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Trump should not forget the Russian hand behind the Houthis

On March 15, US President Donald Trump ordered large-scale airstrikes against Yemen’s Houthi rebels in response to attacks on Red Sea shipping. The Houthis, an armed, Iran-backed group that controls the most populous parts of Yemen, have carried out dozens of attacks against ships in the Red Sea since November 2023, causing disruptions to global shipping.

“Funded by Iran, the Houthi thugs have fired missiles at US aircraft, and targeted our Troops and Allies,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

Trump went on to emphasize that Iran would be held responsible for any future Houthi attacks: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences, and those consequences will be dire!”

The US president is right that Iran plays a large role in supporting the Houthis. But Tehran is not the group’s only state-level supporter. Russia, too, is an important backer of the group.

Back in October 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia was providing targeting data to the Houthis, which they then used while attacking Western ships. US intelligence sources have also confirmed that Russia’s main intelligence directorate, known as the GRU, operates in Houthi-controlled territory to provide technical assistance to the rebels in their military operations.

Beyond targeting and technical assistance, Russia has also reportedly been involved in discussions about transferring weapons with the Houthis. In the fall of 2024, Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout was reportedly attempting to broker the sale of around ten million dollars’ worth of automatic small arms to the group. Iran was also arbitrating secret talks between Russia and the Houthis for transfers of anti-ship missiles to the militants. Such a deal would allow the Houthis to more accurately strike their targets and pose an even greater threat to US and European ships defending commercial shipping.

The relationship between the Kremlin and the Houthis has not been one-sided. By the summer of 2024, the Houthis provided Russia with hundreds of Yemenis who were reportedly then forced into Russian military training. Many of these unwilling recruits apparently believed that they were signing up for construction jobs. This move provided Moscow with much-needed manpower as it grinds past the third year of its war against Ukraine. The Houthis have also allowed safe passage for Russian ships through the Red Sea, an arrangement that became a more formalized agreement through diplomatic discussions in March 2024.

Now is the time for pressure, not more concessions to the Kremlin.

In some ways, this cooperation between Russia and the Houthis represents a new shift in Russia’s Yemen policy. At the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2011, the Kremlin took a more or less neutral stance toward the main combatants, including the Houthis, the separatist Southern Transitional Council, and the former ruling party. For the past few years, however, Russia appears to be meeting most frequently with Houthi representatives—a diplomatic sign, backed with tangible cooperation, that Russia has taken a particular interest in the group.

In part, Russian collaboration with the Houthis should be understood as a facet of increasing cooperation between US adversaries to counter the West in the Middle East. It also indicates a deepening relationship between Tehran and Moscow. Russia’s support allows the Houthis to continue destabilizing the Red Sea, which puts greater pressure on the United States and its allies and partners in the region. This aids Russia and Iran’s shared interest in creating a multipolar-world order with diminished Western influence abroad. In March 2024, a member of the Houthis’ political bureau asserted that greater Houthi collaboration with Russia and China stems from a “common interest in drowning America, Britain, and the West in the swamp of the Red Sea and on the high seas.” At the very minimum, Russian-aided tumult in the Red Sea undermines the West by drawing Western attention and resources away from other pressing crisis points, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

As the United States and Russia continue their talks about the war in Ukraine and diplomatic normalization, US policymakers should not forget Moscow’s involvement in Houthi strikes on commercial ships in the Red Sea. It has already cost the United States more than one billion dollars to respond to Houthi attacks and defend the waterway, through which around 30 percent of global containerized trade transits. While the United States has sought to ensure freedom of navigation against Houthi attacks, so that global trade continues to flow, Russia has aided Houthi operations as a way to ratchet up problems for the United States and its allies and partners.

Trump and US negotiators should refrain from further coddling the Kremlin. The United States already handed some concessions to Moscow in last month’s talks in Riyadh: This included US agreement on helping Russia sell its grain and fertilizer on the world market. Comments from some Trump administration officials also suggest that the White House may make premature concessions to the Kremlin on Ukraine’s future NATO membership prospects, security guarantees, and territory.

Overlooking Russian involvement with the Houthis is a critical error in understanding Moscow’s intentions abroad and toward the West. Now is the time for pressure, not more concessions to the Kremlin.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she interned at the American Enterprise Institute, where she focused on domestic developments in Russia and Russia’s war against Ukraine.