The unthinkable has become discussable. As America under Trump shows alarming sympathy for Russian aggression in Ukraine while threatening its own allies' territory, European nations are quietly reassessing their nuclear options. The American arsenal, deployed across four European states and Turkey, no longer seems the certainty it once was.
Fission and fusion in German politics
The strongest emotions are, for historical reasons, logically tied to Germany's hypothetical possession of nuclear weapons. Friedrich Merz, the leader of the election-winning CDU party, explicitly rejected such a hypothesis. In an interview with Der Spiege l, said "Germany will neither be able nor allowed to possess nuclear weapons," noting Germany's explicit renunciation of nuclear weapons in the "Two Plus Four Treaty" on German reunification.
The future chancellor, whom political scientist Joseph de Weck of the French think-tank Institut Montaigne described for Die Welt as the "most Gaullist" of German chancellors, after the hitherto staunchly Atlanticist politician spoke out in favour of greater autonomy from the United States in defence matters, would rather enter into dialogue with France and the United Kingdom, currently the only nuclear-weapon holders in Europe, about the possibility of "nuclear sharing".
According to Merz, however, a European nuclear umbrella should serve as a "complement" to the existing American nuclear one, which should be preserved if possible.
An independent German nuclear deterrent can no longer be ruled out, argues Fabian Hoffmann of the Oslo Nuclear Project. Speaking to Bavarian broadcaster BR, the nuclear strategy expert argues that Germany must seriously consider all options in the current security environment. While the French nuclear umbrella remains credible for Germany – since any existential threat to Berlin would likely endanger Paris as well – its deterrent effect is rapidly diminishing eastwards.
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The current French arsenal, Hoffmann notes, lacks the capability to provide credible extended deterrence beyond Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, leaving NATO's eastern flank exposed.
The limits of the French nuclear guarantee go even deeper, writes Claudia Buckenmaier in the Tagesschau. In contrast to America's tactical nuclear weapons, which Germany can use under a dual-key system if Washington and Berlin agree, France only maintains strategic weapons under the strict control of its president.
Moreover, France has zealously guarded its nuclear independence. The prospect of Marine Le Pen – who has explicitly rejected extending protection to Germany – moving into the Elysée Palace further complicates Paris's reliability as a nuclear guarantor.
In a somewhat surprising twist, several politicians from the far-right, pro-Trump AfD party have emerged as advocates of a German nuclear deterrent, despite the party's well-documented split between pro-Russian and pro-NATO factions on foreign policy issues, reports Annika Leister for T-Online. The party's defence spokesman, former Bundeswehr colonel Rüdiger Lucassen, is unequivocal: Germany needs its own nuclear weapons and compulsory military service – including for women – which would require constitutional amendments. In his view, the problem is not Mr Trump's rhetoric but Europe's excessive dependence on America, which must come to an end.
A new Civey poll for T-Online shows that while most Germans (48%) still oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons, support has risen significantly over the past year, with a stark east-west divide: two-thirds of eastern Germans reject the nuclear option, while western Germans are almost evenly divided on the issue.
European chain reaction
"If Germany gets the bomb, so must Poland," argues Jędrzej Bielecki of Rzeczpospolita. The commentator points to growing German-Polish trust, evidenced by Warsaw's muted response to Friedrich Merz's ambitious plans to expand the Bundeswehr and Poland's invitation to German troops to help guard its eastern border.
But this rapprochement has its limits, particularly on nuclear weapons – no government in Warsaw could tolerate a nuclear-armed Germany while Poland remains without such capabilities. Mr Bielecki's solution is bold: a coordinated nuclear programme between the two nations, perhaps even joint nuclear forces. Such an arrangement, he suggests, would mark the final reconciliation between these former enemies.
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Writing in WP Wiadomości, Violetta Baran reports that Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk has pointedly refused to rule out nuclear ambitions, noting that Ukraine's surrender of Soviet warheads to Russia – only to be invaded later – shows the value of a nuclear deterrent. But he remains cautious, citing high maintenance costs and the need for robust command structures.
Writing in Polish Newsweek, Slawek Zagorski examines Poland's nuclear ambitions in the light of Prime Minister Tusk's recent comments and polls showing that 52.9% of Poles support nuclear armament. The obstacles are formidable, he argues: Poland is bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, lacks both infrastructure and fissile material, and would face astronomical costs. Its F-16 fleet is also not nuclear-capable. Mr Zagorski argues that conventional modernisation – from new frigates to helicopters and basic military equipment – requires more urgent attention. Nuclear ambitions, he suggests, should wait until conventional forces are brought up to scratch.
Military analyst Lukas Visingr argues in iDnes that the Czech Republic should launch a serious debate about its nuclear future, whether within NATO or independently. He points out that thanks to its extensive civilian nuclear programme, the country has the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons at an estimated cost in the low billions of dollars - a sum the country could afford. He recalls the little-known history of Czechoslovak nuclear aspirations, including the "Hammer" project of the 1990s, when the then chief of military intelligence proposed the production of 20-30 tactical nuclear weapons as a guarantee of sovereignty for a country that was not yet a member of either the EU or NATO.
Visingr sees joining NATO's nuclear sharing as a more realistic option, especially given the planned acquisition of nuclear-capable F-35s. He emphasises that he is not calling for immediate nuclear armament, but rather for a public discourse on the issue, so that citizens are not taken by surprise when the issue suddenly appears on the political agenda.
The disappearance of the American nuclear umbrella is causing concern in Switzerland, where neutrality is part of the country's DNA. "Consider everything and rule out nothing," writes Antoine Menusier in the online daily Watson, arguing that the Alpine nation's defence policy needs to be fundamentally updated because "the American shield was a luxury for Switzerland, as for all Western states, allowing it to hide behind the last vestiges of its neutrality". Menusier advocates increased cooperation with EU states as a middle ground between two extremes - fully autonomous defence and NATO membership.
Similarly, Georg Häsler, writing in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, advocates increased cooperation with neighbours as the only viable security option after Switzerland formally renounced its nuclear ambitions at the end of the Cold War - even though nuclear weapons would have been the most effective means of ensuring neutrality and defence, including from a financial perspective. According to Häsler, Switzerland cannot remain sheltered in today's uncertain world and must consider a serious threat scenario in which the fall of Ukraine and the subsequent geopolitical reorientation of Hungary and Slovakia could open a "Tyrolean corridor" into Switzerland.
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