In hindsight, it almost feels inevitable that it ended like this, doesn’t it?
Everything about the UEFA Europa League final, the match, the goal, and the ending, all feel too perfect for the narrative around the entire thing.
The 2025 Europa League final was contested between the 16th and 17th-placed teams in the English Premier League. That itself is a testament to the strength of the English league. Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur finished third and fourth, respectively, in the Europa League’s “League phase.” Both were rightly favored in every round of the knockout rounds, and each took care of business to make it to Bilbao.
These two clubs starkly represent the gulf in class between England and the rest of Europe, especially in Europe’s second-tier competition. United and Spurs’ position in the final was rightly justified, as is their position in the English table.
English opposition is a whole different ballgame, and these two teams have not handled it well. You’d have to go back to mid-February to find a match where either of these teams won against a team that will play in the Premier League next season, when Tottenham defeated Manchester United 1-0.
On Wednesday, they played like two teams that don’t do well against English clubs. The match was about as far away from a classic as Antarctica is from Santa’s workshop (that’s Father Christmas for you folks in the UK).
The game was decided in the most perfect way for these two teams. A single goal scored by Brennan Johnson, well, maybe? The morning after, there are still questions as to whether Johnson got a touch on the ball or if it was an own goal. A goal of this nature being the deciding factor in this match really is *chef’s kiss.*
But the real story of this match surrounds the managers of both clubs.
Amorim’s principles
Coming into the match, the juxtaposition couldn’t be starker. Regardless of the result, Ange Postecoglou is not expected to be managing in North London next season, whereas the opposite is true for his Manchester United counterpart, Ruben Amorim.
Both managers have a reputation for being stubborn and sticking to their principles. Both have very vocally defended this stance in press conferences throughout the season.
However, it was only Amorim that stayed true to their words Wednesday night.
Amorim set the team up in the same 3-4-3 formation he’s used all season, not that anyone expected otherwise. There were some bold calls in his team selection, though dropping Manuel Ugarte and Alejandro Garnacho was not completely unjustified. But on a night when Amorim could have set up the team to win, he opted for conservatism. On a night when he needed more, he never got out of that conservatism.
Only one change was made from the team that lost 1-0 to Chelsea last Friday. That same team managed just four shots and 89 touches in the attacking third. Much of that came from the use of Amad Diallo - the team’s best player not named Bruno Fernandes - starting in one of the number 10 roles, a role that not only wastes his talent but harms the team.
As the 10 Amad would often drift wide to the touchline. This creates space in the more dangerous areas for the wing-back to attack, which is the space you would typically want Amad to attack.
But more importantly, starting Amad as one of the 10’s leaves you with a starting XI with five recognized defenders in your team. Add in a defensive midfielder, and that leaves you with just four attacking players.
One of those attacking players was Mason Mount, someone who could be described as a “defensive attacker.” When asked about Mount’s selection prior to the match, Amorim said “he is one extra midfielder and you know Tottenham put all the full-backs and midfielders inside .”
Those who have watched Spurs this season would know, Ange Postecoglou does not invert his fullbacks. That Amorim was preparing for this is a red flag. It was also a good look into Amorim’s psyche for this match. He was more focused on worrying about Tottenham than he was on putting his best team on the pitch and trying to win the game.
Amorim’s system requires wing-backs who are very good on the ball in the final third. To maximize your chances of winning, you want your best final third creators playing wing back since that position is going to have the ball in the most dangerous positions most often. When you lack dynamic wing-backs, it reduces the amount of touches the no. 10’s get and often result in them pulling out wide in search of the ball, taking them away from where you want them to be.
c: The Transfer Flow
Rather than putting his best (wide) on-ball players in those positions, Amorim instead deployed Amad as a no. 10, and Luke Shaw as the left-sided center back. Shaw is a solid option in that position, but it still takes away what his biggest strengths are (being on the ball in the final third) and asks him to do more of his weaknesses, which reared their head in the worst way on Wednesday. Shaw’s fitness issues certainly wouldn’t allow him to play as a wing-back over a full season, but for one game at the end of the campaign, it should be manageable.
That left the wing-back job to the duo of Patrick Dorgu and Noussair Mazraoui. Dorgu has been raw but very solid defensively. He’s great at carrying the ball forward but lacks the passing ability to truly make the impact needed from the wing back at this level, and Mazraoui doesn’t possess a single attacking bone in his body.
Playing with five defenders has a habit of leaving the team feeling one player short in almost every situation. They get outnumbered at the back, they get outnumbered in midfield. When they get forward in the attack, they always look one number short, with one of the “options” for the passer typically being a defensive player who you do not want to have the ball in that situation. While commenting on the Manchester Derby, NBC Sports commentator Graham Le Saux pointed out several instances of this happening throughout the match. That was in December. The same things are still prevalent six months later.
Playing with only four attacking players makes the job of each of them all the more difficult and reduces the chances of them playing to their best output. Once again, United struggled to generate any attack. At halftime, they had mustered just five shots for 0.22 xG, a paltry 0.04 xG per shot.
But Amorim persisted. His first change came after 70 minutes and was a like-for-like switch, sticking with the system and hoping different players would just bring about better results. 15 minutes later, he finally removed Mazraoui, only to replace him with another defender in Diogo Dalot. While Dalot for Mazraoui is a move in the right direction, it’s still along the lines of going from a minivan to a Toyota Camry while you’re trying to win a race that features Ferraris.
That Kobbie Mainoo wasn’t brought on until there were two minutes left was the perfect summation of the evening.
Personally, I’m still not sure whether Mainoo is best in the base of a midfield or further forward. He’s far from the finished product and still needs to develop his passing ability if he’s ever going to be a top midfielder at this level.
What I am sure of is he’s one of the most naturally talented players to come out of United’s academy in the last decade. Despite not knowing exactly what he is, he’s already made a habit of coming up with big goals in big moments time and time again.
On a night when you needed your special players to come up with something special, Amorim chose the system. It’s a stark look at how he views the games, that the system is more important than the talent.
Amorim’s failing could be perfectly summed up in this sequence in the 94th minute. With United throwing everything forward and desperately searching for a goal, an under pressure Bruno Fernandes needs an outlet ball. He has one in the form of a ball out wide to Alejandro Garnacho.
This is the failure. This is where you would want your left back to be. This is where you want to have a left footer who, with one touch, can get the ball halfway into the box and be in position to whip in a dangerous cross.
But Amorim’s system doesn’t allow for that. Instead, that left-footed fullback is tucked inside in the half space. Out wide is your right-footed number 10.
Flipping this around might not yield a better result, but it probably creates a more dangerous opportunity. In the mad scramble that was stoppage time, United only created one legitimate chance, a header by Luke Shaw. The fullback. That’s not who you want to be creating your chances for.
Just before stoppage time, Amorim finally removed one of his defenders. For nearly 90 minutes, United chased a goal with five defenders on the pitch. Ruben Amorim never wavered from his principles.
Big game Ange
In the other dugout, there was Ange Postecoglou. Ange-ball is all about constantly using an aggressive press and never stopping the attack.
On Wednesday night, Ange’s Spurs toned down the press and then stopped attacking.
The first half was a slog befitting of two teams who have not been able to handle English opposition. Spurs got their breakthrough just before halftime. Ange-ball dictates that you wouldn’t stop at one, you’d continue going in search of a second.
Rather than play the system, Ange played the occasion. More specifically, he played the opponent.
Spurs came out for the second half and stopped attacking completely. The North London side didn’t attempt a single shot in the second half of the match. They stopped pressing United. Spurs average 9.09 passes per defensive action (PPDA) in the Premier League this season; on Wednesday, that number was 13 (below the Premier League average). They let United have the ball and all the territory.
This is, almost always, a horrible way of going about things. Letting the opposition have the ball and freely attack you for 45 minutes is asking for trouble, and just a few weeks ago, United found out firsthand what typically happens when you ask for trouble. But against this specific opponent, it’s far from a bad idea.
There have been effective ways of playing against Manchester United this season, but without a question, the most effective way has been to just let United have the ball and park yourselves near your own box.
United finished the match with 72 percent of the possession and a field tilt of 77.1 percent - their highest totals against any English opponent this season. Per Mark Stats, the 80th percentile in field tilt is 58.95. This season, United have played seven Premier League matches where they’ve had a field tilt of at least 58.95. Their record in those matches is 0 wins, 1 draw, 6 losses.
This includes their recent matches against West Ham, Wolves, Nottingham Forest, and their draw against Bournemouth, thanks to a scrappy late goal on one of the final kicks of the game. In all these games, as soon as United went behind, their opponents just let them have the ball, and United weren’t able to do anything with it.
Rather than trying to win the trophy “his way,” Ange Postecoglou picked the best strategy for his opponents. United had all the ball in the second half, but only managed 11 shots for 0.75 xG in the second half (0.06 xG per shot). They never created any sustainable threat, with their best opportunity coming on a broken play off a set piece when their goalkeeper was far off his line.
Wednesday night came down to one thing. Ange Postecoglou broke away from his principles. Ruben Amorim, as is often the case, never did.