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The chapter of errors, part IV: 15 biggest mistakes by the Milwaukee Bucks (2002–2025)

**6\. The Chinese Dragon turned into a lizard: drafting Yi Jianlian with the 6th Pick (2007)**

A year before drafting Joe Alexander, the Bucks made another draft blunder—only this one had a global dimension. In 2007, riding on the success of Yao Ming in the NBA, more and more clubs looked greedily at the Chinese market and Chinese talent (also, see Jang Hansen 2025). As luck would have it, Yi Jianlian declared for the draft—a 19-year-old (allegedly) power forward, standing 7’0”, who could also play center, with a decent mid-range shot. The Chinese press hailed him as Yao’s successor, even though he played a different position—because the hype in China was enormous: Yi dominated the youth CBA league, had athleticism and a skillset rarely seen in Chinese big men. US analysts, however, had many doubts: firstly—the level of the Chinese league was difficult to compare with NCAA or Europe; secondly—Yi was reluctant to showcase himself to scouts. His agent (the famous Dan Fegan) was selective: Yi conducted private workouts only for chosen top clubs from large cities (LA, Chicago, Boston), and others—including Milwaukee—were deliberately not invited. Indeed, Yi’s camp openly warned against drafting him if you were a small market. The guy didn’t want to end up in a place without a Chinese community and where he wouldn’t benefit marketing-wise. Milwaukee was probably at the top of the “undesirable” list—small city, cold, no Asian community.

The Bucks, however, had a different perspective. They had the #6 pick and needed a talented big man. In that draft, top prospects were Greg Oden, Kevin Durant (obviously out of reach), then Al Horford, Mike Conley, Jeff Green—those five went before Milwaukee. Yi and a few others remained (Joakim Noah, Corey Brewer, Brandan Wright). Most American experts predicted the Bucks should take Noah—a fresh two-time NCAA champion from Florida, an energizer, a defender, an ideal partner for Bogut under the basket. Noah, however, had a colorful personality and some offensive shortcomings; perhaps they feared trouble. There was also a rumor that the Bucks owner, Senator Herb Kohl, saw a marketing opportunity in Yi—after all, having the second Chinese player after Yao in the NBA meant potential access to millions of fans in Asia, sponsorship contracts, etc. Legend has it that for the draft, the Bucks even hired a Chinese translator and had everything figured out on how to sell Milwaukee to Chinese fans.

And so they picked Yi Jianlian with the 6th pick. Reactions: Chinese media went wild with joy, American media—with a mix of surprise and mockery. Indeed, Yi and his agent were not thrilled. A telenovela began: Yi Jianlian for over two months refused to sign a contract with the Bucks. His side argued that Milwaukee “did not meet his basketball and marketing needs.” The Bucks sent a delegation to China to convince him—Senator Kohl himself went, reportedly meeting with representatives of the Chinese federation and Yi’s club. It was even said that NBA authorities had to quietly pressure them because the situation was dangerous (if Yi had backed out, it would have been a precedent for a foreign player’s rebellion). Ultimately, in late August 2007, Yi relented and signed the contract. A sigh of relief and success was declared: the Bucks have their dragon!

Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the dragon was more of a lizard. Yi started the season decently—Skiles (the coach) even gave him significant minutes as a power forward alongside Bogut. He had flashes: in December, he was even named Rookie of the Month once (20 pts and 7 reb in December—mainly due to one big game of 29 pts against the Knicks). He also had a duel with Yao Ming, a highly publicized game televised to China, where Yi scored 19 points and grabbed 9 rebounds—impressive for a rookie (although the Rockets still won, and Yao had his own numbers). Chinese fans followed Yi’s every move; the Bucks’ viewership in China soared—at one point, it was said that 200 million people watched the Bucks-Rockets game in China! Marketing success, seemingly.

But sportingly—a flop. Yi looked worse with each passing month. His stats: he finished the season with averages of 8.6 points, 5.2 rebounds, 42% shooting, and a dismal 29% from three. After the All-Star break, he faded (as rookies from other continents often do). He also sustained a wrist injury, missing many games. His defense was poor; he was easily pushed around (he weighed perhaps 240 lbs at 7’0”), and on offense, he liked the mid-range but did nothing exceptionally. Such a reminder that Bucks had young Ersan İlyasova (from the 2005 draft)—although Ersan was still in Europe then, when he returned a year later, he proved to be better than Yi.

And here’s a curious fact: Milwaukee stuck with Yi… for only one year. After his rookie season, they decided to cut their losses and, using his residual hype, traded him. In the summer of 2008, the Bucks traded Yi Jianlian and Bobby Simmons to the New Jersey Nets for Richard Jefferson. This was a “win now” move—Jefferson was supposed to bring experience and scoring (which he partly did). New Jersey, meanwhile, wanted to tap into the Chinese market, so they eagerly took Yi. For the Bucks, this was essentially an admission of error quite quickly. Yi himself played a bit more for the Nets for two seasons (11 pts and 6 reb in 2009/10—nothing great), then had brief stints with the Wizards and Mavericks before disappearing from the NBA after four years. The Chinese Kevin Durant—as he was maliciously called—turned out to be a bust. There was a lot of controversy regarding his age: some sources discovered that he might have been 2-3 years older than reported (allegedly born in 1987, but school documents suggested 1984). If true, the Bucks, by drafting him at age 19, were actually taking a 22-year-old—a smaller margin for development. To this day, it remains a mystery (though after returning to China, Yi played long and well, so who knows about that age).

Looking at who they could have had in 2007: Joakim Noah (#9), Thaddeus Young (#12)—a solid forward for over a decade, Al Thornton (#14)—he was also a bust, Rodney Stuckey (#15)—a decent combo guard, Nick Young (#16)—a shooter, Marc Gasol (#48)—the biggest steal, though no one drafted him that high because he was heavy then, but still an All-Star and DPOY in his career. And in the top 10 were Horford (#3) and Conley (#4), but they went earlier. Would Noah have been better for the Bucks? Probably yes, because he became a 2x All-Star, DPOY, the heart of the Bulls. Imagine a Noah-Bogut frontcourt—defensively superb, though offense would have suffered. But they probably would have traded him in the future anyway, doesn’t matter.

The fact is, Yi Jianlian is one of the biggest draft blunders for the Bucks because they picked him somewhat against their own instinct (the agent says “no,” they say “oh yes, we will!”) and against perhaps better available talents. They naively hoped to find another Dirk Nowitzki (since he’s white, tall with a shot, why not), and they got another Nikoloz Tskitishvili (who remembers—bust #5 from 2002). The only plus—thanks to this story, the Bucks became popular in China for a year. But what good was that if it didn’t translate into wins?

Yi lands at number 6 on our list—because although statistically slightly better than Joe Alexander, the expectations and turmoil surrounding him were so immense that the scale of disappointment was equally huge. To this day, older Bucks fans recall with a smirk: “We could have had Noah, but we took the guy who dueled with a chair”. The Bucks learned then that the draft is not the place to build a fan base in Asia—here, you need to pick players who want to play for you and fit the team.

**5\. The pick went up in smoke: the disastrous Greivis Vásquez trade (2015)**

Some mistakes are so incomprehensible that fans still scratch their heads asking, “Seriously, did that happen?” Here’s one of them. The 2015 Draft, Barclays Center, Brooklyn. The Bucks are fresh off their aforementioned successful 41-41 season, have a young team, and a first-round pick, around number 17. With such a pick, you’re usually hunting for a prospect to develop, maybe a shooter, maybe a big man—plenty of options. Suddenly, news of a trade breaks: the Milwaukee Bucks are trading their first-round pick (#17) and a second-round pick (#46) to the Toronto Raptors, in exchange for point guard Greivis Vásquez.

Bucks fans: consternation. Greivis Vásquez? That tall Venezuelan guard from the Raptors? Toronto would surely be happy to get rid of him, as they already had Kyle Lowry and younger players. Vásquez, yes, was a decent backup—a few years earlier he had a flash in New Orleans (even averaged 9 assists per game as a starter), but in 2015 his form was already declining, and he lost some minutes with the Raptors. And for him, we’re giving away pick #17 and #46? What the hell…

Unfortunately, it wasn’t a dream. GM John Hammond decided that the Bucks needed an experienced backup point guard and overpaid like a hired hand. Greivis Vásquez landed in Milwaukee, where he was supposed to provide shooting and playmaking off the bench. In theory, he fit the backup role behind Michael Carter-Williams (he could shoot threes, which MCW couldn’t). But reality can be cruel: Vásquez played just 23 games for the Bucks, performing poorly (6 points, 38% from the field), then underwent ankle surgery and… never played for Milwaukee again. In the next season, he tried with the Nets, but again injuries—that was essentially the end of Greivis’s career. So the Bucks traded two picks for 23 games of a mediocre backup.

Alright, what about those picks? Well, here’s the rub: the Toronto Raptors extracted true gifts from Milwaukee. They used pick #46 in 2015 to draft Norman Powell—a dynamic shooting guard who became a valuable rotation player (he shined in his debut, then developed and was an important backup in the Raptors’ 2019 championship run, now a solid scorer averaging over 15 points per game). Even worse—or rather, better for the Raptors—was what they did with pick #17 in 2015. Right after the trade in 2015, the Raptors didn’t use it immediately—it was a protected pick (reportedly a Clippers pick that Milwaukee had previously acquired, with a future realization if it fell appropriately). In any case, in the 2017 draft, the Bucks’ pick (which fell to #23) was used by the Raptors to select OG Anunoby. And OG, as we know today, is one of the best wing defenders in the league, a heck of a player—in 2023, he was even close to the league lead in steals, a consistently solid starter (approx. 15 pts, 5 reb per game, plus elite defense), and was talked about as an All-Defensive Team candidate. So the Raptors got two significant players (Powell and Anunoby), while the Bucks got—nothing.

This trade is often ridiculed even in league-wide rankings of the worst trades of the decade. Greivis Vásquez himself admitted years later that he felt embarrassed to have been traded for such a price. In one interview, he said: “It’s not that I was worth it. It’s just that the Raptors played it well”—obviously appreciating Masai Ujiri (Toronto’s GM), who outsmarted Milwaukee like children. To this day, it’s incomprehensible: why did the Bucks want Vásquez so badly? Other guards were available on the market for cheaper. Did Kidd want him because he liked tall backcourts? Or did Hammond believe Greivis would be the missing piece?

It must be added in context: that summer of 2015 was also when the Bucks tried to make an “accelerated leap”—they signed a large contract with Greg Monroe (not the 10th biggest mistake, because Monroe played well for a year, but didn’t fit the style, that’s another matter), they just acquired Vásquez—generally, they expected to be a strong playoff team. It didn’t work out; the 2015/16 season was disappointing. And assets went to waste.

In our list, this mistake is top 5—specifically, place 5—because it represents the height of poor asset management. You trade the future (picks) for the present, but the present yields nothing. In a casino, they’d say: you lost twice. Powell and OG Anunoby would have been very useful for the Bucks in later years (Powell, for example, played great against them in the 2019 series against the Raptors; OG was injured then, but in 2021, they lacked such a wing). Instead, they had the memory of Vásquez in a green jersey.

It’s also an example of how one small move can hurt for years. When the Raptors celebrated their title in 2019, the Bucks had already been eliminated—and on the podium stood Norman Powell with the trophy and OG (though he didn’t play in the Finals, he received a trophy), both likely thanking Milwaukee for their generosity. And Bucks fans? They’re left with black humor: “If you ever face a decision whether to give away something valuable for next to nothing—think of this trade. And don’t do it.”

**4\. “Brogdon? No, thank you” – letting go (not paying) Malcolm Brogdon (2019)**

Sometimes an NBA club misjudges its priorities and pays for it with a drop in quality. This happened in the summer of 2019 with the Milwaukee Bucks and Malcolm Brogdon. This case is all the more painful because it concerns a very well-liked player, and the background was cost-saving—something fans hate to see at the expense of sporting success.

Let’s recall: Malcolm Brogdon came to the Bucks in 2016 as an underrated rookie from the second round (pick #36). It quickly became clear that he was a draft steal—in his very first season, Brogdon won the 2017 Rookie of the Year award (which is unprecedented for a second-round pick). He didn’t impress with athleticism, but with intelligence, composure, and versatility. In subsequent years, he became an important piece of the puzzle: capable of playing both point guard and shooting guard alongside Giannis and Middleton. He was known for incredible efficiency—in the 2018/19 season, he joined the elite 50-40-90 club (over 50% from the field, 40% from three, 90% from the free-throw line). Brogdon did many small things: smart defense, hitting open threes, driving to the basket (nickname “President”—because he was serious and balanced).

Unfortunately, in 2019, the Bucks reached the conference finals and lost to the Raptors, and Brogdon, due to a foot injury, missed a significant part of those playoffs (he returned only for the Toronto series, but off the bench). In the summer of 2019, he became a restricted free agent. Milwaukee had a problem of riches: almost the entire roster needed new contracts. Giannis was still on his old contract, but Middleton expected a max (he got 5 years/$178M), Brook Lopez a new deal (he got 4 years/$52M), plus role players. The owners clearly signaled: we can exceed the tax threshold, but no extravagances. The mistake was that they considered keeping Brogdon an “extravagance.”

The Bucks had Brogdon’s Bird rights; they could match any offer. Brogdon was expecting around $20M annually—a lot, but given his quality, not surprising. Meanwhile, the Bucks had quietly agreed on a plan before the free agency window opened: they would send Brogdon to the Indiana Pacers in a sign-and-trade for a draft pick and two second-rounders (something like “better something than nothing”). The Pacers, of course, gladly gave him 4 years/$85M. Milwaukee received a 2020 first-round pick (which ultimately was quite low, #24—it eventually became R.J. Hampton in other trades, effectively nothing).

In this way, the Bucks chose Eric Bledsoe over Brogdon. Because it’s worth mentioning—in March 2019 (a few months earlier), they made another questionable decision: they gave Bledsoe (who was having a great regular season) a 4-year/$70M extension, right before the playoffs. Then, in the playoffs, Bledsoe disappointed again (shot terribly against the Raptors), and Brogdon—though returning from injury—played well. It seemed clear: Bledsoe was an offensive problem, Brogdon would be useful. However, the contract had already gone to Bledsoe, and that likely made them unwilling to spend on expensive Brogdon financially. The result: the Bucks kept the cheaper Bledsoe, let Brogdon go. The money added up, the talent not so much.

The 2019/20 season showed the consequences. Yes, Milwaukee still dominated the regular season (best NBA record). But something was missing—Brogdon’s shooting and playmaking. Bledsoe still defended excellently, but offensively, he remained limited (inaccurate shot, poor decisions). In the 2020 playoffs, disaster struck—a second-round loss to the Miami Heat (4-1). One of the key reasons was the lack of a third reliable shooter and ballhandler besides Giannis and Middleton. Bledsoe played a terrible series (averaging 11 points, 33% from the field, left wide open on the perimeter). More than one fan whispered: “Brogdon would be useful now…” Brogdon in Indiana also got eliminated in the bubble (against Miami in the 1st round, the Pacers were swept), but he actually played well (averaging 21 points and 10 assists in that series—he clearly could perform against the Heat).

Overall, Brogdon in the Pacers showed a new level as a primary point guard: in his first season, he averaged 7.1 assists, which in the Bucks with Giannis probably wouldn’t have been needed as much, but he could handle the scoring load. His three-point shooting efficiency dropped (because he took more difficult shots), but in the Bucks, he would have had easier looks and probably still kept his 40% from three.

However, the biggest price the Bucks paid was a year later. Although they won the coveted championship in 2021, the path could have been easier if Brogdon had been on the roster. In the 2021 Conference Finals against Atlanta, Giannis sprained his knee and missed two games—Middleton and Holiday managed, but extra help wouldn’t have hurt. And in the Finals against Phoenix—they won 4-2, Holiday was phenomenal defensively, but inconsistent offensively. Having Brogdon as an additional option then? A dream.

Of course, there’s no room for complaint—they won the championship, helped by a player they brought in for Bledsoe and picks (Jrue Holiday). However, notice that this is why they had to spend huge draft capital—because Bledsoe didn’t meet expectations, he had to be traded (plus 2 first-round picks and a swap) for Holiday. If they had kept Brogdon and, say, moved forward with him and a cheaper guard instead of Bledsoe? Maybe they wouldn’t have had to give up so much. But Holiday is a top defender and leader, so ultimately, it was worthwhile.

Nevertheless, the belief persists in Milwaukee to this day that letting go of Brogdon was a purely cost-saving move that almost cost them the title. The owners did avoid the tax in 2020 (Brogdon would have pushed them deep into it), but in 2021, they paid a lot anyway with Holiday. And fans felt disappointed because Malcolm was a favorite and fit the organization’s culture perfectly: intelligent, humble, hardworking—a true team player. He was even a spiritual leader in the locker room.

Years later, one can say: okay, we managed without him. But as a list of the biggest mistakes, this is high up, because at that moment—first, we didn’t know Holiday would come (that only emerged a year later), second, 2020 was a disaster—it seemed tragic. Many analysts pointed to Brogdon’s absence as one of the main reasons why the Bucks struggled in the playoffs. What’s more, he probably would have stayed if the Bucks had simply written the check. The Pacers gladly gave him what he wanted. And Milwaukee even defended the decision, emphasizing “we want to give Donte DiVincenzo a bigger role” (Brogdon was only a 2nd rounder anyway, easy to find a successor?). Donte was solid, but not in the same class.

So, place 4 on our list—not because Brogdon became a superstar elsewhere (because he didn’t, though he won Sixth Man of the Year in Boston in 2023), but because the Bucks weakened themselves at a moment when they were a step away from the Finals. It’s rare to see a 60-win team trade one of its top 3 players, and a young one at that, without a real replacement, just to avoid paying. Those few million in tax could have cost them dearly. Maybe it didn’t, because Giannis and co. managed with Holiday a year later. But imagine if Giannis hadn’t signed his extension in December 2020 (it was rumored he wanted to see if the club was all-in—letting go of Brogdon was hardly an all-in move). If Giannis had left in 2021 then—the Brogdon case would have been talked about until the end of time.

Phew, they avoided the worst, but the stain remained. Brogdon, by the way, admitted he wanted to stay in Milwaukee but didn’t get an offer. He packed his bags for Indiana with a heavy heart. For a player who gave so much, it must have been upsetting.

In Bucksland, many people to this day would have preferred Bledsoe to leave in the summer of 2019 and Brogdon to stay. Finances, however, are a powerful argument, and unfortunately, fans sometimes witness such unpleasant decisions.

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