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From Passion to Portfolio: How SWFs are Turning Sports Clubs into a New Asset Class

ByWinston Ma,GPIFF Executive Directorand Adjunct Professor, NYU School of Law

In June 2025, the Los Angeles Lakers, one of the most iconic franchises in global sports, was sold for arecord-breaking $10 billion. The buyer, Mark Walter—already a stakeholder in the Los Angeles Dodgers and Chelsea FC—executed the deal through TWG Global. The firm recently secured a multi-billion-dollar investment alliance from Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Capital, a subsidiary of Mubadala Investment Company, the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) of the UAE.

While theNBA limits a single SWF’s direct ownership of a basketball team to 5%, Mubadala has acquired significant indirect exposure to TWG’s sports assets, including the Lakers. This reflects a growing trend: SWFs are reshaping the sports investment landscape, often with direct ownership in headline deals, and now increasingly through strategic partnerships and indirect stakes to avoid ownership restrictions and potential political sensitivities.

The big picture is that sports teams, especially elite football (soccer) and basketball clubs, have undergone a remarkable transformation over the past two decades. Once dominated by wealthy individuals and family offices, ownership of sports franchises is now increasingly driven by institutional capital like SWFs.

This article explores why sports teams were not previously seen as institutional-grade investments, how SWFs have catalyzed their evolution, the impact of digital media and infrastructure, and what the future holds as SWFs reshape the landscape of global sports ownership.

Why Sports Teams Weren’t Previously Viewed as an Asset Class

Historically, sports teams were seen as "trophy assets,” purchased more for prestige and emotional satisfaction than for financial gain. Sports team ownership was driven by this prestige, patriotism, or personal passion. Wealthy individuals or families, like the Buss family with the Lakers, often held onto teams for decades, viewing them as legacy assets rather than financial investments.

Several factors contributed to this perception:

Opaque Financial Structures: Many teams lacked transparent accounting, making it difficult to assess profitability or long-term value. Financial disclosures were rare, and debt levels were often unsustainable.

Limited Revenue Streams: Before the digital era, club income was largely confined to ticket sales, local broadcasting rights, and merchandise. A single bad season could create significant revenue volatility.

Illiquidity of club ownership: The pool of potential buyers was small, usually limited to ultra-wealthy individuals or corporations. League restrictions on ownership transfers further constrained liquidity.

In short, sports teams in the past lacked the financial stability, transparency, and liquidity that institutional investors require.

SWFs Enter the Arena: from Passive Allocators to Active Owners

Sovereign wealth funds—state-backed investment vehicles—manage an enormous amount of long-term capital. Their match with sports teams has been driven by two important trends that are reinforcing each other.

First, the value of elite sports clubs has soared at an unprecedented rate (thanks to the SWFs’ participation, to a large extent). Top franchises across the NBA, Premier League, and global football have seen their valuations multiply several times over (see Table 1), often outpacing major stock indices. This explosive growth in club values means related investments have become capital-intensive, paving the way for large SWFs’ club ownership acquisitions.

Second, SWFs have shaken off their traditional, passive investor roles and stepped intothe vanguard of direct investing, from real estate to infrastructure, from high tech to sports clubs. Theirample resources, preference for lower profile, long time horizons and adherence to sustainability make them the perfect shareholders and strategic partners for tech startup founders. As shown in Table 2, SWFs (especially those from the Middle East) have emerged as major players in the global sports investment arena.

Table 2: Major Recent Billion-Dollar Football Club Deals by Middle East SWFs

SWFs have recalibrated sports ownership models by addressing historical weaknesses. First, their investments provide exit opportunities for traditional owners, increasing market liquidity and facilitating secondary transactions (more on this later). Second, they have initiated post-investment club governance overhauls, such as replacing opaque decision-making with PE-style management teams and instituting more data-driven operations.

The Breakthrough: Digital Transformation and Globalization

The digital revolution has fundamentally altered the economics of sports teams, creatingmultiple avenues for value creation. SWFs and their portfolio of sport teams are at the forefront of this shift, from direct-to-consumer content to immersive fan experiences. It’s a whole new ball game.

A prime example is Qatar Investment Authority’s (QIA) ownership of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) through its subsidiary Qatar Sports Investments (QSI). Since being acquired in 2011, PSG hasshifted toward global brand building and digital innovation, leveragingsocial media, e-commerce, proprietary streaming platforms, and exclusive content. Today, over 60% of PSG’s commercial revenue comes from digital channels, such as VR and other state-of-the-art content creation and distribution.

PSG (and many clubs like Newcastle United) has also invested heavily insmart stadiums equipped with digital payment systems, mobile apps, and real-time analytics. These upgrades allow for an enhanced fan experience and higher revenue per visit, while also enabling sophisticated data collection and monetization. With emerging AI technologies, the club is poised to deliver personalized, automated fan engagement at scale. PSG was also an early adopter of digital assets,launching fan tokens and NFTs, and illustrating the growing integration ofWeb3 technologies into sports monetization models.

The Soft Power: Why SWFs See Strategic Value in Sports

SWFs are also drawn to sports forstrategic reasons. The elite clubs present investment opportunities with unique synergies between global teams and Middle East markets. With the sports industry booming with younger populations in the Gulf, SWFs could help foreign sports clubs to design and execute innovative value-enhancing strategies in the region.

Investments in sports teams also cultivate soft power and diplomacy, offering geopolitical influence and cultural capital. Qatar’s QSI, established in 2005 as a long-term sports investment vehicle, reinvests profits into Qatar’s sport, leisure, and entertainment sectors. Its acquisition of PSG, beyond financial return, was central to the country’s broader strategy that culminated in hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) acquired Newcastle United in 2021 for approximately $400 million as part of a wider effort to align global investments and domestic industries. In 2023, PIF established SRJ Sports Investments to acquire and develophigh-growth sports assets in Saudi Arabia and the MENA region. These initiatives reflect PIF’s ambition to position the Kingdom as a global sports hub and its bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup.

Navigating Scrutiny: Acquiring Sports Ownership Amid Escalating Regulations

The influx of institutional capital (especially SWF capital from foreign governments that have “strategic” agenda) into professional sports leagues remains in its early stages. In response, leagues have established regulatory safeguards to mitigate risks, particularly from foreign government-backed entities seeking ownership stakes.

For example, U.S. sports leagues have implemented strict regulations and ownership limits. In 2023, QIA became thefirst SWF to invest in a major U.S. professional sports franchise, acquiring a roughly 5% stake in Monumental Sports & Entertainment (parent company of the Mystics, Wizards, and Capitals). This followed theNBA and WNBA’s 2022 policy revision allowing passive, non-controlling minority investments by institutional investors, including SWFs — capped at 30% total, with no more than 20% from any single SWF.

Despite these limits, SWF involvement is drawing increased scrutiny from the U.S. Government. The proposed PGA Tour and Saudi-backed LIV Golf merger, for example, is actively being investigated by the Department of Justice forpotential antitrust violations. While members of Congress haverequested a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review,legal experts suggest that, antitrust concerns (not national security concerns) are the main legal hurdle, much to the relief of global golfers.

Due to this regulatory resistance, SWFs are expected to focus on minority stakes or indirect investments in the near term. Still, their investments play a critical role in making sports clubs an asset class with sufficient liquidity. Many private equity funds are interested in sports clubs, but if their investments are limited to minority stakes by league rules, thenthey need exit options to generate liquidity for LPs. Thanks to their long time horizons, SWFs can provide that liquidity, supporting a stronger secondary market and boosting investor confidence in the asset class.

Pension Funds Entering the Game? Sports Clubs Becoming Infrastructure-Like Assets

The transformation of sports teams into institutional-grade assets is accelerating. SWFs have led this shift, and pension funds are likely to follow, drawn by the growing maturity of the asset class and its resemblance to long-duration, inflation-protected infrastructure assets.

Stable, Predictable Cash Flows: Despite economic cycles, sports franchises often exhibit resilient revenue streams, driven by long-term media contracts, sponsorship deals, and digital subscriptions, generating contracted, inflation-linked income like toll roads or utilities.

Scarcity of Supply: Elite sports leagues carefullycontrol their expansion processes. They operate with high barriers to entry as natural monopolies or oligopolies, creating a scarcity of franchises available for acquisition like regulated infrastructure.

Monopoly Characteristicsand Pricing Power: Top leagues control "best-in-class" global IP with limited competition, akin to regulated infrastructure. Theytightly control their intellectual property and enjoy significant pricing power.

Diversification amid Geopolitical Uncertainty: Sports franchise valuations have historically shown low correlation with broader equity and bond markets. In times of geopolitical tension or economic volatility, these assets offer portfolio diversification benefits. Their resilience was evident during the pandemic, when clubs with strong digital platforms maintained revenue streams even without live games.

Conclusion

Once passion projects for eccentric billionaires or symbols of national pride, sports teams have transformed into institutional-grade assets. By leveraging their capital, patience, and strategic vision, SWFs are professionalizing sports ownership, expanding global reach, and unlocking new value streams. While regulatory and geopolitical hurdles remain, landmark SWF investments in PSG, Newcastle United, and the Lakers demonstrate that sports can be both a powerful financial investment and a soft power engine. The $10 billion Lakers sale is not an anomaly but a reflection of a broader trend: a new wave of strategic, indirect SWF investments in major sports franchises.

About the Contributor

Winston Ma, CFA and Esq. is the Executive Director ofGlobal Public Investment Funds Forum andAdjunct Professor of NYU School of Law, and he is the authorofThe Hunt for Unicorns: How Sovereign Funds Are Reshaping Investment in the Digital Economy. Most recently for 10 years, he was Managing Director and Head of North America Office for China Investment Corporation (CIC), China’s sovereign wealth fund. Prior to that, Mr. Ma served as the deputy head of equity capital markets at Barclays Capital, a vice president at J.P. Morgan investment banking, and a corporate lawyer at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. In 2022-2024, he was the board chairman of Nasdaq-listed MCAA, which announcedits merger with the digital media unit of FCB (Football Club Barcelona) in August 2023.

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