy. This requires building consensus around a common approach among its members. Progress has been made in this regard, with the EU reaching a unanimous agreement to lift some sectoral sanctions, despite initial resistance from Greece and Cyprus.
The EU should also actively support the promising steps already taken toward reunifying Syria. The EU must demonstrate its commitment to this vision while avoiding the promotion of sectarian rhetoric. It should continue stressing the authorities’ obligation to respect the rights of all Syrians and ensure accountability.
The most evident way the EU can provide support is through lifting sanctions and providing financial support to aid Syria’s transition and socio-economic recovery. In addition to suspending some sectoral sanctions, the EU also pledged €2.5 billion for 2025 and 2026 to aid Syria and Syrians. But reconstruction, as demonstrated in Libya, is not just a matter of funding; it requires a holistic approach, as the EU foreign policy chief noted during the Brussels conference. Beyond addressing immediate needs, the EU should explore ways to make its sanctions relief more effective while working with the Syrian business community and regional allies to encourage economic cooperation.
Encouraging a Syrian-led transitional justice process that prioritizes reconciliation should be a key component of any political transition
Economic prosperity is dependent on the rule of law and respect for human rights. The EU rightly highlighted the importance of accountability and it must follow through. Trading justice for peace proved ineffective in Libya. Encouraging a Syrian-led transitional justice process that prioritizes reconciliation should be a key component of any political transition. And given that meaningful reform to the Syrian judicial system will take years, the EU should also support international investigative mechanisms and justice systems to pursue accountability in the interim.
The role of independent media, civil society, and political parties cannot be overstated. While EU leaders emphasize these elements in their discourse, they should follow through by investing in Syrian independent media and civil society, fostering an enabling environment for both. Independent media and civil society are vital in countering disinformation and anti-democratic forces. In Syria, disinformation campaigns are already fueling fear and division. Syrian civil society has been at the forefront of efforts to challenge these campaigns, but they will need all the support they can get.
Play the long game with migration
On the migration front, the EU must adopt a sensible policy in Syria—something it failed to do in Libya. There, EU member states cooperated with militias to curb migration flows at any cost, fueling trafficking and instability. For example, a 2016 deal between Italy and Libyan militias reduced arrivals but worsened Libya’s political crisis, enabling traffickers and militias to capture the state. Ultimately, the deal failed to close the Libya trafficking route and exacerbated long-term instability.
In Syria, the EU faces an uphill battle in formulating a long-term migration strategy, given the contentions surrounding the migration debate. While some member states expressed intentions to encourage Syrians to return or stopped processing Syrians’ asylum claims altogether, the European Commission days after the fall of Assad said that forced returns to Syria were not possible. Equally, the commission stated that conditions for voluntary, safe, sustainable, and dignified returns to Syria have not yet been met. However, there are warning signs emerging, as influential political parties, including in the Netherlands and Germany, are calling for the forcible return of Syrians. As such, the governments in these countries may eventually start forcibly returning Syrians, which would have destabilizing effects for Syria.
The EU must think long-term on migration. A stable and prosperous Syria, with respect for the rule of law and human rights, would reduce the number of Syrians seeking refuge in Europe, encourage voluntary returns, and restrict trafficking routes.
Standing up to disruptors and work with constructive actors
In Libya, the EU failed to stand up to allies like Egypt and the UAE, which armed and supported Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces controlling eastern and southern Libya. Haftar later brought in Russian Wagner troops, further complicating the conflict. Some EU member states—namely France, Greece, and Cyprus—even shielded Egypt and the UAE from UN condemnation. The EU also failed to counter Egypt’s disruptive efforts to derail the UN-led political transition. As a result, the Libyan Tripoli-based government signed a maritime deal with Turkey to save it to the detriment of European interests. Today, Libya remains divided between two rival governments.
While the EU has opposed Iran’s attempts to destabilize Syria and the wider region, it remains to be seen whether the EU will find the resolve to stand up to Israel’s role in perpetuating instability
In Syria, the EU must avoid repeating these mistakes by confronting disruptive regional actors such as Israel and Iran, whose interests are diametrically opposed to that of the EU’s. Israel seeks to solidify its occupation of Syria and keep Syria weak and decentralized, while Iran aims to fragment the country and maintain its influence over it. If left unchecked, both would undermine Syria’s stability and prosperity, and by extension, the EU’s broader objectives. While the EU has opposed Iran’s attempts to destabilize Syria and the wider region, it remains to be seen whether the EU will find the resolve to stand up to Israel’s role in perpetuating instability.
Despite withdrawing military equipment following the fall of Assad, Russia continues to retain military bases in Syria, and the Syrian government has limited options to deal with Moscow. In Libya, France and Greece found their immediate interests aligned with Russia, creating a paradoxical dynamic: while France and Russia were adversaries in Europe and West Africa, they were aligned in Libya to counter Turkish influence. Similarly, some European states may view Russia’s continued presence in Syria as a possible counterbalance to Turkey, much like Israel, which views maintaining Russian troops in Syria as crucial to its interests. The EU must be clear on its stance that reducing Russia’s presence in Syria is vital for both European and Syrian interests.
At the same time, the EU must also navigate its relationship with Turkey to avoid a post-2020 Libya scenario, where Turkish military intervention cemented its influence over the country at the expense of both European and Libyan interests. It remains to be seen how the Syrian government perceives its future ties with Turkey, however early signs indicate that Syria does not want to be a Turkish client state.
To address both Russia and Turkey’s roles in Syria, the EU must take a measured approach rather than forcing Syria to cut or restrict ties with either or attempting to play them against each other. A more effective strategy would be to lift economic sanctions, offer closer cooperation, and invest in Syria’s reconstruction while laying the groundwork for political forces aligned with the EU’s vision. That way the EU, working alongside its Gulf allies, could offer Syria a future that does not depend on Turkey or Russia.
Additionally, the EU must engage with Gulf states and Jordan to encourage constructive policies in Syria, leveraging their influence while maintaining the flexibility to diverge from them should their interests no longer align. The EU has been drawing closer to the Gulf and vice versa in recent years, and their cooperation in Syria could be mutually beneficial and further solidify their relationship. However, should any Gulf state adopt a destabilizing role, the EU must be prepared to push back.
While the EU-US ties have seen better days, the EU must actively engage with the US to ensure that it remains a constructive partner or at minimum, a non-disruptive one
Meanwhile, although the US appears largely disengaged, it remains an extremely influential actor capable of making or breaking Syria’s transition. Washington played a key role in brokering the deal between the new Syrian administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as in allowing Qatar to supply Syria with gas. Moreover, US sanctions on Syria remain the most comprehensive and American troops are still present in the country. Israel has been actively lobbying the US to undermine the EU on two fronts: keeping Syria weak and ensuring Russia maintains a presence. While the EU-US ties have seen better days, the EU must actively engage with the US to ensure that it remains a constructive partner or at minimum, a non-disruptive one.
The EU has a rare second chance to act with the benefit of hindsight in Syria, drawing on its experiences in Libya. Success would bring significant geopolitical rewards, while failure could have severe consequences for the EU’s strategic position in the Middle East and embolden anti-democratic forces within Europe. The stakes are high, and the EU must act decisively to avoid repeating past mistakes.
Hussein Baoumi is an Egyptian human rights advocate with expertise in international law and international relations.