The Albanese government has hung its hat on improving ties with Australia’s two near regions, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. And while there is clearly a hierarchy of effort, with the Pacific rightly allocated greater resources, Southeast Asia has been a focus for Foreign Minister Penny Wong. She has travelled extensively to Southeast Asian countries (except Myanmar) and driven a major new initiative – the Southeast Asia Economic Strategy – aimed at boosting Australian investment in the region.
So, would these efforts be sustained, either under a second Labor term, or a Coalition government?
Opposition leader Peter Dutton’s recent Lowy Institute speech on foreign policy gives a few clues. In a political address, focused on identifying areas of Labor weakness, Dutton did not identify Southeast Asia as an area of contention. While relations with the Pacific have been politicised in Australia since China’s security deal with Solomon Islands in 2022, with each side seeking to position itself as the better guardian of Australia’s security interests in the region, relations with Southeast Asia have not been caught in the whirlwinds of partisan competition. This suggests some degree of continuity.
Whichever party is elected, there are four issues to watch in Australia’s relationships with Southeast Asia.
First is the basic question of attentiveness and focus. Government-to-government cooperation will continue whichever party is elected. But political-level attention is required to keep Australia on the radar and back up the message that it is a reliable partner for the region. On this score, Dutton’s failure in his Lowy Institute speech to mention Southeast Asia suggests that these relationships would not animate his government’s foreign policy to the extent they have under Labor. Revealingly, Dutton did suggest he would make his first overseas visit to the United States, despite the longstanding tradition of new Australian prime ministers to make Jakarta their first bilateral port of call. But it’s worth pointing out that Albanese, too, broke with a similar convention by failing to attend Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s inauguration in October last year.
Depending on how relations with the United States and China evolve, Australia could find in future that its defence and foreign policies are not well received in the region.
Second is the future of the economic strategy, the signature initiative of the Albanese government. Viewed positively, the strategy takes a long-term view (its full title is “Invested: Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040”) and throws real resources at a sticky problem of weak Australian investment and business engagement in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian officials have good awareness of the strategy, and don’t doubt the Albanese government’s sincerity. Yet, while the strategy has drawn attention to the problem, the jury is still out on whether it will change business behaviour. Labor would certainly retain the approach, but it is unclear whether a Coalition government would be equally sold on the benefits.
Third, Australia’s ties with the region are affected by the broader direction of Australian strategic policy. Australia’s participation in minilateral arrangements such as the Quad or its defence technology partnership under AUKUS haven’t been a barrier to improved bilateral ties, almost across the board. But, depending on how relations with the United States and China evolve, Australia could find in future that its defence and foreign policies are not well received in the region, perhaps except in the Philippines. This sense of strategic divergence could limit enthusiasm from both sides, as it did under the Morrison government post-AUKUS announcement.
The last area is Middle East policy. Reputable regional surveys show huge damage to US standing in Muslim majority Southeast Asian countries due to Washington’s support for Israel’s war on Hamas since 7 October 2023. The middle ground position that the Albanese government has tried to stake out has helped insulate Australia’s regional relationships from the politics of the Middle East. Regional relationships will remain a secondary consideration in determining Australia’s Middle East policy settings. Still, it shouldn’t be forgotten that Indonesia and Malaysia reacted negatively to the Morrison government’s announcement, following a decision by the first Trump administration to relocate the US embassy, that Australia would recognise “West Jerusalem” as Israel’s capital.
Ultimately, a Coalition government, if elected, might not share Labor’s zeal for Southeast Asia. But at a time of great uncertainty about Australia’s outlook, it’s likely that it too would ultimately come to prioritise the one constant: Australia’s immediate geographic neighbourhood.